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This PhD dissertation is about legal fictions in private law. A legal fiction, broadly, is a 
false assumption knowingly relied upon by the courts. The main aim of the dissertation is 
to formulate a test for which fictions should be accepted and which rejected. Subsidiary 
aims include a better understanding of the fiction as a device and of certain individual 
fictions, past and present.   
This research is undertaken, primarily, to establish a rigorous system for the treatment of 
fictions in English law – which is lacking. Secondarily, it is intended to settle some 
intractable disputes, which have plagued the scholarship. These theoretical debates have 
hindered progress on the practical matters which affect litigants in the real world.  
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is a historical study of 
common-law fictions. The conclusions drawn thereform are the foundation of the 
acceptance test for fictions. The second chapter deals with the theoretical problems 
surrounding the fiction. Chiefly, it seeks precisely to define ‘legal fiction’, a recurrent 
problem in the literature. A solution, in the form of a two-pronged definition, is proposed, 
adding an important element to the acceptance test. The third chapter analyses modern-day 
fictions and recommends retention or abolition for each fiction. In the fourth chapter, the 
findings hitherto are synthesised into a general acceptance test for fictions. This test, which 
is the thesis of this work, is presented as a flowchart.  
It is the author’s hope that this project will raise awareness as to the merits and demerits of 
legal fictions, de-mystify the debate and bring about reform.    
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A legal fiction, for present purposes, is a false assumption a court knowingly relies upon. 
The maxim that ‘Everybody knows the law’ is an example of a legal fiction.1 As a statement 
of fact, the maxim is evidently false. Not even lawyers or judges know all the law. And 
yet, courts apply it, as if it were true, with the result that ignorance of the law is no defence.2 
We therefore say that the maxim is a legal fiction. 
To better understand our subject, let us consider the case of one Richard Bailey, who, in 
the year 1800, learned about legal fictions the hard way.3 His case is particularly illustrative 
of the maxim that ‘Everybody knows the law’, for Mr Bailey was not merely ignorant of 
the law: he could not possibly know it. The facts were as follows. In May 1799, Parliament 
passed an Act, creating a new offence.4 In June 1799, Mr Bailey committed this offence. It 
so happened that during this period Bailey was on a ship sailing the high seas. It was 
practically impossible for news of the change in the law to have reached him. That was his 
defence at trial. But these protestations of ignorance fell on deaf ears. Ignorance was no 
defence. Everybody knew the law and so did Bailey, who was duly convicted. The 
punishment for the offence was death.5   
* * * 
Bailey’s mortal experience with fictions shows that the subject of our inquiry is not 
theoretical. Legal fictions decide real cases and affect real people. The fiction may not be 
real, but the result is as real as life and death. What if the reader should find himself or 
herself, like Bailey, the victim of a legal fiction? Even where life and limb are not at risk, 
                                                          
1 1 Hale PC, ch 6, 42; 4 Bl Comm, ch 2, V, 27; Carter v Mclaren & Co (1870-75) LR 2 Sc 120 (HL) 125 
(Lord Chelmsford); Cooper v Simmons (1862) 7 Hurl&N 707, 158 ER 654 (Exchequer) 658 (Pollock CB).  
2 Today the maxim applies only when a person is accused of wrongdoing. A mistake of law does not bar 
recovery: Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 371, 375 (Lord Goff), 405ff (Lord 
Hope); Pankhania v Hackney LBC [2002] EWHC 2441 (Ch), [2002] NPC 123 [57] (Rex Tedd QC). 
3 R v Bailey (1800) Russ&Ry 1, 168 ER 651 (Crown Cases Reserved). 
4 The offence was ‘maliciously shooting’. It had originally been enacted by 9 Geo I c 22 (1723) (‘Black 
Act’), s 1. The Act referred to in the main text extended this offence to the high seas: 39 Geo III c 37 (1799). 




the use of fictions in the law raises serious questions. Can legal fictions be justified? Why 
do we have them? What is to be done about them? These are the questions that animate 
this research.     
Important though they are, these questions are not the only reasons to study legal fictions. 
For, after all, these questions are not new. Legal fictions are as old as Imperial Rome, where 
one fiction killed a Roman citizen a moment before he was taken prisoner and another 
fiction abolished his captivity upon release.6 Fictions have provoked thinkers throughout 
the ages – some to fury, others to approbation; none, it seems, to indifference. Hale, 
Bentham, Fuller, to name a few, weighed into this controversy, each in his time: the 
Restoration, the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression.7 So why indeed, after two 
millennia, do we ask the same questions?  
This brings us to the state of the scholarship. Fictions are seldom treated as a topic in their 
own right. Just as fictions are incidental to the law, so are they incidental to legal 
commentary – with few notable exceptions.8 Fiction scholarship, such as it is, is beset by 
three challenges. First, scholars have widely divergent definitions of legal fiction. While 
they appear to discuss the same thing, in truth each refers to a somewhat different device, 
though by the common label of ‘fiction’. These different conceptions of the legal fiction, 
which are sometimes implicit, part overlap and part contradict. This breeds confusion and 
impedes debate, which requires agreement on premises. This work will propose a way out 
of this house of mirrors.   
                                                          
6 A captured citizen was considered a slave (of the enemy) and could not own or bequeath property. If he 
died a captive, his inheritance was saved by lex Cornelia, which presumed he had died before capture: 
D35.2.1.1. If he returned, postliminium reinstated him in citizenship and property as if he had not been 
captured (excepting property owned by possession): D49.15.5.1; U23.5.   
7 See chs 2 and 4 herein; for the date of Hale’s contribution, see MJ Prichard and DEC Yale, ‘Introduction’ 
in MJ Prichard and DEC Yale (eds), Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction, vol 108 (Selden 
Society 1993) xviii. 
8 eg Lon L Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press 1967); Pierre JJ Olivier, Legal Fictions in 
Practice and Legal Science (Rotterdam University Press 1975); Maksymilian Del Mar and William 




The second problem with the scholarship is the resolution. It is either too high or too low: 
a particular fiction under the microscope or philosophical disputations about truth, fact and 
fiction. There is scarcely anything in between. An analysis of the role of fictions in an area 
of law is what we need. This work will supply this want.    
The third problem is that the literature is strong on theory and weak on practical advice. It 
is too, dare we say, academic. Fiction scholarship is varied, insightful and, for those so-
inclined, rewarding in intellectual satisfaction. It has certainly enriched the ensuing pages. 
But, for all its wealth, it does not answer the real-world questions of what to do about the 
fictions that exist and under what circumstances to create new ones. This work will answer 
these questions.   
* * * 
This dissertation is a study of legal fictions in English private law. The field of research is 
thus confined to one, albeit broad, area. It is so confined for reasons of practicality, namely 
time, space and the author’s competence. 
The aim of this dissertation is to answer a single practical question. Answering this question 
naturally involves answering many preliminary questions. Yet, everything in these pages 
is directed towards answering the following core question about legal fictions: Which 
fictions should we accept and which reject? The answer to this question is the thesis of 
this project. 
* * * 
We will seek an answer to this core question by doctrinal legal analysis. Unlike many 
doctrinal projects, our mission is not to devise a model that explains existing law.9 Our 
approach does not assume an underlying consistency waiting to be discovered. At present, 
let it be said, there is no set of principles governing fictions. For fiction is the abandonment 
of principle. We wish hereby to offer a new system for dealing with legal fictions. This 
                                                          




system is designed to be as compatible as possible with existing law, but is emphatically 
not a reflection of it. We will describe the law, evaluate it and propose reform. The reform 
is encapsulated in the answer to the core question highlighted above: which fictions to keep 
and which discard.     
The dissertation which follows is divided into four substantive chapters in chronological 
order. The first chapter summarises the extraordinary history of legal fictions in English 
law. The second chapter recounts the history of thought concerning the legal fiction and, 
arriving at the present, tackles the problem of definition. The third chapter analyses 
contemporary fictions in the light of the preceding chapters. The fourth chapter answers 
the core question by proposing a test for which fictions to retain and which to abolish.  
In the course of this journey, traversed in just under 90,000 words, we will encounter 25 
legal fictions, visit several jurisdictions, meet many scholars and take our part in 
intellectual battles. We will heed the anonymous call to arms in the Harvard Law Review 
that ‘the nearly dormant debate over the legal fiction should be reawakened’.10 
* * * 
Incidentally, Mr Bailey was pardoned by George III, on the advice of the judges who had 
tried him.11 The law works in mysterious ways.      
                                                          
10 Anonymous, ‘Lessons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the Law’ (2002) 115 
Harvard LR 2228, 2228. 









As readers of plea rolls, we will have long since learned to be skeptical of the facts 
contained in our documents. Jurisdictional ruses, fictional procedural devices, and 
other non-traversable tricks are familiar … Sometimes we can find comfort in 
thinking that the clerk who entered them did not know precisely what they meant 
either; or we may occasionally seek solace in the possibility – sometimes the sure 
knowledge – that they meant nothing at all. 
         Morris Arnold1 
 
  
                                                          






The common law is a building whose foundations were laid in the High Middle Ages. Legal 
fictions may not have been solid or stable enough to be called foundations, but they were 
certainly building blocks – or at least, as commentators like to say, scaffolding. 2  In 
hindsight, it seems the law would not have been able to answer the changing needs of 
society without them.  
So great a role did fictions play in the development of the common law3 that any study of 
fictions in English law must perforce include an historical dimension. As one historian 
noted, ‘understanding … the abuses which Dickens and others decried in the early 
nineteenth century is impossible without some cognizance of mediaeval forms and the 
elaborate fictions which came to be based upon them’.4 This chapter tells the fascinating, 
at times strange, story of these fictions.   
For our purposes, legal history begins in the twelfth century with the emergence of the 
common law and ends in the mid-nineteenth century with the abolition of the forms of 
action. For ease of reference, I will call this period the ‘Old System’ and fictions that 
developed under it ‘Old Fictions’. The system established by the nineteenth-century 
reforms is the ‘New System’, our system. Fictions existing under it are ‘New Fictions’.    
At the outset, we will set the scene by explaining the procedural conditions that prevailed 
under the Old System. The most important of these, as far as fictions are concerned, were 
the writ system, formal pleading and civil juries. We will then look at a selection of Old 
Fictions, one by one, against the background of these three conditions. We will describe 
                                                          
2 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd edn, Macmillan 1921) 35; Lon L Fuller, 
Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press 1967) 70; Michael Lobban, ‘Legal Fictions before the Age of 
Reform’ in Maksymilian Del Mar and William Twining (eds), LFTP (Springer 2015) 215; Peter Sparkes, 
‘Ejectment: Three Births and a Funeral’ in Del Mar and Twining (n 2) 276; James Lee, ‘Fictions in Tort’ 
in Del Mar and Twining (n 2) 271; cf RA Samek, ‘Fictions and the Law’ (1981) 31 U Toronto LJ 290, 313.  
3 FW Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (AH Chaytor and WJ Whittaker eds, CUP 1965) 79. 





the development of each fiction, how it functioned and how far it effaced the rule that came 
under its attack. Finally, we will ask how the abolition of the forms of action affected Old 
Fictions: did they die, survive or metamorphose?  
Specifically, this chapter will consider eleven Old Fictions: (i) dominus remisit curiam; (ii) 
vi et armis; (iii) geographical fictions; (iv) the bill of Middlesex; (v) the writ of quominus; 
(vi) the benefit of clergy; (vii) pleading the belly; (viii) the common recovery; (ix) trover; 
(x) ejectment; and (xi) quasi-contract. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Such an 
undertaking would require an entire dissertation. The fictions discussed here are a sample 
and have been chosen for their diversity. They illuminate different facets of the Old Fiction 
and help us answer the questions we have posed regarding the development, operation, 
effect and abolition of Old Fictions.  
As we will see, Old Fictions do not submit easily to systematic classification; we attempt 
a taxonomy at our peril. Nevertheless, it is instructive for our purposes to distinguish 
between three broad types. The first type is the ‘Jurisdictional Fiction’. This fiction does 
not affect the substance of any action, but simply which court the action may be brought 
in. It is normally used because a litigant wants to avail himself of a procedure which that 
court offers. The second type is the ‘Auxiliary Fiction’. This type of fiction affects the 
substance of the law, but without disturbing its conceptual basis. Auxiliary Fictions are 
thus mere incantations, legal lip-service, that no lawyer takes seriously as reasons for the 
result of a case. The third type is the Essential Fiction. This title we bestow on fictions 
which affect the substance of the law through doctrine. Unlike Auxiliary Fictions, Essential 
Fictions are seen as a conceptual basis for the result of a case.        
It is contended in this chapter that this typology of Old Fictions is the key to understanding 
how the downfall of the forms of action affected Old Fictions. It is argued that 
Jurisdictional and Auxiliary Fictions disappeared seamlessly, whereas Essential Fictions 




Fictions, which had been harmless (if unprincipled) instruments of justice, became 
obstacles to justice.    
      
II. The Procedural Framework of the Old System 
 
A. The Writ System 
Henry II is credited by legal historians with the foundation of the common law.5 But unlike 
the giants of the legal pantheon – Justinian, Suleiman, Napoleon – the first Plantagenet 
king was no lawgiver. FW Maitland said of his contribution that ‘we may even doubt 
whether he published any one new rule which we should call a rule of substantive law’.6 
He certainly left posterity no code or treatise.7 His legacy, which is rightly revered, was 
administrative: the centralisation of justice in England. Previously, law had depended on 
local custom and been administered in local assemblies or manor courts.8 Centralisation 
was achieved not by laying down the law as such, but by establishing a uniform and 
effective procedural framework for the resolution of disputes.9 This procedural framework 
was the writ system.  
An original writ was a document, written in Latin, on a strap of parchment, about eleven 
inches long, folded and sealed with the tip of the great seal of the realm.10 It was issued by 
the Chancery in the name of the king and addressed to the sheriff of the relevant county.11 
                                                          
5 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward 
I, vol 1 (2nd edn, CUP 1968) 136; GDG Hall (ed), The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England 
commonly called Glanvill (Nelson 1965) xii; William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 1 (AL 
Goodhart and HG Hanbury eds, 7th edn, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell 1969) 4; JH Baker, IELH (4th edn, 
Butterworths 2002) 13.   
6 Pollock and Maitland (n 5) 136. 
7 The treatise known as Glanvill was written during Henry’s reign, but it is the work of an unidentified 
scholar and is not attributed to the king: Hall (n 5) xxx–xxxiii, 3. 
8 John Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol 2 (1st edn, OUP 2012) 276–289. 
9 Holdsworth (n 5) 47–53. 
10 Hastings (n 4) 158; Baker, IELH (n 5) 57. 




The writ was a mark of authority and a symbol of jurisdiction. Hence the expression that 
one’s writ does or does not run somewhere. Certain writs were called ‘original’; not in the 
sense of not being copies, but because they originated an action. The original writ was the 
claimant’s ticket, obtained for a fee, to the royal justice system and had the effect of 
commencing proceedings. Generally speaking, the writ described the substance of the 
claim and demanded either compliance or a defence.12 As such, the writs were the claim 
forms of medieval England.  
Unlike today’s claim form – and this is crucial for our purposes – these writs had set 
wording. The claimant only filled in the blanks: names, places, times, quantities, 
particulars. Each action had its fixed formula.13 Thus, if A sought to recover a debt of £20 
from B, A would commence proceedings by causing a ‘writ of debt’ to be issued. It is a 
testament to the stability of the writ system that the writ of debt was in constant use 
throughout England for six centuries. During this time its operative wording barely 
changed.14 Below is a sample from 1318:  
Edward, by the grace of God, King of England, Lord of Ireland and Duke of 
Aquitaine to the sheriff of X, greeting. Command B that justly and without delay he 
render to A twenty pounds which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he says. And 
if he does not do so, summon the aforesaid B by good summoners to be before me 
or my justices at Westminster on the third Sunday after Easter to show why he has 
not done so. And have there the summoners and this writ. Witness myself at 
Westminster the eighth day of October in the twelfth year of our reign.15 
                                                          
12 The writ of right patent was again exceptional in that it demanded compliance without the option of a 
defence, but in practice a defence could still be mounted.  
13 Trespass on the case was a notable exception: Bernardeston v Heighlynge (1344) B&M 2nd edn 381 
(KB) 383. 
14 For the evolution of the writ of debt, see AWB Simpson, HCLC (Clarendon Press 1987) 54–59. 





Note that in this entire, somewhat august, statement the claimant only ‘contributed’ the 
names, the place and the amount; the rest was template or administrative detail. Even 
though other writs, notably trespass on the case, allowed the claimant greater liberty in 
framing his case, the writ system was essentially about fixed forms of words that 
represented actions in law.     
And so the law grew around the writs. Each writ was a distinct procedure with its own 
rules, pre-trial process, mode of trial and defences. Thus emerged the formulary system 
that has come down to us as ‘the forms of action’. As late as 1824, a barrister described the 
role of writs as follows:  
An original writ … is essential to the due institution of the suit. These instruments 
have consequently had the effect of limiting and defining the right of action itself; 
and no cases are considered as within the scope of judicial remedy, in the English 
law, but those to which the language of some known writ is found to apply … The 
enumeration of writs, and that of actions, have become, in this manner, identical.16  
Many a worthy plaintiff lost a case because he chose the wrong writ – and in borderline or 
novel cases the choice was something of a gamble.17 Such was the nature of a formulary 
system. As one chief justice said, ‘We must keep up the boundaries of actions, otherwise 
we shall introduce the utmost confusion’.18 Professor Milsom commented that ‘law itself 
was seen as based, not upon elementary ideas, but upon the common law writs … a range 
of remedies which had as it were come down from the skies’.19  
                                                          
16 Henry John Stephen, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions (Joseph Butterworth & 
Son 1824) 8 (footnotes omitted). 
17 The elusive boundary between trespass and case in the eighteenth century was a particular frustration: 
SFC Milsom, HFCL (2nd edn, Butterworths 1981) 397–398. Arguably the most famous case in English 
legal history, Slade’s Case (1598) 4 Co Rep 92b, 76 ER 1074, was technically about which writ to use: 
David Ibbetson, ‘Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context’ (1984) 4 OJLS 295, 295.  
18 Reynolds v Clarke (1724) 1 Strange 634, 93 ER 747, 748 (KB) (Raymond CJKB). 




This writ system was partly abolished in the 1830’s,20 finally meeting its quietus in 1852.21 
It gave way to the system we have today, where an action is a concept rather than a form 
of words or procedure. The period we have herein called the Old System is demarcated by 
the life of the writ system: from the twelfth century to the mid-nineteenth century.    
In a system so dependent on form, legal development often meant deviation from form; or 
more precisely, turning a blind eye to deviation from form. This is where legal fictions 
came in. But before we turn to the Old Fictions themselves, we need to describe the two 
other procedural conditions of the Old System.  
 
B. Civil Juries and Formal Pleading 
One of the problems facing any legal system is how to decide questions of fact. In the 
twelfth century, when the writs made their appearance, several primitive modes of trial, or 
rather of proof,22 were already well-established. The ordeals of fire and water, as well as 
wager of law, 23  had been in use since Anglo-Saxon times. Trial by battle had been 
introduced by the invading Normans.24 All of these appealed to the supernatural – for it 
was God who determined the outcome. 
The jury began as an administrative inquest rather than a mode of trial. With strong roots 
in Anglo-Saxon England, Norman kings continued to use the jury, then a self-informing 
investigative body, to collect information about their subjects. A notable example was the 
Domesday survey of the 1080’s – a countrywide census conducted by investigative juries.25 
                                                          
20 The forms of action were abolished as distinct procedures when one uniform writ was introduced (in 
which the form of action was to be named): Uniformity of Process Act 1832 (2 William IV c 39) s 1 (being 
the preamble); Real Property Limitation Act 1833 (3 & 4 William IV c 27) s 36.  
21 Now it was not even necessary to specify the form of action in the uniform writ: Common Law Procedure 
Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict c 76) s 3.  
22 ‘Trial’ suggests formal evaluation of evidence: Baker, IELH (n 5) 72. 
23 In a wager of law, also known as compurgation, the defendant would conclusively prove his innocence 
by swearing to it himself and producing eleven other men who swore to his integrity: Hudson (n 8) 81. 
24 ibid 84, 81, 303 for fire and water, wager, and battle respectively. 




As Professor Baker explained, when seeking to collect information as opposed to 
answering a binary question about guilt, an appeal to Providence would not serve. God 
could not be asked to count oxen.26 In time, the jury came to be prescribed as the mode of 
trial in original writs, the earliest examples being the writs of iuris utrum, novel disseisin 
and mort d’ancestor,27 promulgated by Henry II in 1164, 1166 and 1176 respectively.28 The 
jury proved itself a more effective mode of trial than its superstitious alternatives and by 
1300 eclipsed the ordeals29 and judicial combat.30 Wager of law remained in use for the 
writs of debt and detinue, albeit in ceremonial form, until the seventeenth century.31 It then 
became practically extinct as debt was supplanted by trespass on the case, in which the 
defendant could not wage law.32 In short, by 1300 the jury was the common and favoured 
option; by 1700, its triumph was complete.  
As Professor Arnold noted, the jury presented a challenge for medieval law: ‘with the 
abolition of the ordeal and the disuse of battle, professional lawyers were forced to confront 
a device which had not the advantages of infallibility and inscrutability.’33 The crucial 
difference between the jury and the archaic modes of proof is that God needs no 
explanations. If we ask God who has the highest ‘right’ to certain land, we do not need to 
explain what right means or go into questions of priority. In fact, we do not even have to 
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28 Baker, IELH (n 5) 73 fn 7; 1166 is an approximate date. 
29 The ordeals were dealt a fatal blow in 1215 when Pope Innocent III forbade the (required) clerical 
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Baker, ‘New Light on Slade’s Case’ [1971] CLJ 213, 230. As Professor Ibbetson showed, wager of law had 
fallen into such disrepute that ‘A gentleman would not, dared not, wage his law’ Ibbetson (n 17) 313. 
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understand these terms ourselves. We ask an impenetrable question and receive an equally 
impenetrable answer. But when jurors are asked these questions, they cannot answer them 
unless the questions are narrowed down and presented in a way that is comprehensible to 
laymen. Jurors may also be confused or distracted by a fact which is not legally relevant.34 
And so the need arose for a mechanism to disentangle fact from law and direct the jury’s 
attention to the right issue.      
Formal pleading, which reached maturity in the thirteenth century, achieved exactly that 
purpose. It was a system unique to English law.35 The aim of pleading was to isolate the 
‘issue’ to be decided by the jury. It was an ‘oral altercation, in open court, in presence of 
the judges’.36 It worked in the following way. The claimant, by his lawyer, stated his claim, 
elaborating somewhat on the usually succinct writ. This first move was called the 
‘declaration’. When the claimant had recited the declaration, the defendant had four 
options. He could either: (1) deny everything (by a plea called a ‘general traverse’), putting 
the claimant to proof before the jury of all the facts on which he relied; (2) admit some 
facts and deny others (‘special traverse’), putting the claimant to proof only of the denied 
facts; (3) admit all the facts, but say that they amount to nothing at law (‘demurrer’); or (4) 
admit all the facts, but plead other facts which exculpate the defendant (‘confession and 
avoidance’).  
When the defendant had made his answer, known as a ‘plea’, the roles were reversed: now 
the claimant replied by one of the same four options. This third move, the reply to the reply, 
was called ‘replication’. The process continued in that manner until some proposition was 
wholly affirmed by one party and wholly denied by the other. That proposition was 
designated the ‘issue’. The parties were then said to be ‘at issue’ and the issue was ‘joined’. 
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If the issue was of law, the result of a demurrer, it fell to the judges to decide; if of fact, to 
the jury.37    
The advantage of pleas (2) and (4), whereby only some facts or new facts are put in issue, 
is that the jury’s attention is focussed exclusively on the relevant aspect of the case. For 
example, suppose I am a defendant to a writ of trespass alleging I burnt the claimant’s field. 
I could plead the general traverse (deny everything – option (1) above) and simply tell the 
jury my side of the story. Or I could plead the special traverse (admit some facts, deny 
others – option (2) above), admitting that I burnt the field, but denying that the field 
belonged to the claimant. That would conveniently focus the attention of the jury on 
whether the field belonged to the claimant, not on whether I burnt it. It would eliminate all 
other factual questions. I could also, alternatively, demur (raise a legal objection – option 
(3) above), arguing that my burning of the claimant’s field amounts to nothing in law since, 
hypothetically, trespass did not cover the situation. Finally, I could plead confession and 
avoidance (admit all facts, add new ones – option (4) above): yes, I did burn the claimant’s 
field, but I did so out of necessity to stop a fire from spreading. In this last plea, too, the 
jury would only be required to decide on my defence of necessity, it being the only thing 
in dispute.38 In fact, the jury were forbidden from taking into consideration any matter that 
was not in issue, ‘for, it is to try the issue, and that only, that they are summoned’.39 This 
means that all facts not in issue do not fall to be proved and cannot be proved. They are 
just statements hanging in the air.           
The result is a system where many facts which appear solemnly on the record never have 
to be proved and whose truth is therefore neither here nor there; neither true nor false. This 
is the ideal procedural environment for legal fictions: statements required for form but 
whose truth is immaterial. If the writ is all-important at the beginning of the litigation, what 
matters in the end is what has to be proved. The writ has standard text, but if certain words 
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in the writ are agreed by the parties not to be in issue, or cannot be put in issue by judicial 
policy, these words become mere form – that is to say: fictionalised.  
As a way to define the issue, pleading had the neat and logical appeal of an algorithm. But 
centuries of rule-making made it byzantine, as the following example illustrates. The rule 
against double-pleading disallowed pleading more than one matter in respect of a particular 
demand. In other words, a defendant could only have one defence, not two. It was then 
decided that ‘matter may suffice to make a pleading double though it be ill-pleaded’, but 
not if it was ‘immaterial’ or only ‘necessary inducement to another allegation’ or 
constituting ‘an entire point’; unless there were several defendants, in which case the 
pleadings could be severed, leading to several issues; except, again, that if the several 
defendants ‘once united in a plea, they cannot afterwards sever at the rejoinder’.40 Such 
labyrinthine pleading manuals filled treatises.41  
Forms of pleadings multiplied, becoming very specific, and could be re-opened, retracted 
and amended even after trial, but before judgment, by a variety of motions in banc.42 Many 
meritorious actions failed because of formal niceties43 or variance between the pleadings 
and the proof produced at trial.44 Pleadings also had to be made in ‘due order’: first to 
jurisdiction, then disability, then the declaration, then the writ and finally the action. 45 
Importantly, as the rule against double-pleading implies, the system whose aim was 
pinpointing an issue confined the proceedings to a single make-or-break issue; the parties 
could not plead in the alternative.46 From a mechanism intended to facilitate jury trial, 
pleading became an arcane art and indeed the focus of litigation. It may come as a shock 
to modern lawyers that medieval law reports (known as Year Books) focussed on the 
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pleadings, not the judgments.47 As late as the nineteenth century, pleading was a game of 
high stakes, often likened to a game of chess; so much so that a case ‘may be won or lost 
by playing some particular move’.48  
Formal pleading was eventually abolished, along with the forms of action, by a series of 
reforms beginning with the Common Law Procedure Act 185249 and culminating in the 
Judicature Acts of the 1870s.50 In the former, Parliament specifically enacted that ‘All 
Statements which need not be proved … shall be omitted’ and that pleadings shall not be 
contested for any ‘Imperfection, Omission, Defect in or Lack of Form’.51 As Lord Bowen 
stated:  
It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that it is not possible in the year 
1887 for an honest litigant in Her Majesty’s Supreme Court to be defeated by any 
mere technicality, any slip, any mistaken step in his litigation.52  
In 1854, the same wave of reform struck its first blow against the civil jury by allowing 
judges, with the consent of both parties, to decide questions of fact.53 This was the first time 
in the history of the common law that a judge could determine a fact. Twentieth-century 
legislation took away the right of a freeborn Englishman to a civil jury – except in cases of 
fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.54 In 2013, defamation 
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was excised from the list of exceptions.55 Today judicial policy (in civil cases) is to refuse 
jury trial where there is no specific right to it.56  
 
C. Procedural Framework: An Epilogue  
Throughout the Old System, a period of over 600 years, the common law was characterised 
by strict formalism. However, this formalism was sometimes bypassed by the pleading 
rules which prevented certain allegations of fact from being tested in trial. One element of 
the system thus counteracted the other, enabling the substance of actions to be changed 
while the form remained unchanged. It is this aspect of the Old Fiction which prompted Sir 
Henry Maine, in 1861, to define legal fiction as: 
[A]ny assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law 
has undergone alteration its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being 
modified … The fact is … that the law has wholly changed; the fiction is that it 
remains what it always was.57  
We will now look at a selection of Old Fictions to learn how and why they formed and the 
ways in which they functioned. We will see how Maine’s concealed alteration of the law 
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III. Old Fictions Examined 
 
A. Dominus Remisit Curiam 
Possibly the earliest legal fiction to enter the common law made its mark on land law. 
Under customary feudal law, which predated the common law, a lord had jurisdiction to 
determine claims among his tenants. Henry’s writ system gave the tenant a second resort: 
if the lord failed to ‘do right’ in the dispute, the tenant could appeal to royal justice by 
procuring a writ (‘of right patent’). In practice, however, tenants preferred to skip their 
lord’s court altogether; that is, to beg royal intervention without bothering with the 
seignorial court. As a result, the lords lost face and business. So chagrined were the barons 
by this usurpation of their ancient jurisdiction, that one of the demands they forced upon 
King John in Magna Carta was that ‘the writ called praecipe [eg a writ of right patent] 
shall not in future be issued … if a free man could thereby be deprived of … his own lord's 
court.’58  
But the barons could not halt the march of history – in this case legal history. These warlike 
magnates, who had brought the king of England to heel, were at last bested by the English 
legal fiction. After 1215, it became standard to include a clause in the writ stating that 
‘dominus remisit curiam suam’ (the lord has waived his court) even if the lord had done 
no such thing. But neither party had any interest to put the dubious clause in issue during 
the pleading process. It became mere form and thus the lords’ ancient right was lost – the 
Great Charter notwithstanding.59 By 1300, the baronial jurisdiction over title to land was 
obsolete.60 The legal fiction had made its first impression on English legal history and, in 
its own way, proved the pen to be mightier than the sword.      
In summary, the fiction dominus remisit curiam functioned as a pleading which could not 
be disproved or did not fall to be proved. The aim was to evade clause 34 of Magna Carta, 
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which effectively enjoined that the tenant must exhaust his remedies with the lord before 
petitioning the king. Hence the motive of the fiction was convenience or efficiency. It was 
clearly a Jurisdictional Fiction as it did not affect the substance of any action, but simply 
the choice of court. The effect of the fiction was to completely dispense with the exhaustion 
rule. Nothing was left of the old prerequisite for jurisdiction.  
 
B. Vi et Armis 
When the king extended the benefit of royal justice to his subjects, he did not do so 
indiscriminately. Only causes of sufficient gravity would attract the king’s benevolence 
and be justiciable in his courts. Lesser complaints would continue to be dealt with by local 
courts.61 In the field of civil wrongs, the position by the mid-thirteenth century was that a 
case was of sufficient gravity if it involved ‘force and arms’ and was committed ‘against 
the king’s peace’. Henceforth all trespass writs were issued with the words vi et armis and 
contra pacem regis.62     
While the meaning of the king’s peace was vague to begin with, the requirement of force 
and arms was fairly clear. The problem was that local courts could not entertain trespasses 
over 40 shillings without royal sanction. 63  So, ostensibly, trespasses over 40 shillings 
committed without force and arms had no remedy. This was an intolerable situation and 
something had to give. Fiction came to the rescue. Claimants, who had little choice, crossed 
their fingers and brought the standard writ (containing the words ‘vi et armis’) even though 
the trespass had not been carried out with force and arms. Judges, sympathetic to their 
predicament, eventually ruled that vi et armis had to be pleaded but not proved. A concrete 
example, one of many, appears in the Year Book for 1304:  
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R. brought his writ against J. … and said that they came wrongfully with force and 
arms and cut and carried away the wood of this same R.  
The defendants pleaded Not guilty.  
The inquest [ie the jury] came and said that they cut his wood, but not with force 
and arms.  
BEREFORD [the judge] therefore adjudged that [R.] should recover his 
damages etc., and that the defendants should be taken … notwithstanding they did 
not come with force and arms...64 
       
In the language of formal pleading, the allegation of force and arms became ‘non-
traversable’: incontestable, incapable of being ‘in issue’. And so, from the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, claimants falsely pleaded force and arms as a matter of course, adding 
for good measure such standard embellishments as ‘swords and bows and arrows’ (all 
equally fictitious).65 Thus was born another Old Fiction – vi et armis.66 It had a long life. 
Lawyers kept averring force and arms until 1852, when Parliament passed the Common 
Law Procedure Act,67 abolishing the forms of action, as aforesaid.     
It might be added, by way of comic interlude, that the fiction produced some colourful 
pleadings in the rich legal phraseology of the time. MJ Prichard, in an influential 1973 
lecture, recalled: 
Just two hundred years ago one infant sued another infant for injuries received on 
the day of the fair in Milborne Port, in Somerset, in October 1770. The action was 
one of trespass, in which the plaintiff declared that the defendant ‘with force and 
arms, (to wit) with sticks, staves, clubs and fists, made an assault upon the plaintiff 
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… and greatly bruised, wounded and ill-treated him, so that his life was greatly 
despaired of, and then and there, threw, cast and tossed, a lighted squib, consisting 
of gunpowder and other combustible materials, at and against the said plaintiff, and 
struck the said plaintiff on the face therewith, and so greatly burnt one of the eyes 
of the said plaintiff, that the plaintiff underwent and suffered great and excruciating 
pain and torment for a long time … and afterwards wholly lost his said eye.’68     
Like dominus remisit curiam, the vi et armis fiction functioned as a pleading which could 
not be disproved. It should be noted, however, that unlike dominus remisit curiam, this Old 
Fiction did not completely dispense with the requirement in question (here force and arms, 
there exhaustion of remedies). Professor Ibbetson, for example, argues that while the 
‘blood-chilling lists of weaponry … bear no relation whatsoever to reality’, the allegation 
of force and arms still implied minimal ‘physical interference’ and constituted a ‘low 
threshold test’.69 Professor Palmer contends that while ‘the allegation of force and arms 
was not literally true’, vi et armis ‘was not fictional but rather a low threshold test’.70 That 
is to say, the allegation was not entirely fictional. Concludes Palmer:  
[T]he allegation of force was probably not merely formal, an allegation without 
either meaning or effect on the scope of the action. It seemed rather a test limiting 
the use of trespass vi et armis to factual situations in which the defendant had done 
forcible wrong.71  
This shows that fictionalisation does not necessarily denude the pleading in question of all 
meaning. In the case of vi et armis, it entailed the significant relaxation of a requirement, 
almost to the point of extinction, but not the expurgation of it.       
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In terms of classification, vi et armis was a Jurisdictional Fiction. As Milsom and Baker 
established, it was simply a jurisdictional limit, a ticket to the royal courts, not an element 
of the concept of trespass.72 The motive for this fiction was justice. Without it, as we have 
observed, some trespasses would fall between the cracks and be without remedy.   
 
C. Geographical Fictions 
This is a class of fictions used to commence actions arising beyond the seas or on the sea. 
This Old Fiction is even more tied to the civil jury than other Old Fictions. It was a rule of 
the common law that a question of fact had to be tried by a jury summoned from the county 
in which the cause of action arose.73 It was impossible to summon juries from foreign lands 
or the high seas and so trespasses committed in such places could not properly be brought. 
The legal community, however, thought that a procedural problem should not stand in the 
way of substantive justice – at least when there was an English connection to justify 
jurisdiction. As Sir Edward Coke explained, the solution was more pragmatic than 
imaginative: 
Note, An obligation made beyond the seas may be sued here in England in what 
place the plaintiff will. As if it bear date at Bourdeaux in France, it may be alleged 
to be made in a certain place called Bourdeaux in France, in Islington in the county 
of Middlesex, and there it shall be tried, for whether there be such a place in 
Islington or no, is not traversable in that case.74 
In the mid 1670’s, Sir Matthew Hale retrospectively justified this fiction: 
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Otherwise there might be a failure of justice; for suppose an Englishman sells his 
horse to another in France; they both come over to England, [so] that the vendor be 
without remedy for his money. In France, he cannot sue him [because the defendant 
is not there] … Certainly no man can think the Common Law so deficient, especially 
our Island consisting much in forreign [sic] Intercourse, and Journeys and Voyages 
to forreign Parts, as that it should be destitute of a remedy … merely upon a 
supposition of want of cognizance for forreign matters.75           
To that end, judges condoned what became perhaps the most egregious fiction of the 
common law. The claimant would falsely plead the foreign act to have taken place in some 
random place in England and the defendant would be barred from traversing it (ie denying 
the fact in the pleading). By Hale’s time, the fiction had been in use for centuries: ‘[W]e 
see it upon every day’s Experience … and this is no new device, but very ancient.’76 It was 
so simple and yet so effective. It brings to mind Lon Fuller’s description of the legal fiction 
as ‘an awkward patch applied to a rent in the law's fabric of theory’.77  
The case of Mostyn v Fabrigas (1775)78 concerned a trespass on the island of Minorca, then 
a British possession.79 The alleged tortfeasor was the governor of the island. The reporter, 
Cowper, tells us:  
This was an action of trespass, brought in the Court of Common Pleas by Anthony 
Fabrigas against John Mostyn, for an assault and false imprisonment; in which the 
plaintiff declared, that the defendant on the first of September, in the year 1771, 
with force and arms, &c. made an assault upon the said Anthony, at Minorca, (to 
wit) at London aforesaid, in the parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the ward of Cheap, 
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and beat, wounded, and ill-treated him, and then and there imprisoned him, and kept 
and detained him in prison there for a long time…80 
The non-traversable falsehood is now a familiar fix – a kind of cure-all in a formalistic 
system. But note that here the form of the pleading makes the fiction transparent: it begins 
with the actual place – Minorca – and then asserts that Minorca is in London. In other 
words, there is no attempt to conceal the fiction; no reticence or bashfulness. This form of 
pleading stands in contrast to the silent fictions we encountered in dominus remisit curiam 
or vi et armis, where there was no way to detect the fiction from the pleadings.81 The writ 
and declaration stated that the lord had waived his court, or that the act had been done with 
force and arms, and there was no hint that it had been otherwise. Here the fiction is obvious 
on the face of the record. This goes to show just how comfortable with fictions judges and 
lawyers had grown – no matter how absurd the assertion.  
When the defendant in Mostyn v Fabrigas had the temerity to challenge the fiction, Lord 
Mansfield took the bull by the horns:  
[N]o Judge ever thought that when the declaration said in Fort St. George, viz. in 
Cheapside, that the plaintiff meant it was in Cheapside. It is a fiction of form; every 
country has its forms, which are invented for the furtherance of justice… I was 
embarrassed a great while to find … counsel for the plaintiff really meant to make 
a question of it … In sea batteries the plaintiff often lays the injury to have been 
done in Middlesex, and then proves it to be done a thousand leagues distant on the 
other side of the Atlantic…82 
It is worthy of note that geographical fictions were also used by claimants who wanted to 
avoid the High Court of Admiralty in favour of the common law courts in Westminster. 
The Admiralty, established in the fourteenth century, was a court in the civilian tradition 
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exercising jurisdiction over the seas. To avoid it, contracts made at sea, for example, could 
be averred to have been made at the Royal Exchange. This was commonly done by 1600.83   
Geographical fictions exhibit the characteristics of earlier fictions but in sharper relief. This 
class of Old Fictions, like the foregoing fictions, functioned as a pleading that could not be 
disproved. Notice, however, that unlike dominus remisit curiam where the requirement was 
completely dispensed with; and unlike vi et armis, where the requirement was significantly 
relaxed; here the requirement was generally unchanged. In the ordinary run of cases 
questions of fact still had to be tried by juries summoned from the relevant county. It was 
only in foreign cases that the requirement was (effectively) set aside. That is, the effect of 
the fiction was to introduce an exception to the rule.   
Geographical fictions are, without a doubt, Jurisdictional Fictions. No action or remedy 
was created or changed. The fiction simply enabled actions arising overseas to be brought 
in English courts. The motive for this fiction, as we have seen from the justifications above, 
was more than convenience or efficiency. It was justice. Without this fiction, deserving 
claimants would have been denied a remedy for procedural reasons.   
 
D. Bill of Middlesex 
This Old Fiction, common by the 1480’s,84 is harder to explain than the fictions we have 
already discussed. This is because it involves layer upon layer of procedure. But it is 
worthwhile to take a glimpse at the tangled web of rules that was the Old System and 
acquaint ourselves with the world inhabited by lawyers. Besides, the academic interest in 
this fiction has been great. Marjorie Blatcher went so far as to claim:  
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Few legal fictions have attracted as much interest as the bill of Middlesex and none 
more deservedly, since it was to the manipulation of this bill that the king’s bench 
owed its recovery and hence, to some degree, the common law its future.85    
While writs were the primary mode of initiating litigation, it was also possible, from 
earliest times, to commence proceedings by bill. A bill was a written petition to the king, 
embodied by the justices of the Court of King’s Bench. A bill was better for the plaintiff 
than an original writ because the bill had no standard text. There was also no issuance fee 
as it was written by the plaintiff rather than Chancery clerks.  
Understandably, therefore, claimants’ lawyers preferred bills to writs. The problem was 
that bills could hardly ever be used. Generally, an action in the royal courts required an 
original writ. There were two important exceptions. First, bill procedure could be used for 
an action which arose in the county where the King’s Bench happened to be sitting.86 Once 
the King’s Bench stopped following the monarch and permanently settled in Westminster 
in 1421,87 that county was almost invariably Middlesex.88 In other words, an action in the 
King’s Bench, arising in Middlesex, could be begun by bill.89   
The second exception was that bill procedure could be used if the defendant was already 
in the custody of the King’s Bench (usually a prisoner in the Marshalsea prison).90 This 
exception applied even to actions, like debt, which were otherwise, by dint of Magna 
Carta, the exclusive province of the Court of Common Pleas.91 The combination of these 
two exceptions to writ procedure was the opening the lawyers (who preferred bills) needed.  
                                                          
85 Marjorie Blatcher, The Court of King’s Bench 1450-1550 (Athlone Press 1978) 111. 
86 ibid 112. 
87 Baker, IELH (n 5) 39. 
88 In times of plague the Court would temporarily sit outside Middlesex.   
89 Baker, IELH (n 5) 41. 
90 ibid 41–42; Blatcher (n 85) 116. 




Suppose I want to recover a debt. As we have said, debt falls in the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Common Pleas where custody bill procedure does not exist.92 I could go by the book 
and pay for a writ of debt returnable to the Common Pleas and hope that the defendant will 
be caught and brought to trial. Alternatively, I could present a bill alleging a fictitious 
trespass by my debtor in Middlesex. I can do so by bill because the trespass was supposedly 
in Middlesex. Upon presentation of this bill, my debtor would be arrested and imprisoned 
in the Marshalsea awaiting trial.93 This provisional imprisonment was standard procedure 
in civil actions, effected by a judicial writ called capias. Now in the custody of the Court 
(albeit on false grounds), I can proceed against him, in the genuine action for debt, by bill. 
The action for debt has nothing to do with Middlesex, but it does not matter anymore 
because the debtor is in custody by virtue of the trespass bill. I then withdraw the trespass 
bill before it comes to trial, thus ensuring the trespass bill is never exposed as baseless. 
And voilà: I have started an action for debt without a writ, in the wrong court and without 
a fee. An additional advantage, which counted more than all the others, is that I would not 
have to incur the bulk of legal costs until the defendant’s appearance was secured.94 It was 
impossible to proceed against an absent defendant.95 The bill of Middlesex, more than any 
other fiction, exemplifies the ingenuity of the common lawyers.           
Of course, this ploy required the connivance of the judges of the King’s Bench in turning 
a blind eye to the suspicious proliferation of withdrawn trespass bills in Middlesex. But 
connive in it they did, partly in a drive to attract plaintiffs by offering better procedure than 
in the Common Pleas.96 The connivance was made easy by the fact that the fictionalisation 
process was gradual. 97  In any event, all the chicanery happened outside ‘judicial 
consciousness’.  
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It may seem unethical to allow people to be imprisoned for a knowingly false allegation, 
but such interlocutory imprisonment was the procedure in the writ of debt anyway.98 It 
made little ethical difference whether the defendant was imprisoned by bill or by writ. 
More importantly, the imprisonment itself was fictionalised early on when, in a 1452 case, 
a defendant on bail was deemed to be in constructive custody.99 Henceforth the debtors 
would be arrested and released on bail. One fiction propped up another.     
To say that the bill of Middlesex, like its fictitious forerunners, was a false pleading would 
be an understatement. The whole action for trespass was fictitious. There was no trespass 
in Middlesex or anywhere else. As such, the bill of Middlesex was a bolder fiction than its 
forerunners, which consisted in false incidental pleadings in the course of genuine actions.   
Moreover, whereas previous fictions functioned as non-traversable pleadings, the false 
pleadings in this wholly-false action were traversable. No court would ever force a 
defendant to admit a substantive trespass – as opposed to a jurisdictional condition like 
force and arms. The false allegation was simply withdrawn before it could be tested. There 
is perhaps not much in this difference, except that the bill of Middlesex did not depend on 
formal pleading.  
Generally, the motive and reason for the success of this Old Fiction was convenience. As 
Margaret Hastings summed it up, ‘procedure by bill of Middlesex was like the wave of a 
magician’s rod compared to the Common Pleas procedure at its worst’.100 The rule under 
attack was the requirement for bill procedure that an action arise in Middlesex. This rule 
was completely abrogated. Practically, plaintiffs used the fiction to enjoy the advantages 
of bill procedure over writ procedure.  
It is noteworthy that this fiction was wholly procedural. As a corollary of being so 
procedural in nature, the fiction was tied to a particular court – the King’s Bench. It did not 
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‘work’ anywhere else. The substance of no action was affected. Even the availability of 
actions was not affected. The effect of the fiction was only to expand the availability of bill 
procedure and end the monopoly of the Common Pleas over certain actions. It was clearly 
a Jurisdictional Fiction.  
Finally, this fiction underscores what we have learned from previous fictions: the English 
courts did not baulk at false allegations, bordering on perjury,101 so long as they were 
formalistic in nature. So long as there was no substantive injustice, no pleading was too 
outrageous. It may offend our sense of propriety, but it is heartening to see that the judges, 
as wedded as they were to formalism, saw it for what it was – just form. They were not 
mesmerised by the forms or ruled by the forms. They were pragmatic about their merits 
and demerits. Interestingly, it is in fictions that we see most clearly the distinction between 
form and substance.  
       
E. Writ of Quominus 
This Old Fiction is similar to the bill of Middlesex in its procedural character. Just as the 
bill of Middlesex was a creature of the procedure of the King’s Bench, the writ of quominus 
was a creature of Exchequer procedure. The Court of Exchequer,102 which had grown out 
of the Chancery in the late twelfth century, was the judicial arm of the treasury. It was 
primarily concerned with taxation. Generally, its jurisdiction was limited to tax-related 
claims by or against officers of the Crown. In the fourteenth century, it started hearing debt 
claims between private citizens (normally the business of the Common Pleas) in situations 
where the claimant creditor had to recover a private debt to repay a Crown debt. Such 
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claims were seen as sufficiently connected with the court’s aim of tax collection.103 The 
writ used in these three-party cases was called quominus.104  
From the point of view of the claimant creditors, it was highly advantageous to chase 
private debts in the Exchequer. The procedure in that court, designed for the king’s tax 
collectors, had more teeth than the regular procedure in the Common Pleas. Here was an 
opening the common lawyers would surely not miss.105 
All that was necessary to get a private debt claim into the Exchequer was a Crown debt by 
the claimant. Perhaps encouraged by the King’s Bench’s acceptance of the bill of 
Middlesex, lawyers in the Tudor era started alleging fictitious debts to the Crown to take 
advantage of Exchequer procedure in private debt claims. At first, the judges were 
unimpressed and thwarted the fiction by allowing the imaginary debt to the Crown to be 
traversed.106 Within a century, probably by the Interregnum, the judges relented and the 
fictitious debt became non-traversable – mere form.107 
Like many of the Old Fictions we have seen so far, the writ of quominus was essentially a 
non-traversable pleading. Like its cousin, the bill of Middlesex, it was a Jurisdictional 
Fiction, completely procedural and its motive was convenience or efficiency. Unlike its 
cousin, it did depend on formal pleading and did involve a genuine claim (the private debt). 
The rule it attacked was that only debts that make the Crown debtor less able to pay a 
Crown debt were within the jurisdiction of the Exchequer. This restriction was completely 
abrogated.  
It is interesting to note that the writ of quominus had its origin in a non-fictitious rule of 
law: that people who owe money to the treasury could recover (in the Court of Exchequer) 
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monies owed to them to the extent that it lessened their ability to pay the treasury. It is only 
that the factual condition of this rule came to be disregarded. We see this phenomenon of 
‘prefigurement’ in the other fictions as well, although less clearly. Old Fictions were based 
on, indeed foreshadowed by, genuine rules whose factual foundation grew weaker and 
weaker under the pressure of some practical need and eventually partly or wholly gave 
way. In the bill of Middlesex, to take one example, the fiction was prefigured by two 
genuine rules about bill procedure. In time, the factual conditions of the rules evaporated, 
giving rise to the fiction. The point is that Old Fictions did not appear ex nihilo. They were 
not novel in the sense of being new actions, forms or procedures. Nor were they the product 
of any systematic intellectual approach. They were simply the well-preserved shells of 
former rules – fossils.    
 
F. Benefit of Clergy 
This fiction is technically outside the scope of this work because it is a fiction of the 
criminal law. It is included as background information because it is just too good to leave 
out. As Professor Baker wrote, this fiction played a ‘bizarre role’ in English law.108 More 
than any other fiction, old or new, it shows the power of fictions. In this case, it was power 
over life and death.    
Suitably for its bizarre future, the birth of the fiction was an ironic twist. The tug of war 
between Henry II and Thomas Becket, played out from the latter’s elevation to the see of 
Canterbury in 1162 to his assassination in that cathedral in 1170, was fought primarily over 
the treatment of felonious clergy. The king wanted clerics to be tried and punished by 
secular courts, whereas the church insisted they had to be dealt with in accordance with 
Canon law (which was more lenient) in ecclesiastical courts. The murder of Becket by 
knights loyal to the king, with or without royal sanction, backfired disastrously. Amid 
                                                          




international condemnation, Henry was forced to give ground on the very point of the 
controversy.109 It was then settled that the clergy would be exempt from capital punishment. 
If found guilty of a capital offence by a secular court, they would handed over to the 
ecclesiastical authorities and face such canonical penalties as penance, imprisonment or 
defrocking.110 This was the ‘benefit of clergy’. 
In a practice that would characterise criminal trials in England for centuries, the accused 
cleric would be tried by jury and, if pronounced guilty, would, before sentence was passed, 
claim the benefit of clergy. A church official in attendance, supervised by the judge, would 
then assess the defendant’s clerical status, and either accept or reject him. Rejection often 
meant death.  
In the years following the settlement, judges applied it to the letter. They expected those in 
holy orders to wear the correct vestments, to be tonsured, to be literate.111 But as we have 
so often seen with fictions, that was only an omen of things to come. By 1490, judges had 
completely abandoned any genuine assessment of clerical status – probably as a way to 
mitigate the harshness of medieval punishment. Rather than send a man to the gallows for 
larceny (death was the automatic penalty for many offences), he was declared a clerk and 
handed over to the church for milder treatment. Thus a concession reluctantly extended by 
Henry II to the clergy became, by the time of Henry VII, a general exemption, for laymen, 
from the law of the land. As FW Maitland observed in a different context, ‘By such means 
our archaic procedure is being adapted to modern times but in an evasory and roundabout 
way by means of fictions.’112  
The salient element of this fiction was the reading test. Originally a literacy test whereby 
the judge would randomly select a biblical passage for the defendant to read aloud in open 
court, it soon degenerated into farce. The judges would always select the same text, namely 
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Psalm 51, and illiterate defendants were expected to have memorised it. Fittingly, the psalm 
read ‘Miserere mei Deus…’ (Have mercy upon me, O God…)113 and came to be known as 
the ‘neck verse’. The recitation of Latin poetry by illiterate felons, on pain of death,114 
became a symbol of the fiction. This extraordinary ritual, which Blackstone called ‘so vain 
and impious a ceremony’,115 is unparalleled in any other legal system. It bespeaks more 
clearly than any legal history the role of fictions in English law. 
Such was the drama of the fiction that we are not surprised to find it in contemporary 
drama. In Christopher Marlowe’s 1592 play, The Jew of Malta, a villain is said to be 
‘conning his neck-verse’.116 A few years later, in 1598, playwright Ben Jonson recited the 
verse (in real life) to save his own neck, having been found guilty of manslaughter.117  
In Tudor times, Parliament started to rein in the benefit of clergy by excluding it for certain 
offences, making them ‘non-clergiable’. Thus, the benefit of clergy, from a blunt 
instrument, became a means of distinguishing between offences depending on seriousness 
or moral culpability. For example, a 1512 statute118 suppressed the benefit of clergy for 
malicious homicide, incidentally enshrining in law the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter: manslaughter was clergiable; murder was not.119 The courts then had to 
clarify the malice distinction, adding much refinement to criminal law.  
Indeed, Parliament used this fiction time and again to indirectly regulate criminal justice. 
It limited the use of the benefit to once only in the case of laymen120 (ironically restoring 
the distinction between laity and clergy sacrificed to create the fiction); introduced 
branding with a hot iron for ‘clergied’ criminals, with a judicial discretion to impose a 
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sentence of up to one year’s imprisonment121 (Ben Jonson was branded on the thumb);122 
extended the benefit of clergy to women123 (an illogicality since women could not be 
ordained); and allowed transportation (exile to a penal colony) as an alternative to branding 
of ‘clergied’ criminals.124 More strangely, in deciding whether the defendant passed the 
reading test, the court could take into consideration the defendant’s character and the 
seriousness of the offence.125 And so criminal law was regulated in large part through the 
perverse medium of the fiction. The benefit of clergy, the unintended legacy of bloody-
minded knights, morphed from an unjust clerical privilege into the main agent of penal 
reform. In 1827, after six and a half centuries of weird contortions, the benefit of clergy 
was laid to rest.126  
It did not, however, involve a non-traversable pleading. Claiming the benefit after trial took 
place outside the pleading process, whose purpose, it will be recalled, was to define the 
issue for trial. In fact, even as a statement, the claim of being a clerk was not incontestable 
as such. In fact, a test was administered to verify the statement. It is only that the test was 
a sham. What we have then is not a non-traversable pleading, or even an incontestable 
statement, but bad evidence. This shows that Old Fictions do not necessarily function as 
non-traversable pleadings (eg dominus remisit curiam) or withdrawn pleadings (eg bill of 
Middlesex). The benefit of clergy consisted in the court’s conscious acceptance of bad 
evidence.  
Turning to our classification of fictions, the benefit of clergy was an Auxiliary Fiction. It 
was not a Jurisdictional Fiction because the substance of the law was affected. It was an 
Auxiliary Fiction as no one considered clerical status, let alone the reading test, to be the 
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real reason for the compassionate treatment of convicted criminals. It was lip-service, quite 
literally. The ostensible preoccupation with religious ordination was an accident of history.  
The motive for this fiction was not convenience or efficiency, but justice. As for the effect 
of the fiction on the law, the original basis of the benefit – clerical immunity – was 
completely disregarded, with even women found to be of the clergy. The abrogation of the 
rule was therefore complete. Interestingly, this is the first Old Fiction we have come across 
that restricts, rather than extends, jurisdiction. By conducting a sham reading test, the court 
found the defendant to be a clerk and thus outside its sentencing jurisdiction.       
The benefit of clergy lends further support to the argument that fictions do not appear ex 
nihilo, but emerge from the existing structures of the law, by hollowing them out. The 
benefit of clergy had been real. Even the reading test had been real. It was just hollowed 
out of factual content.         
Finally, the benefit of clergy shows that legal fictions can be a means of positive (if 
tortuous) legal development, used by judges and legislators alike.          
 
G. Pleading the Belly 
The plea of the belly is the sister-fiction of the benefit of clergy. By the seventeenth century, 
it served the same purpose of offering an escape from the death penalty. The rule 
underlying the fiction was that a pregnant woman could not be executed – to spare the 
unborn child. To claim the immunity, a pregnant woman under sentence of death would 
‘plead her belly’, whereupon a jury of twelve matrons would be convoked. These dozen 




with child’.127 If the woman was so found, a stay of execution was given, which often led, 
by way of pardon, to a commutation of the sentence to transportation.128  
We have no reason to doubt that the examination by the all-female jury (which is actually 
of ancient origin129) was originally conducted in good faith. However, the statistically 
improbable number of pregnant convicts, certainly by the seventeenth century, led 
historians to conclude the examination was spurious in many cases.130 It would seem that 
here, too, the factual foundation of a rule was compromised in the interest of policy.  
This supposition that the examination had become fictionalised is supported by references 
to pleading the belly in contemporary fiction (of the literary sort), collated by James 
Oldham. For example, in Daniel Defoe’s novel, Moll Flanders, published in 1722, the 
eponymous heroine is told by her fellow inmate in Newgate Prison, ‘I pleaded my belly, 
but I am no more with child than the judge’.131 Other references abound.132  
By contrast with the benefit of clergy, neither the finding of pregnancy, nor the escape from 
the death penalty, was a matter of course. Only a proportion of women were found to be 
pregnant by the matrons and not all of those were pardoned.133 Those not fortunate enough 
to be pardoned would be hanged on the next execution day following the birth.134 What is 
more arresting is that many women, even in the heyday of the fiction, did not bother to 
plead the belly. Oldham has found that from 1698 to 1727, ‘62 percent of all women 
sentenced to death pleaded pregnancy, and of these, 61 percent were successful before 
juries of matrons’.135 The inspection by the matronly jury was not as reliable a fiction as 
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the neck verse. We seem to have a fiction haphazardly applied – which is a creature we 
encounter for the first time.  
Strangely (considering its rationale), but consistently with the benefit of clergy, a woman 
could only plead the belly once. As Blackstone tells us, ‘if she once hath had the benefit of 
this reprieve and been delivered, and afterwards becomes pregnant again, she shall not be 
entitled to the benefit of a further respite for that cause.’136 
Unlike other fictions, pleading the belly was not officially abolished; probably because 
there was no need to do so. By the nineteenth century, with the advances in medical science, 
the jury of matrons had fallen into desuetude.137   
Let us summarise the characteristics of this fiction. Pleading the belly did not function as 
a non-traversable pleading. We have seen that in many cases the jury returned a verdict of 
not pregnant. We must classify it as a fiction of bad evidence – like its sister-fiction, the 
benefit of clergy. To the extent that it was a fiction, the benefit of the belly was so because 
of questionable findings of fact by the matrons.  
As for the completeness of its effect, we know the fiction was haphazardly applied. The 
factual foundation of the rule was only weakened, and unpredictably so. Its effect was to 
undermine the rule but not to obliterate it. Clearly, the benefit of the belly was no more 
than an Auxiliary Fiction. Feigned pregnancies were not taken seriously as a rational 
ground for suspending the criminal law. The real reason was simply compassion. The 
motive for the acceptance of this fiction was justice – a desire to temper the severity of the 
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H. Common Recovery 
The aim of this fiction was to ‘break an entail’. An entail was a restriction on the inheritance 
of land, placed by the grantor. Consider the following example. A has two sons: X, the 
eldest, and Y. A grants a parcel of land, Blackacre, to Y, on the condition that the land is 
only heritable by the male descendants of Y and his wife, Z. This is an entail. It means that 
as long as Y and Z have living male descendants, Blackacre is passed on from generation 
to generation, from male to male. However, if and when the owner for the time being dies 
and there is no male of the X-Y parentage living, the condition cannot be satisfied and 
Blackacre reverts to the original grantor, A. If by such time A has died, Blackacre reverts 
to A’s heirs, namely first X (his eldest son) and X’s heirs. And so, Y does not receive from 
A an estate in fee simple, a full-blown title, but a curtailed or cut-down estate, known as 
the fee tail. The fee simple remains with the grantor (A and his heirs) as reversioner.  
The statute De Donis Conditionalibus138 (‘Of Conditional Gifts’), enacted under Edward I 
in 1285, was aimed at preventing the frustration of entails by the grantee or his heirs, but 
was poorly drafted.139 Most significantly, it was unclear how long the entail lasted. After 
much judicial consideration, the position by the 1420’s was that De Donis barred the 
alienation of entailed land (for alienation would defeat the entail) and that the entail lasted 
so long as there were eligible heirs.140 This meant that the fee tail was in effect a perpetuity, 
by which the grantor controlled the land from the grave – potentially forever.    
The motivation behind this device was to ensure that the wealth of the family stayed in the 
family for generations, protecting it against dissipation by reckless descendants (through 
alienation) and leakage to other families (through female inheritance). 
But in the long-run, the law abhorred perpetuities. The prospect, theoretically possible, that 
all land in England could be governed by the dead, unable to be traded, was so ghastly that 
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something had to give. Once again, fiction saved the day. The common recovery, the 
ultimate entail-breaker,141 debuted on the plea rolls in 1440, soon after the entail became 
definitely perpetual. 142  Joseph Biancalana’s explanation of the common recovery can 
hardly be improved upon: 
The procedure of a common recovery was fairly simple. Suppose A holds land in 
fee tail but wishes to grant the land to B and to bar the entail. A grants the land to B 
and then B brings an action for the land against A in the Court of Common Pleas. A 
denies B's right and vouches a warrantor143 who enters into the warranty and defends 
the action. The grantee-plaintiff, B, pleads against the warrantor, who denies B's 
right. Either the plaintiff or the warrantor then requests and receives a continuance 
[ie an adjournment]. On the day appointed to resume the case, the warrantor absents 
himself. The court gives a default judgment for B against A and for A against the 
defaulting warrantor.144   
And so the fiction, dubbed the common recovery, was a collusive lawsuit. The purchaser 
sued the owner in tail for the land. The owner in tail failed to defend it. The court awarded 
the land to the purchaser by default judgment.145 Collusion on a large scale required judicial 
acquiescence, but this is exactly what happened by the 1470s.146 
This fiction, like the benefit of clergy, but now in the private law sphere, does not involve 
a non-traversable pleading. The pleadings in the purchaser’s writ were certainly false, but 
they were traversable. The defendant owner in tail (or more precisely, his warrantor) simply 
failed to disprove them. In contrast to the benefit of clergy, however, there was not even 
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bad evidence. In what sense was the common recovery a fiction? This challenges our 
understanding of Old Fictions. Was it a fiction at all?  
On balance, it is more sensible to say that it was. The court knowingly entertained sham 
proceedings, mounted upon false pleadings (the claimant’s ownership of the land), 
amounting to a conspiracy to disinherit third parties (the heir in tail and the reversioner). It 
is telling that such collusive suits attracted severe penalties in other contexts.147 At any rate, 
the fact that all parties involved were happy to say that black was white does not mean 
there was no fiction in saying so. We have now identified a fourth species of the genus Old 
Fiction, namely collusion. The other three are the non-traversable pleading, the withdrawn 
pleading and bad evidence.  
The motive of this fiction was justice – but in a technical sense. Perpetuities were viewed 
as fundamentally wrong and unsustainable. Sir Edward Coke called them ‘a monstrous 
brood carved out of mere invention, and never known to the ancient sages of the law … At 
whose solemn funeral I was present, and accompanied the dead to the grave, but mourned 
not.’148 
In terms of our classification, the common recovery is best seen as an Auxiliary Fiction. 
The collusion was countenanced merely as a means to an end – being the prevention of 
perpetuities. Collusion could not have been the rationale for the outcome of the case.   
As for the completeness of its effect, the common recovery was almost comprehensive: it 
barred all heirs, reversions and remainders, but it did not bar executory devises (an 
inheritance conditional on a future contingency).149  
The aim of the fiction was to defeat the statute De Donis. It thus stands out as an Old Fiction 
which does not subvert a rule of common law, or a form of action, but an Act of Parliament. 
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Furthermore, the subversion of the Act could hardly be more flagrant. The mischief which 
the Act had been enacted to stamp out, namely the frustration of entails, was precisely what 
the fiction achieved. The common recovery thus disturbed the constitutional order. Legal 
fictions were now used by courts to unmake legislative acts.  
On a lighter note, the reader may like to know that the fiction of the common recovery was 
immortalised in the most iconic scene of Shakespearean drama. In a churchyard with 
Horatio, Hamlet holds up a skull and says: 
 There's another: why may not that be the skull of a 
lawyer? Where be his quiddities now, his quillets, 
his cases, his tenures, and his tricks? why does he 
suffer this rude knave now to knock him about the 
sconce with a dirty shovel, and will not tell him of 
his action of battery? Hum! This fellow might be 
in's time a great buyer of land, with his statutes, 
his recognizances, his fines, his double vouchers, 
his recoveries: is this the fine of his fines, and 
the recovery of his recoveries, to have his fine 
pate full of fine dirt? …150 
 
I. Trover 
It is said that necessity is the mother of invention. This proverb may with all propriety be 
applied to fictions. Common lawyers were at their most inventive when confronted by 
                                                          




some necessity. The fiction of trover arose from the shortcomings of the ancient writ of 
detinue. Alleging that the defendant unjustly detained the claimant’s goods, it was meant 
to be the primary vehicle for the vindication of property in chattels.151  
However, there were two defects in this form of action.152 Suppose A lends his horse to B. 
The horse is not returned and is later found with C. By the thirteenth century, A could 
sustain an action in detinue against the third party C. The problem was that A had to explain 
how the horse had come into the hands of C. This explanation was a traversable allegation 
and imperilled the whole claim.153 A did not necessarily know by what means, fair or foul, 
C had acquired the horse from B, or whether there had been intermediate possessors. This 
requirement of backward tracing was onerous and claimants sought to avoid it.  
The second defect of detinue was the unavailability of trial by jury. Instead, this old writ 
was tried by wager of law. Under this mode of proof, which we mentioned when 
introducing the jury, the defendant proved his defence by solemnly swearing to it and 
producing eleven ‘oath-helpers’ or ‘compurgators’, who swore to his integrity. 154  A 
dishonest defendant who could muster enough support was able escape liability,155 if at the 
risk of his immortal soul.     
By 1455, the first problem (of backward tracing) was solved by a blunt fiction. Instead of 
explaining how C had gotten the horse from B, A alleged that he, A, had casually lost the 
horse and that C had found and unjustly detained it.156 B was excised from the narrative. 
Ironically then, the solution to the problem of not definitely knowing, or proving, how the 
horse made its way to the defendant was to tell a story that was definitely false. But of 
                                                          
151 For the text of the writ: Baker, IELH (n 5) 543. 
152 A third defect was that the defendant could return damaged goods without liability. This is not discussed 
here. For more, see AWB Simpson, ‘The Introduction of the Action on the Case for Conversion’ [1959] 
LQR 364, 364. 
153 Baker, IELH (n 5) 392–393. 
154 Hudson (n 8) 81. 
155 Simpson, ‘The Introduction of the Action on the Case for Conversion’ (n 152) 365. 




course, it was an explanation and for the judges this was enough. By 1400, the allegation 
of losing and finding was non-traversable.  
The reader may wonder how such a fiction, and indeed the other fictions, could get off the 
ground in the first place. Was there a trailblazing lawyer who gambled his client’s claim 
on a chance of creating a new fiction (when the false allegation was not yet non-
traversable)? How did judges decide to make an allegation non-traversable as a matter of 
policy? Was there a backroom deal? Was there an invitation or intimation from the bench? 
These are fascinating questions for the legal historian. Disappointingly, we will probably 
never know the answer. As Professor Baker said:  
[T]he experiments which preceded the familiar forms, are in some ways the most 
interesting to the historian, and yet they shade off into the invisible … Fictions only 
surface in the books once they have become widely known and well established. 
The precise origin of a fictional device is therefore almost always beyond 
recovery.157 
In any event, the courts, from 1400 onwards, did not allow the allegation of losing and 
finding to be traversed. So was born the fiction of trover – literally ‘finding’. Some of its 
more entertaining manifestations included one plaintiff who lost a ship in London, another 
who lost a battery of guns and several who misplaced housefuls of furniture and utensils.158     
The second problem with the writ of detinue (wager of law) was solved when trespass on 
the case for conversion supplanted detinue as a whole in the Tudor era. This process is of 
no interest to us, except to say that the trover fiction (the allegation of losing and finding) 
was copied into the new pleading.159 Trover thus became part of the tort of conversion.    
In general terms, trover was a simple non-traversable fiction. Its effect, however, was 
incomplete. The defendant was allowed to traverse the fiction only to show that he had 
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come by the property through some recognised means. The fiction was calibrated to the 
purpose. That purpose, the motive for the fiction, was justice. For it was unjust that a 
proprietary action should fail because the claimant could not prove how the defendant had 
obtained the chattel – unless the defendant could show he had a better claim (in which case 
the fiction was suspended so that the allegation of losing and finding could be traversed).160  
Trover was a model Auxiliary Fiction. The story of losing and finding was not a genuine 
doctrinal ground. It was not seen as the real reason for the decision. It was just meaningless 
text, and so it remained, until the abolition of the fiction by the Common Law Procedure 
Act 1852.161 Detinue, incidentally, survived until 1977.162 Conversion, needless to say, is 
still alive and well.   
 
J. Ejectment 
It was a consequence of the writ system that a body of law grew around the peculiarities of 
each writ. This sometimes led to illogical inconsistencies between actions that were 
conceptually similar. The fiction of ejectment owes its origin to such an inconsistency.  
Following a change in the law in 1481,163 lessees could use the highly effective writ of 
ejectione firmæ (a variant of the writ of trespass) to recover a leasehold, that is the land in 
specie, from a squatter. Landlords had no access to this writ and had to use more archaic 
and dilatory writs to eject a squatter. This Tudor-era anomaly, whereby lessees suddenly 
found themselves in a better position than landlords, was the incentive for legal ingenuity. 
The solution is almost obvious. If the reason the landlord cannot use ejectione firmæ is that 
he is not a lessee, all the landlord has to do is to lease the disputed land to a collaborator 
who would enter upon the land and be duly ejected by the squatter. The ousted lessee would 
                                                          
160 Baker, IELH (n 5) 393. 
161 s 49 (the allegation of losing and finding was to be omitted).  
162 Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s 2(1).  




then have recourse to the writ ejectione firmæ as any other lessee in the land. If successful 
in his suit, the lessee would surrender the lease to the landlord, the true claimant. Thus a 
landlord would contrive to use the superior writ. The courts approved this practice by 1580 
at the latest.164 What is crucial about this device, in its Elizabethan form, is that there was 
nothing fictitious about it. A lease was actually granted; the lessee actually entered the 
land; the defendant did oust the lessee; the lessee really did have a cause of action in 
trespass against the defendant. In contradistinction to the common recovery, there was no 
collusion. On the contrary: the defendant (the alleged squatter) had to contest the action or 
lose the land. In the absence of any fictitious element, we must conclude the Elizabethan 
form of ejectment was no fiction at all.  
Professor Sparkes takes a different view. He argues that ‘ejectment was fictional in the 
sense that an artificial lease was used to secure leasehold recovery when the underlying 
issue was determination of freehold title’.165 This argument has merit: neither the lessor nor 
the lessee was genuinely interested in a lease. Nor was the lease ever enjoyed as such by 
the lessee. It was just a means to an end. However, on balance, it seems to me that the 
parties’ ulterior motives have nothing to do with whether a deed of lease confers a lease or 
not. If a lease has come into existence – as in the present instance – it should not be reduced 
to a fictitious lease; for surely this lease is as good as any other. This conclusion is 
consistent with the general position of this dissertation, to be expounded in the next chapter, 
that fictions should not be defined by their motives or effects.166      
We return to the narrative. As ejectment became increasingly popular in the seventeenth 
century,167 the rigmarole of lease, entry and ouster came to be seen as superfluous. It was 
also unpleasant and potentially dangerous because the lessee had to physically enter the 
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land the defendant occupied and be physically removed by him.168 Since the whole charade 
was merely a means to an end, why not expedite matters by eliminating the need for lease, 
entry and ouster? At first blocked by legislation against pretended titles, 169  the 
fictionalisation of ejectment occurred in the early 1650’s when the Upper Bench (as the 
King’s Bench was known during the Interregnum) decreed that defendants must confess 
lease, entry and ouster. In other words, the allegations of lease, entry and ouster became 
non-traversable.  
By 1700, the nominal lessee himself no longer had to be a real person (he too was a means 
to an end), but merely a fictitious party by the standard name of John Doe or the more self-
righteous Goodright, Goodtitle, Fairclaim etc. And if the ousted lessee was wholly 
imaginary, why not also imagine a lessee of the defendant as the ejector and call him 
Richard Roe – or more pejoratively Shamtitle, Thrustout, Troublesome or indeed Vice?170 
The appearance of Richard Roe was easier to procure than of a flesh-and-blood defendant 
since the true claimant controlled him.171 To seal the deal, the ‘attorney’ of the imaginary 
Richard Roe would write to the real defendant, advising him that he, Roe, had been sued 
and did not intend to defend himself. Then the real defendant intervened in the action as a 
reversioner and the real case began.172 In the 1762 case of Fairclaim v Shamtitle, Lord 
Mansfield said:  
Ejectment is an ingenious fiction for the trial of titles to the possession of land. In 
form it is a trick between two to dispossess a third by a sham suit and judgment. The 
artifice would be criminal, unless the Court converted it into a fair trial between the 
proper parties.173 
Jeremy Bentham, typically, was less forgiving: 
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A man to whom you let your house for a year – does he at the expiration of the time 
refuse to quit it? Not a chance will they give you for obtaining possession again of 
your house, unless you trump up a foolish story about two persons, real or 
imaginary, one of whom turned the other out of it. This is what you are forced to 
do, in bringing an action of ejectment.174          
In the full-fledged version of ejectment, attained in the 1700’s, the English fiction reached 
its apotheosis: an action to try leasehold had become the main common law vehicle to try 
freehold; every single constitutive element of the action was non-existent (no lease, no 
entry, no ouster); even the parties were non-existent.    
To summarise the characteristics of ejectment, it was a fiction born of convenience; it 
operated as a non-traversable pleading; and its effect was complete. It is the first fiction we 
can credit as being an Essential Fiction – because the steps that became fictitious (lease, 
entry, ouster) were the substantive basis for the outcome of the case. The fiction was a 
convenient shortcut, but, conceptually, ejectment remained a vindication of a lessee’s 
possession. The lease, entry and ouster were not mere incantations like the reading test. 
They actually meant something: a lessee in possession had been ousted. They formed the 
doctrinal basis for recovery.  
The death of this fiction, however, is more interesting for our purposes than its life. The 
fiction of ejectment was abolished in the bonfire of the fictions that was the Common Law 
Procedure Act 1852 along with many other fictions – among them vi et armis.175 But 
whereas vi et armis was simply dumped as meaningless text in a writ (that is, the words ‘vi 
et armis’ no longer had to be averred), the fiction of ejectment could not be disposed of so 
easily. This is because the fiction encompassed an entire action. This action was the 
primary means to recover land in England. Indeed, a 1833 statute had made it the only 
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permissible real action, with few exceptions.176 If the fictitious elements of ejectment were 
simply omitted, as the words ‘vi et armis’ were omitted, there would be nothing left of the 
action – not even parties. In 1852, Parliament faced the task of reconstructing an action for 
the vindication of land ownership on a non-fictitious basis.  
The reconstruction proved unimaginative. Statutory ejectment preserved all the substantive 
aspects of common law ejectment while ditching the fictitious pleadings.177 Section 221 of 
the Common Law Procedure Act explicitly incorporated into the new scheme the 
‘Jurisdiction as heretofore exercised in the Action of Ejectment’ and all relevant legislation 
not inconsistent with the said Act.  
In Butler v Meredith, an ejectment case decided in 1855, three years after the passage of 
the Act, Pollock CB said: ‘Under the new order of things, which [the Act] has introduced, 
the action of ejectment is placed … on the same footing as when it existed as the mere 
creature of the Court.’178 Parke B concurred: ‘I feel satisfied that the position of parties 
under [the Act] is exactly the same as it was before.’179 
In other words, the action of ejectment was not expunged and built anew, but simply shorn 
of its disposable elements, namely the fictitious pleadings. In a sense, the fiction’s abolition 
was its ultimate victory, the culmination of the fictionalisation process: originally, in 
Elizabethan times, lease, entry and ouster had to be carried out; then, from the Interregnum, 
only pleaded; finally, in the Victorian era, not even pleaded. Thus these steps completely 
disappeared from the record.  
This is a good illustration of the recurring idea in the commentary that fictions are like 
scaffolding. In the words of John Chipman Gray, which Lon Fuller later endorsed,180 ‘Such 
fictions are scaffolding – useful, almost necessary, in construction – but, after the building 
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is erected, serving only to obscure it.’181 Peter Sparkes has recently articulated the concept 
in the context of ejectment:   
The fiction in ejectment can be seen as scaffolding, a metaphor which implies that 
a fiction is useful when building a new doctrine out of existing case-law only to 
achieve redundancy as soon as the construction is complete. While a building under 
construction is clad in scaffolding the external appearance is an imitation of the final 
shape, even though the scaffolding carries the purely procedural role of facilitating 
access to the work by the builders. When work is complete the scaffolding is 
removed to reveal the true shape of the edifice, the substantive doctrine to which the 
scaffolding provided a path. This is equivalent to the abolition of the fiction.182   
But herein lies the rub. In simply removing the scaffolding, the Act did not create a new 
action. The substantive doctrine – a possessory action based on notional entry and ouster – 
was not abolished. All the Act did was to change the procedure for the action. We have 
already seen that, in effect, only the fictitious pleadings were abolished. As a result, 
statutory ejectment did not lie for incorporeal hereditaments, such as an advowson183 or a 
profit-à-prendre, as these could not be entered upon.184 This is an important point. The 
claimant no longer had to plead lease, entry and ouster, but this doctrinal basis of the action 
still had to be satisfied notionally. Failure to do so meant the statutory action was 
unavailable. So much for the abolition of the fiction. FW Maitland’s famous saying echoes 
in our ears: ‘The forms of action we have buried but still they rule us from their graves.’185 
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The story of quasi-contract is another example of a fiction officially abolished, but which, 
Zombie-like, refused to die. Following the watershed case of Slade v Morley186 in 1602, all 
debts (except by deed187) were normally recovered under the writ of assumpsit.188 It was the 
legacy of Slade’s Case that the promissory writ of assumpsit became the writ most 
associated with contract.189 It was promissory because it alleged that the defendant debtor 
had promised to pay the debt to the claimant creditor. In the contractual context, this 
promise could be properly implied. To assume a debt is to promise to repay it.  
But shortly after Slade’s Case, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter,190 
plaintiffs adopted a form of pleading in which the promise was subsequent to the contract 
(rather than implied in it). At this point, the implied promise became a fictitious promise.191 
This fictitious way of pleading assumpsit was known as indebitatus assumpsit. Literally 
meaning ‘being indebted, he promised’, these words of the writ encapsulated the fictitious 
separation between the contract and the subsequent promise.     
Now that the promise was fictitious anyway, there was a temptation to use it in non-
contractual contexts, where there could not have been any promise express or implied, 
coincident or subsequent.192 One such non-contractual context is what we today call unjust 
enrichment. Soon enough, the writ of assumpsit was doing the work of modern unjust 
enrichment.193 To recover money paid to the defendant by mistake – to use the classic 
example – the claimant would sue in assumpsit, alleging that the defendant had promised 
to pay him the money. The promise was of course made up. It was also more fanciful than 
                                                          
186 (1602) 4 Co Rep 92b, (1602) 76 ER 1074 (Exchequer Chamber). 
187 Still only recoverable by the writ of debt: Baker, IELH (n 5) 347; Ibbetson, HILO (n 64) 150. 
188 Baker, IELH (n 5) 345. 
189 Though actually a variant of trespass.  
190 See Ibbetson, ‘Slade's Case in Context’ (n 17) 315–316. 
191 Baker, IELH (n 5) 368. For more detail, see Simpson, HCLC (n 14) 491–493. 
192 Baker, IELH (n 5) 367. 
193 ibid 370. For more on the fictional origins of the law of unjust enrichment, see John H Langbein, ‘The 
Later History of Restitution’ in WR Cornish and others (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart 




the subsequent promise in the contractual context. But it did not matter: the promise was 
in any case non-traversable. As Lord Atkin retrospectively explained, ‘The law, in order to 
do justice, imputed … a promise which alone as forms of action then existed could give 
the injured person a reasonable remedy.’194 The locus classicus of this fiction is Lord 
Mansfield’s dictum in Moses v Macferlan (1760):  
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to refund; 
the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the equity of the plaintiff’s 
case, as it were upon a contract (‘quasi ex contractu,’ as the Roman law expresses 
it).195  
In this quotation we see the historic entanglement of unjust enrichment with contract. The 
case was brought on the writ of assumpsit, used for contract, meaning the pleading was 
promissory. Since the fictitious promise was used in all contract cases (save deeds), it 
seemed as though a mistaken payment was recoverable because it was like a contract – and 
not because the law imposed an obligation. Lawyers thought of the situations we associate 
with the distinct category of unjust enrichment as analogous to contract; not quite the same 
as contract, because there was no agreement, but like contract – that is, quasi-contract.196  
It is not immediately obvious why an obligation which springs ‘from the ties of natural 
justice’ should in any way resemble a contract, the obligations in which derive from 
agreement.197 It is possible that this conflation is simply the result of the pleading system: 
because unjust enrichment cases were framed as promissory actions, they came to be seen 
in contractual terms. 
The operation of the fiction was quite simple. It was a non-traversable pleading whose 
effect could be said to be maximal: whenever ‘natural justice’ demanded a remedy, the 
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fictitious promise obliged. 198  It follows that the motive for this fiction was justice. 
Importantly, quasi-contract was an Essential Fiction, at least by the nineteenth century. 
This is because the analogy with contract, or alternatively the promise springing from 
natural justice, was seen as the rational basis for recovery – even if the promise was known 
to be fabricated factually speaking.  
The conceptual link between unjust enrichment and contract was so strong that when the 
fiction of the implied promise was abolished by the Common Law Procedure Act 1852,199 
the courts were not soon disabused of it. In fact, Tariq Baloch suggests that far from being 
abolished, the fiction of quasi-contract thickened, as ‘courts would inform their 
understanding of the indebitatus claims by reference to a genuine implied contract’.200 The 
‘worst example’ of this tendency, according to William Swadling,201 was the decision of 
the House of Lords in Sinclair v Brougham in 1914.202 In that case, the claimants had 
deposited money with a building society pursuant to a loan contract. This contract was 
declared void for being ultra vires the society’s constitution. The claimants sought to 
recover their deposits in a quasi-contractual action (technically an action for money had 
and received). Explaining why this action failed, Viscount Haldane LC said: 
[S]o far as proceedings in personam are concerned, the common law of England 
really recognizes … only actions of two classes, those founded on contract and those 
founded on tort. When it speaks of actions arising quasi ex contractu it refers merely 
to a class of action in theory based on a contract which is imputed to the defendant 
by a fiction of law. The fiction can only be set up with effect if such a contract would 
be valid if it really existed.203 
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Since the building society in Sinclair v Brougham had no power to enter into the loan 
contract (it being ultra vires its constitution), there could never be any contract, even in 
theory, and the fiction could not ‘be set up with effect’. His Lordship continued: 
[T]he law of England cannot … impute the fiction of such a promise where it would 
have been ultra vires to give it. The fiction becomes … inapplicable where 
substantive law … makes the defendant incapable of undertaking contractual 
liability. For to impute a fictitious promise is simply to presume the existence of a 
state of facts, and the presumption can give rise to no higher right than would result 
if the facts were actual.204 
Reading Viscount Haldane’s reasons, one might be excused for thinking that the fiction 
had never been abolished. More, this reasoning betrays a misunderstanding of the fiction 
of quasi-contract; for the whole point of the fiction is that the promise and contract are not 
genuine. Even under the forms of action, that golden age of fictions, judges had not fallen 
into the fallacy of the genuine fiction.205 Like a pathological liar who starts to believe his 
own lies, post-abolition judges believed a theoretical contract was necessary for recovery. 
This fallacy, the same we saw in post-abolition ejectment, is the hideous strength of 
Essential Fictions, which form the doctrinal basis of an action.  
Another example of the staying power of the quasi-contract fiction was Cowern v Neild,206 
decided by the High Court in 1912. The claimant had bought hay and clover from a 
business run by a minor. The clover arrived rotten and the hay never arrived at all. The 
buyer sought to recover the cheque he had given by an action for money had and received. 
He lost because the minor lacked capacity to contract and thus no contract could exist in 
theory to sustain the fiction of quasi-contract.207 Just as post-abolition ejectment did not lie 
for incorporeal hereditaments because they could not be entered upon as required by the 
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underlying fiction, so too unjust enrichment did not lie where a contract could not have 
existed.  
It is clear that, post-abolition, judges did not consider quasi-contract abolished as a matter 
of substance or doctrine, but simply as a matter of pleading or procedure. The implied 
promise did not have to be pleaded, but as with lease, entry and ouster in ejectment, the 
promise continued to exist as the basis of the action. To paraphrase Mark Twain, the report 
of its death was greatly exaggerated.208  
By the middle of the twentieth century, the link between contract and unjust enrichment 
was unravelling. In 1940, with the Luftwaffe thundering overhead, Lord Atkin channelled 
Winston Churchill in the House of Lords: 
These fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to meet requirements of 
the law as to forms of action which have now disappeared should not in these days 
be allowed to affect actual rights. When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of 
justice clanking their mediæval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass 
through them undeterred.209      
In 1991, the doctrine of quasi-contract was finally jettisoned in favour of a non-fictitious 
action of unjust enrichment.210 However, it was not until 2010, in Haugesund Kommune v 
Depfa ACS Bank,211 that the last vestige of the ‘fictitious nexus’212 between contract and 
unjust enrichment was finally consigned to oblivion. In a re-enactment of the relevant facts 
of Sinclair v Brougham, Norwegian local authorities borrowed money ultra vires their 
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statutory capacity. Departing from Sinclair v Brougham, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
bank’s claim in unjust enrichment for the money lent.213 As Graham Virgo put it:  
The result for the [local authorities] was that they had to make restitution of the 
money lent. But the result for English law is even more significant: just under 100 
years later, this is the final nail in the coffin of Sinclair v. Brougham.214 
Indeed, it was the final nail in the coffin of quasi-contract. Now that the law of unjust 
enrichment was not predicated on an implied contract (which had to be theoretically 
possible), there was no impediment to restitution in cases of void loans and no denial of 
just remedies.   
What we see in the post-abolition history of quasi-contract is that, even more than 
ejectment, it resisted retirement for many decades and even gained strength. The Common 
Law Procedure Act 1852 only succeeded in removing it superficially as a pleading, as a 
form of action.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Our survey of Old Fictions ends here. We have seen that Old Fictions are not cast of the 
same mould. Besides being fictions, the similarity between them is at most a family 
resemblance. Most Old Fictions operated as non-traversable pleadings, but some relied on 
bad evidence (benefit of clergy and belly) or collusion (common recovery) or withdrawn 
pleadings (bill of Middlesex). Most Old Fictions completely eradicated the rule they 
targeted, but some only softened the rule (vi et armis) or created an exception to it 
(geographical fictions). Some Old Fictions were tolerated because they facilitated justice 
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in a formally inflexible system. Others were condoned simply to avoid inconvenience or 
save money. The table below sets out the characteristics of the eleven fictions we have 
described. 
Fiction Type Manner of 
operation 
Effect on rule Motive 
Dominus remisit 
curiam 





Vi et armis Jurisdictional Non-traversable 
pleading 




































Auxiliary Collusion Almost complete 
abrogation 
Justice 
Trover Auxiliary Non-traversable 
pleading 
Partial abrogation Justice 














Notwithstanding the versatility of the Old Fiction, it is possible to extrapolate some general 
conclusions about Old Fictions from our findings about particular Old Fictions. First, Old 
Fictions did not appear ex nihilo. They mostly emerged tentatively, piecemeal, by 
weakening the factual basis of pre-existing structures. Second, English judges were not 
afraid of fictions, no matter how ludicrous they might have seemed to a layman. They saw 
fictions in purely technical, instrumental terms and nothing more. Fictions were thus used 
to mitigate the rigidity of the forms of action. Fiction was an antidote to formalism; a 
corrective mechanism that allowed the law to develop in a formalist age.  
Thirdly, and perhaps more controversially, for all their inelegance and lack of principle, 
fictions under the Old System tended to be a force for good. They generally made the legal 
system more just, more accessible, more convenient. As Sir Matthew Hale said in defence 
of fictions, ‘they are but expedients without injuring anybody to bring men to their 
rights’.215 The hideous strength of Essential Fictions was a post-abolition, New System 
phenomenon.  
This brings us to the final question, the post-mortem question. What befell the Old Fictions 
following the death of the forms of action? It is not surprising that the Jurisdictional 
Fictions – dominus remisit curiam, vi et armis, geographical fictions, bill of Middlesex and 
writ of quominus – disappeared without a trace when the writ system and formal pleading 
were abolished. These Old Fictions were purely procedural. When the procedures went out 
of use, they too went out of use.     
Auxiliary Fictions suffered a similar fate. Although not strictly of procedure, they consisted 
simply of words that had to be recited with respect to some actions without representing 
any real doctrinal substance. Put differently, they were purely formal. These included such 
ancient stalwarts as the benefit of clergy and the common recovery – as well as the lesser 
                                                          




known plea of the belly. They too went down without a fight when the forms of action 
vanished.    
It was the third type of Old Fiction, the Essential Fiction, that cheated the hangman. When 
the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 pronounced the death sentence for ejectment and 
quasi-contract216 they did not mount the gallows but instead went underground. There, 
below the surface, they continued to underpin the action from which they were doctrinally 
inextricable – as they had always been considered to be reasons for the outcome of the 
case.  
So it was that Essential Fictions lost only their formal manifestations, their outward signs. 
They receded from the light of day – the pleadings and the writs – deep into the dark heart 
of doctrine; a grave from which they continued to exert their power over the law above 
ground. In a sense, they were buried alive.      
In ejectment, we have seen that the fiction consisted in the skipping of doctrinally-
necessary steps. Even when the fiction was removed, the action was still conceived in terms 
of these steps. When these steps were not possible (eg entry on an incorporeal 
hereditament), the action failed regardless of the formal abolition of the fiction. Similarly, 
when unjust enrichment was thought of as a quasi-contractual action, the abolition of the 
implied promise did not mean lawyers stopped looking for theoretically-possible contracts. 
No; the Old Essential Fictions receded into the heart of doctrine, becoming New Fictions.                      
This metamorphosis from Old to New Fictions is the subject of the next chapter.    
 
                                                          






NEW FICTIONS DEFINED 
 
 
It is obvious that a critical evaluation of the fiction 
as a device of legal thought and expression cannot  
be undertaken until one has at least attempted an  
answer to the question: What is a fiction? 
 
      Lon L Fuller1 
 
       
  
  
                                                          





The abolition of the forms of action in the mid-nineteenth century was a seismic shift in 
the history of English law. Actions now became concepts rather than forms of words or 
procedures. And if it was an earthquake for the law in general, it was a mass extinction 
event for legal fictions in particular. We saw in the previous chapter that nearly all fictions 
– some of which had thrived for centuries – ceased to exist at one statutory swoop. Even 
the few survivors no longer functioned in the old way; that is to say, as a non-traversable 
pleading. In fact, that is why these fictions (which we called ‘Essential’ in the last chapter) 
survived: by forming a conceptual element of the action they escaped Parliament’s purge 
of ‘All Statements which need not be proved’.2   
The new paradigm, with its conceptual fictions, presents a problem that the Old System 
did not. Legal philosopher Lon Fuller said that ‘it is generally more difficult to say that a 
given statement is false when it relates purely to legal concepts, than when it relates to 
extralegal fact’.3 In the last chapter, we had little reason to doubt whether an Old Fiction 
was really a fiction4 (historical accuracy aside5). For one thing, the blatancy of many Old 
Fictions left little to the imagination. For another, their operation was mechanical. The 
pleading system separated (if artificially at times) law from fact, and carefully picked 
which allegations of fact had to be proved. It meant that certain facts were not capable of 
refutation and were fictions by definition, by the very nature of the system.     
Now that we no longer have non-traversable pleadings; now that fictions are conceptual 
and mixed with the law, identifying fictions is more problematic. It is often difficult to 
draw a line between legal fictions and intangible legal concepts; between legal fictions and 
rules; between legal fictions and mistakes; and between legal fictions and the general 
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artificiality of the law. These fine distinctions have bedevilled generations of legal scholars. 
Lon Fuller devoted a third of his monograph, Legal Fictions, to the question ‘What is a 
legal fiction?’6 Fully another third of his canonical work is concerned with the awkward 
position of fictions in a system which is artificial in the sense that it is man-made. James 
Stoneking was correct to say that the ‘legal fiction often seems to defy definition’.7 While 
this dissertation was being written, Douglas Lind wrote: ‘The paradox of legal fictions 
begins in a puzzle of definition. Just what is a legal fiction? This simple question yields no 
easy answer.’8  
It is argued here that the lack of success which has attended the quest for a definition is 
partly attributable to an uncompromising approach: that there exists a single, absolute idea 
of fiction or, as it were, a Platonic form of fiction. This approach, while intellectually 
seductive, does not capture the nuance of legal argument. It does not do justice to the 
subtleties of language in which judges couch their reasoning. The alternative approach 
advanced in this chapter is to define legal fiction as either ‘Hard’ or ‘Soft’ and thereby to 
better understand what goes on in the judgments.  
In short, the aim of this chapter is to clarify the outer boundaries of the term ‘legal fiction’ 
and to distinguish between Hard Fictions and Soft Fictions.  
This chapter begins with a description of the problem with the current state of the 
scholarship, followed by a description of the desired solution. We then lock horns with 
some common theoretical objections to fictions, before turning to an historical overview 
of the existing definitions of legal fiction. Next, the definitions of Hard and Soft Fiction 
are put forward and tested in two contemporary case studies in private law: the reasonable 
man and volenti non fit injuria.  
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II. The Problem: A Loose Concept 
We use the term ‘legal fiction’ familiarly with the confidence that we know what it means. 
But what does it really signify – except some vague notion of unreality? Does it include 
strained arguments; errors; deceptions; absurdities; misnomers?  
Commentators have assumed (precariously in my view) that the following are fictions, in 
whole or in part: companies,9 trusts,10 the reasonable man,11 implied terms,12 tracing,13 
vicarious liability,14 ‘practical benefit’ consideration,15 absolute Crown ownership of 
land,16 hypothetical scenarios,17 the Crown and the British constitution;18 to name a few 
examples. William Swadling, Peter Birks, John Langbein and others have argued that the 
constructive trust is a fiction because it is not really a trust.19 The label ‘legal fiction’ has 
been applied more generally to ‘intellectual sophistication’ which causes a ‘disconnect 
between [the law] and the understanding of ordinary men and women’.20 American writers 
have expanded the definition even further to include empirically-false suppositions (eg 
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18 JH Baker, LTB (OUP 2001) 47–48. 
19 William Swadling, ‘The Fiction of the Constructive Trust’ (2011) 64 CLP 399; Peter Birks, ‘Fictions 
Ancient and Modern’ in Neil MacCormick and Peter Birks (eds), The Legal Mind (Clarendon Press 1986) 
84; John H Langbein, ‘The Later History of Restitution’ in WR Cornish and others (eds), Restitution: Past, 
Present and Future (Hart 1998) 58; John V Orth, ‘Fact & Fiction in the Law of Property’ (2007) 11 Green 
Bag 65, 72–73; Jeremiah Smith, ‘Surviving Fictions’ (1917) 27 Yale LJ 317, 322–324. For another 
argument why certain constructive trusts are not trusts, see Simon Gardner and Emily MacKenzie, An 
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reliability of eye-witness testimony),21 discredited legal regimes (eg slavery)22 and 
complex statutory schemes.23 Legal philosopher Hans Vaihinger took the matter to the 
furthest possible extreme arguing that all the law was a fiction.24  
In the courts, the term is deployed with equal liberality. In two recent decisions, Lord Reed 
and Lord Hope described a host of hypothetical persons, among them the officious 
bystander, the right-thinking member of society and the reasonable man as legal fictions.25 
In the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ stated that the ‘well-established principle under which 
… documents constituting a single transaction are read and construed as one document’ 
was a ‘legal fiction’.26 In the High Court, the treatment of past events, found to be more 
likely than not, as certain was also considered a fiction.27    
In response to those who spy fictions everywhere, some writers have insisted on a narrow 
view of fictions, holding that failure to reflect reality is not in itself fictitious;28 that no 
matter of law is fictitious;29 and even that the law is unable to generate a fiction.30  
And so, opinion is divided: the meaning of legal fiction ranges from all legal thought at 
one extremity to hardly any law-related thing at the other. As one author recently observed, 
‘Any reader pursuing the topic will quickly discern that there is an oscillation in the 
literature between those who think legal fictions are an illusory category … and those who 
see legal fictions everywhere’.31  
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How many of the above-mentioned legal concepts, devices or rules are really fictions? 
When Lord Hoffmann says in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd (2009) that in 
interpreting the terms of a contract there is no ‘limit to the amount of red ink or verbal 
rearrangement or correction which the court is allowed’,32 do we slide into the realm of 
fiction?  
In my view, judges and scholars (with some exceptions) have too broad a conception of 
fictions. This conception is too broad not only for what we shall define below as the Hard 
Fiction, but even for its Soft counterpart.    
The significance of formulating a definition – the aim of this chapter – is threefold. First, 
a precise definition for Hard and Soft Fictions would demystify a fraught concept, 
providing analytical clarity and consistency. In law, language is important. The opening 
sentence of Sir John Baker’s The Three Languages of the Common Law reads: ‘The 
development of a body of legal ideas is inseparable from the creation of special legal 
language.’33 Later, Professor Baker adds, ‘The development of terms of art is of the essence 
of legal development, and the common law could never have become a distinct body of 
law without its own distinct language … in which to express its concepts.’34 It is contended 
that legal fiction ought to be a term of art.  
This leads us to the second benefit of this chapter: the potential for ‘legal development’. 
Just as the law needs terms of art to operate internally, any external academic evaluation 
of the legal fiction depends on a sound and widely-accepted definition.  
The third advantage of a precise definition arises from the fact that legal fictions, rightly or 
wrongly, carry an odour. Thus, the classification of a legal concept as fictitious may 
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undermine its legitimacy. Such was the case with quasi-contract35 and a similar attack has 
been launched on the constructive trust.36 If we conclude that this or that legal concept is 
not fictitious, we can, just by removing the epithet, avoid an argument.   
 
III. The Solution: Hard and Soft Fictions 
The obvious solution to the problem of definition is to suggest a good definition. But in 
practice that would do no more than add another definition to the pool. It is likely to fare 
no better than its predecessors and only exacerbate the problem.  
The solution proposed here is unique because it takes a more inclusive, yet precise, 
approach. By offering two original definitions – one ‘Hard’, one ‘Soft’ – we aim to make 
peace between conflicting definitions, without giving up precision. Instead of endlessly 
arguing about the correct standard, let us recognise two standards of fiction. It is hoped that 
this solution will be more widely-accepted; more likely to take root and end the uncertainty.         
Before we commence, one further point needs clarification. The new definition promoted 
in these pages, including as it does the distinction between Hard and Soft Fictions, does 
not invalidate alternative definitions. As a matter of English usage, anything which is 
untrue or fabricated may be called fictitious. The word is flexible enough to sustain any 
definition which contains invention as an element. The conclusion of this inquiry is not, 
say, that Bentham’s or Fuller’s definition is wrong, but that the proposed twin definition is 
a better analytical tool.   
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IV. Do Legal Fictions Exist? 
The legal fiction is so unsettled a concept that even its existence has been questioned. The 
first challenge we are called upon to meet, therefore, is to demonstrate that legal fictions 
exist. Ironic as it may be to prove that fictions are real; and disquieting to the author to 
doubt the existence of his subject matter, the fragility of the concept must be acknowledged 
– and dealt with.  
The argument against the existence of legal fictions, in a nutshell, is that all law is fictitious 
and therefore there is no distinction between so-called fictions and the rest of the law. It is 
the argument from artificiality of law. Below we discuss several intellectual assaults on the 
legal fiction, each of which is inspired by the argument from artificiality, but in different 
ways and to different extents. I conclude that these assaults on the fiction do restrict the 
scope of the concept, but do not destroy its core: some ground is lost to the assaulting 
forces, but the citadel holds on. And so the answer to the paradoxical heading of this section 
is yes, legal fictions exist.    
 
A. Vaihinger’s Assault 
In his 1911 book, The Philosophy of As-If, Professor Hans Vaihinger called for a wholesale 
re-assessment of fiction in human thought.37 The German philosopher was not primarily 
concerned with law. Indeed, Fuller called his ‘treatment of the legal fiction exceedingly 
superficial.’38 Nevertheless, Vaihinger’s radical thesis, if accepted, might have the 
consequence of expanding the definition of fiction to include – worryingly – all the law.39     
Vaihinger’s thesis, as applied to law by Fuller,40 may be summarised as follows. He 
observes that all branches of knowledge, including the exact sciences, rely on fictions. 
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Economists assume a market of rational actors and mathematicians use imaginary numbers. 
Vaihinger attributes this universal reliance on fiction to the fact that fiction is essential to 
reasoning.41 We reason by analogy, induction and assimilation. When presented with a new 
thing, we tame it by matching it to something familiar. In this way, we misdescribe the 
facts and make inexact analogies in order to fit a new case into our existing system of 
thought.  
The writ system we looked at in the previous chapter was, in its own way, a perfect 
illustration of Vaihinger’s theory. New facts had to be shoehorned into existing forms – 
actually inserted into templates – often by way of fiction. Mistaken payments, for example, 
were forced into the promissory writ of assumpsit by the mediation of the fictitious implied 
promise.42 Actions arising overseas were brought within existing procedures by misstating 
the locality.43  
The Old System was but an extreme case of a general phenomenon. Whenever a new set 
of facts presents itself to a lawyer, what does he do? He tries to fit it into the existing legal 
structures and make analogies with existing cases. Vaihinger says this is how our mind 
works always. He goes on to say that this process of false analogy – false because no two 
cases are alike – is endemic, legitimate and inescapable. The point of thinking is not to 
create an exact picture of reality, but to process it. This involves oversimplification and 
mistranslation to familiar terms. To shun fictions is to shun reasoning. Jerome Frank, we 
note in passing, argued along similar lines in Law and the Modern Mind.44     
The breadth of Vaihinger’s assault is hard to overstate. Alf Ross said of Vaihinger that ‘He 
extends the idea [of fiction] gradually to the point where everything beyond empirically 
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given sense data is taken as fictitious’.45 More recently, Christoph Kletzer has likewise 
observed: 
Vaihinger actually ends up arguing that nearly every concept is a fiction. In the 800 
pages of his work there seems to be no linguistic construct which he thinks would 
not benefit from being understood as a fiction. After all he says that every abstract 
and every general term is a fiction. Now, since every term, even an indexical, has 
an element of generality, according to Vaihinger every term must have a fictional 
element. This, however, is clearly proving too much as this generality robs fictions 
of any explanatory power.46 
Fuller had reached the same conclusion in the early 1930’s: Vaihinger ‘proves too much. 
If everything is “fiction,” then the meaning of the word “fiction” has been lost, and “as if” 
has become simply “is.” Indeed … if everything is fiction, then this includes Vaihinger's 
own philosophy’.47  
What, then, does this mean for the definition of legal fiction? If fiction is understood as the 
oversimplification of reality for analytical purposes; if all constructs are fictions, surely the 
law as a whole is implicated. For what is the law if not an oversimplification of reality by 
rules and constructs that hopelessly aim to answer an infinite variety of circumstances? The 
law, as a whole, then, is a man-made fiction.  
Thankfully, lawyers are not philosophers. Even if Vaihinger is right that on some 
fundamental level all the law is a fiction, we are free to adopt a definition that suits our 
purposes. Clearly, a definition which covers the entire field has no analytical value. And 
so, the sting of Vaihinger’s assault on the fiction is this: if all reasoning involves fiction; if 
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the law is based on fiction; if the law is fiction; how do we meaningfully fish out the ‘real’ 
legal fictions from this sea of artificiality? How do we distinguish fiction from non-fiction? 
   
B. Repelling Vaihinger’s Assault  
The artificiality of the law as such must of course be conceded. Positive law is not 
discovered in the physical world in the same way as the laws of biology or chemistry, but 
is created by human beings. That said, we can – and should – distinguish between degrees 
of artificiality. There is more nuance in the world than Vaihinger allowed. Much of the 
disagreement between scholars arises from the fact that the word ‘fiction’ can be 
understood in more than one sense. These senses may be ranked in order of stringency, that 
is, as different thresholds for ‘fiction’.   
At the lowest level, meaning the lowest threshold for ‘fiction’, we can say that anything 
which does not perfectly and comprehensively reflect a particular aspect of the physical 
world is fictitious. According to this understanding, which is really Vaihinger’s 
understanding, even a documentary film is fiction because no film can comprehensively 
and with perfect precision describe all facets of its subject matter. A threshold that is so 
low entails, unsurprisingly, that all the law is fictitious. If this is what we mean by ‘fiction’, 
then the argument from artificiality succeeds: all the law is artificial so either everything 
or nothing is fictitious.  
An intermediate threshold for fiction is to say that anything which has no parallel, broadly 
speaking, in the physical world is fictitious. Put differently, anything that we speak of but 
does not exist in the physical world is fictitious. According to this understanding, corporate 
personality would be fictitious. It is an invention of the legal mind. In the real world, there 
is no entity which is independent of the people and things that make up the corporation. If 
this is what we mean by ‘fiction’, the situation is much the same; the argument from 
artificiality still succeeds. The law is a product of the mind; it does not exist in the physical 




A high threshold for fiction is that only things that contradict the physical world are 
fictitious. This higher standard for fiction requires more than the mere non-existence of the 
thing in the physical world, but an inconsistency with something that does exist – with a 
fact – in the physical world. Thus, things which have no parallel in the physical world, like 
corporations, would not be fictitious. Purely legal rules such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’ cannot 
be fictitious – because they have no parallel in the physical world which is capable of 
contradiction. By contrast, the geographical fictions we saw in the last chapter would be 
fictitious – because to say that Minorca is in London contradicts the physical world. If this 
is what we mean by ‘fiction’, the argument from artificiality fails – because not all the law 
is fictitious. A company is not fictitious. A trust is not fictitious. Rules in general are not 
fictitious. Only legal statements that contradict facts in the physical world are fictitious. 
There is now a place for fictions.   
In conclusion, the argument from artificiality, here personified by Hans Vaihinger, is 
effective against the low and intermediate understandings of fiction, but not the more 
stringent understanding, namely that fiction requires inconsistency with a fact in the 
physical world. In this dissertation, we adhere to the stringent understanding. Hence, for 
our purposes, legal fictions exist.   
 
C. Kelsen’s Assault 
If Vaihinger stands for the proposition that all legal thought is fictitious, Professor Hans 
Kelsen stands for the opposite extreme, that none of the law is fictitious.48 The Austrian 
legal theorist granted that statements about the law (eg jurisprudential theories) could be 
fictitious.49 However, as far as the law itself was concerned, it was unable to generate a 
fiction. In Kelsen’s words:   
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[T]he legislator—and with him everyone applying the law—does not ‘think’ that 
the matter were as such, he rather decrees whatever he wishes. This is how the 
‘matters’ become actually, i.e. legally, as they are. Within his realm, the legislator 
is almighty, since his function rests in nothing but his ability to tie certain legal 
consequences to legal conditions. A fiction of the legislator would thus be as 
impossible as a fiction of nature itself. After all, the law could only be opposed to 
itself—i.e. to its own reality. This, however, would be nonsensical.50  
According to Kelsen, the law is not, as Vaihinger believed, an inaccurate description of 
reality. It is not a description of reality at all – and ought not to be treated as such. It is an 
artificial system that has its own inherent validity or truth. Whatever was created by law 
would share in the general artificiality of the law and be true as a matter of law. It follows 
that legal fictions, which are created by the law, share in the general artificiality of the law; 
are simply true as a matter of law; and should not be contrasted with the physical world. 
Hence there are no legal fictions. 
  
D. Repelling Kelsen’s Assault 
In the first place, it should be pointed out that Kelsen’s conception of law as standing apart 
from the physical world is somewhat unrealistic. Kelsen was more philosopher than 
lawyer. When one descends from the world of theory to the world of practice, such a purist 
worldview is difficult to sustain. Let us take the allegations that the defendant entered vi et 
armis, or that Minorca was in London, or that a woman was ordained (for the purposes of 
benefit of clergy). It would be rather contrived, if not downright wrong, to call these 
statements purely legal. To say that the location of an island is a point of law merely, and 
has nothing to do with the physical world, is to stretch the credulity of the most sympathetic 
                                                          




reader. To say that ordinary words are to be understood in a non-factual sense is sophistry.51 
As Frederick Schauer said, ‘legal language is not, and cannot be, entirely sui generis in all 
of its words’.52 One cannot but be reminded of a certain entry from the famous proceedings 
of the Pickwick Club, as collated by Charles Dickens: 
The CHAIRMAN was quite sure the honourable Pickwickian would withdraw the 
expression he had just made use of. 
Mr. BLOTTON, with all possible respect for the chair, was quite sure he would not. 
The CHAIRMAN felt it his imperative duty to demand of the honourable 
gentleman, whether he had used the expression which had just escaped him in a 
common sense. 
Mr. BLOTTON had no hesitation in saying that he had not--he had used the word 
in its Pickwickian sense. (Hear, hear.) He was bound to acknowledge that, 
personally, he entertained the highest regard and esteem for the honourable 
gentleman; he had merely considered him a humbug in a Pickwickian point of view. 
(Hear, hear.) 
Mr. PICKWICK felt much gratified by the fair, candid, and full explanation of his 
honourable friend. He begged it to be at once understood, that his own observations 
had been merely intended to bear a Pickwickian construction. (Cheers.)53 
In the second place, Kelsen’s assault is more similar to Vaihinger’s than it appears at first 
sight. Although Vaihinger and Kelsen start from opposite extremes – all law is fiction; no 
law is fiction – they converge in holding all law to be artificial. Vaihinger says it is artificial 
because it fails to mirror reality. Kelsen says it is artificial because it is not supposed to 
mirror reality. It is the old argument from artificiality in a different guise. Vaihinger and 
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Kelsen differ in that one says this artificiality means fiction; the other a truth distinct from 
the truth of the physical world. But of course it is the same thing. It is like two men who 
argue whether Jane Eyre is fictitious or existing only in an imaginary world. As the French 
say, les extrêmes se touchent: the extremes meet.  
So we return to the same old argument, but now we can attach labels to the possibilities. 
Either all law is fictitious (as Vaihinger says) or no law is fictitious (as Kelsen says). In 
either case, how do we isolate legal fictions so as to give them some sensible meaning? 
We have already answered this question. We repel Kelsen with the same shield we used 
against Vaihinger. If we adopt an understanding of fiction as a statement which contradicts 
a fact in the physical world, then legal fictions are severable from the law in general. This 
is true even if the law as a whole is artificial in Kelsen’s sense of having ‘its own reality’.54  
  
E. Fictions and Rules 
Now that we have carved out a place for fictions within the artificiality of the law, we have 
to deal with subtler challenges to the concept of legal fiction. These relate to the 
relationship between fictions and rules. 
 
1. Can a Rule be Fictitious?  
Let us take the rule that ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs for the purposes of pet tax’. It is 
obviously made up, but seems to me plausible enough as a legal rule. Does this rule 
represent or contain a legal fiction?  
Sir John Baker says it does not. In The Law’s Two Bodies, Baker suggests that so-called 
fictions often do not make claims about facts but about the legal treatment of these facts.55 
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This treatment, Kenneth Campbell agrees, is but a rule with no truth value.56 And so, if we 
say that ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs for the purposes of pet tax’, we are not saying that 
cats are dogs, but only that cats are treated like dogs in relation to pet tax.57 In what sense 
is this false? It cannot be factually false because it is a statement about the law, not about 
cats. In Sir John’s own words: 
Rules of law cannot be true or false in the factual sense … lawyers have often used 
metaphorical language to describe abstract concepts. For example, husband and 
wife were deemed to be one person in law, a monk was treated as becoming civilly 
dead on profession, an abbot and his monks had a corporate legal personality distinct 
from that of the individuals (who were legally dead), acts of parliament were 
deemed to have been made on the first day of the session, and so forth. These are 
often said to be fictions. But they are not really so.58 
To borrow an example from Fuller,59 the German Civil Code once provided that ‘An 
illegitimate child and its father are not deemed to be related.’60 Baker would say that to 
object to this rule on the basis that father and child are biologically related is to miss the 
point. The law is not saying they are unrelated in fact, but that they are unrelated in the 
eyes of the law.  
While Baker’s view is certainly persuasive, I argue that the better view is that rules of law 
can be fictitious in certain circumstances. Let us re-consider the above examples. If the law 
treats father and child as unrelated, is this treatment not fictitious in that the law treats them 
as what they are not? If an Act of parliament is passed on Friday but is treated as having 
passed on Monday, is this not a contradiction of reality? And to return to the initial 
question, if a cat is treated as a dog, is this not a fictitious treatment? There is no relevant 
difference between treating Minorca as being in London and treating cats as dogs. The 
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fiction lies precisely in the false treatment: a fact in the physical world is treated as if it is 
otherwise. This contradiction with reality constitutes a legal fiction.61 The fact that it forms 
part of a rule is nothing to the purpose. Indeed, the most notorious fictions, such as 
geographical fictions, were ultimately rules of law, namely that the location (or whatever) 
was non-traversable. If we accept that Minorca in London was a fiction (and Baker does),62 
we must also accept that rules can be fictitious and that a rule deeming cats to be dogs is 
fictitious (or, at least, contains a fiction).63 
In conclusion, a rule of law may be fictitious to the extent that it contradicts a fact.  
It may be asked, apropos of this conclusion, whether a rule of law that contradicts another 
rule of law (rather than a fact) is a legal fiction. If the analysis above is accepted, the answer 
is clearly no. Only a contradiction with the physical world can generate a fiction. If two 
legal rules contradict each other, there is no ‘true’ or ‘false’ – because there is no external 
standard by which to validate or falsify them. There is only a logical inconsistency. 
   
2. Can a Rule be Fictitious if it can be re-stated without Resort to Fiction? 
It was argued in the previous section that a rule may be fictitious to the extent that it 
contradicts a fact. But what if the contradiction (ie the fiction) can be avoided by way of 
simple re-wording? In such re-wording, the fiction disappears but the substance of the rule 
is unaffected. For example, the rule that ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs for the purposes of 
pet tax’ can be re-written as ‘pet tax applies equally to dogs and cats’. The latter 
formulation cannot be faulted for any contradiction with the physical world. In the 
American case of Tyler v Judges of the Court of Registration (1900), Holmes CJ said: 
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[A] ship is not a person. It cannot do a wrong or make a contract. To say that a ship 
has committed a tort is merely a shorthand way of saying that you have decided to 
deal with it as if it had committed one, because some man has committed one in fact 
… The contrary view would indicate that you really believed the fiction that a vessel 
had an independent personality…64  
The question we need to answer is whether this susceptibility of certain fictitious rules to 
elimination by re-formulation means these rules are not fictions properly speaking. Are 
these so-to-speak ‘avoidable fictions’ purely semantic rather than substantive?  
Hölder, Eggens and Esser answered the question in the affirmative. For them, fictitious 
rules were but shorthand or convenient formulations: ‘What we usually accept as fictions 
are mere forms of expression, methods of cross-reference, equalisation.’65 In the same vein, 
Kelsen believed that so-called legislative fictions were no more than abbreviations.66 For 
to say that ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs’ is simply to enjoin equal treatment of dogs and 
cats. The rule, thus understood, does no violence to the physical world. The ‘fiction’ is not 
a matter of law, but of language, of phraseology.67  
Alf Ross put the case against recognising avoidable fictions as true fictions at its most 
convincing:  
To ‘pretend’ that A is B is merely an odd way of expressing the thought that, for the 
purposes of law, A is to be treated as subject to the same rules as apply to B. The 
oddity is thus exclusively of a linguistic, not a logical, kind … it is meaningless to 
talk of a ‘fiction’ in this context … There is no falsehood of any kind involved in 
saying that in a certain context women are to be treated according to the same rules 
as men.68       
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In my view, this refusal to recognise avoidable fictions as true fictions is misconceived. 
Ross is correct to say that there is no falsehood in saying that women are to be treated like 
men. But that is not what the rule under consideration says. The rule under consideration 
says that women are men. The two rules may have the same effect, but they are not the 
same rule.   
As Pierre Olivier cogently argues, the fact that we can arrive at the same outcome by two 
different legal techniques, one which contradicts reality on its face and another which does 
not, does not mean the two techniques are the same.69 Just because I can arrive at the same 
destination by two routes does not mean the routes are identical. To paraphrase Olivier, ‘It 
is fatuous to argue that because the same object can be achieved by the [re-formulation] 
and the fiction, the fictions we use are not fictions but [re-formulations].’70  
Furthermore, if two routes lead to the same destination, it would be unnatural to describe 
one route as a re-formulation (or re-anything) of the other. By the same token, it is wrong-
headed to conceive of rules with the same effect as the same rule formulated differently. 
What we have is not two formulations of the same rule, but two rules. Hence ‘Cats are 
deemed to be dogs for the purposes of pet tax’ is a fictitious rule, but ‘Pet tax applies 
equally to dogs and cats’ is not a fictitious rule, though both rules have the same effect.     
Thus, the answer to the question posed (Can a rule be fictitious if it can be re-stated without 
resort to fiction?) is yes.  
 
3. Is there a Difference between Assertive and Assumptive Fictions? 
Lon Fuller distinguishes between two forms of fiction. The assumptive form ‘carried a 
grammatical acknowledgement of its falsity’.71 Fuller offers as an example the ‘as if’ 
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construction but deeming would do just as well. ‘Cats are to be treated as if they are dogs’ 
or ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs’ are assumptive fictions. The assertive fiction, by contrast, 
‘appeared as a statement of fact; its fictitious character was apparent only to the initiate’.72 
Old Fictions were almost invariably of the assertive kind. The defendant was alleged to 
have entered with force and arms. A trespass was alleged to have occurred in Middlesex. 
The record made no concession of the falsity of the allegation. Only one initiated into the 
mysteries of the Old System would know that these statements were not to be taken at face 
value.      
There has therefore been a tendency in some quarters to say that assumptive fictions are 
not contrary to fact. This is supposedly because they contain an admission of the 
inconsistency. According to this view, to deem cats to be dogs is not a fiction, but to allege 
that cats are dogs is a fiction – because only the latter says anything about reality. This 
tendency has the respectability of old age. In the second century, Gaius ‘condemned the 
kind of fiction which required a lawyer to assert that green was red, but he allowed that the 
law could resolve to treat green as though green were red.’73 In his Institutes, the Roman 
jurist says the following of a manifest thief (namely a thief caught in the act): 
The fact that the statute enacts that in [other cases] there is manifest theft causes 
some writers to say that theft may be manifest by statute or in fact … But the truth 
is that manifest theft means manifest in fact; for statute can no more turn a thief who 
is not manifest into a manifest thief than it can turn into a thief one who is not a thief 
at all, or into an adulterer or homicide one who is neither ... What statute can do is 
simply this: it can make a man liable to a penalty as if he had committed theft...74  
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Gaius does make an important distinction between facts and the legal consequence of these 
facts. However, Fuller rejects the idea that there is any relevant difference between 
assumptive and assertive fictions: 
It might seem at first glance that we were dealing here with something very 
fundamental. Indeed, it might be argued that an assumptive fiction (an ‘as if’ fiction) 
is not a fiction at all … Yet a closer examination will show that the distinction is 
one of form merely. The ‘supposing that’ or ‘as if’ construction in the assumptive 
fiction only constitutes a grammatical concession of that which is known anyway, 
namely, that the statement is false. When we are dealing with statements which are 
known to be false it is a matter of indifference whether the author adopts a 
grammatical construction which concedes this falsity, or makes his statement in the 
form of a statement of fact.75 
I accept Fuller’s argument wholeheartedly. The fiction lies in the false treatment of facts 
as what they are not. It does not matter if the language of the fiction proclaims or conceals 
this false treatment. 
For the avoidance of doubt, my argument is not that an assumptive formulation and an 
assertive formulation which have the same effect are actually the same rule. Such a 
proposition would contradict the previous section. The argument is that they are two 
separate rules, but both may be fictitious.  
  
F. Conclusion 
We began this Part IV by posing a life-or-death question for this dissertation: whether the 
legal fiction exists at all. In defending the fiction concept from critics of various colours, it 
has been argued that the legal fiction does exist in the sense that it contradicts a fact in the 
physical world. This contradiction often takes the form of falsely treating a fact as what it 
                                                          




is not. It is irrelevant that the contradiction is part of a rule, or can be avoided by re-
wording, or is grammatically acknowledged.  
      
V. Overview of Existing Definitions 
Now that we have a reasoned basis for the assumption that our subject matter exists, it is 
necessary to give it precise shape. All we know at present is that legal fictions contradict 
the physical world in some sense. In this part, we critically survey existing definitions of 
legal fiction and related commentary with a view to refining the definition. We will find, 
in Fuller’s analysis, the seed of the distinction between Hard and Soft Fictions. 
  
A. Plain and Ordinary Meaning 
In a legal context, words such as ‘consideration’ or ‘receiver’ have assumed a technical 
meaning, quite distinct from their ordinary English sense. They have, to borrow a phrase 
from the tort of passing-off, ‘acquired a secondary meaning’.76 This has not been the fate 
of the word ‘fiction’. Indeed, the subject of our inquiry has no definition in case law or 
statute and commentators fundamentally disagree on its scope. It is used loosely and 
inconsistently, within the bounds of its lay meaning.  
We therefore begin with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. Webster’s Dictionary 
relevantly defines ‘fiction’ as ‘an intentional fabrication; a convenient assumption that 
overlooks known facts in order to achieve an immediate goal’.77 This definition has three 
core elements: a falsehood, which is intentional (not a mistake) and known to be false (since 
it ‘overlooks known facts’).        
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The Oxford English Dictionary generally renders ‘fiction’ as something ‘imaginatively 
invented; feigned existence, event or state of things; invention as opposed to fact’; and 
more specifically for our purposes as ‘A supposition known to be at variance with fact, but 
conventionally accepted for some reason of practical convenience, conformity with 
traditional usage, decorum or the like.’78 This definition displays the aforementioned core 
elements of falsity and consciousness thereof. It omits intention, but, on reflection, 
intention is implicit: if a statement is known to be false, its falsity must be intentional.  
Kenneth Campbell rightly points out that a statement may be known to be false by some 
and not others.79 For example, a party may lead false evidence to mislead the court. To 
avoid doubt, consciousness henceforth shall mean that the falsity of the statement is shared 
by the court, the lawyers and the wider legal community, though not necessarily the 
litigants themselves (who may not be versed in the law or aware of the legal niceties of 
their case).  
We have no interest in developing a definition that falls outside the dictionary definition. 
Our object is precision. What is more, we do not wish to risk the irony of the definition 
itself being fictitious. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us, throughout this inquiry, to 
preserve the core elements of the dictionary definition: falsity and consciousness.  
The OED also provides a legal definition:  
Chiefly applied to those feigned statements of fact which the practice of the courts 
authorized to be alleged by a plaintiff in order to bring his case within the scope of 
the law or the jurisdiction of the court, and which the defendant was not allowed to 
disprove.80  
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Webster’s technical definition is to the same effect.81 Such procedural definitions seem 
insufficient. Even under the Old System, not all legal fictions functioned as the non-
traversable pleading alluded to in the definition. In a world bereft of formal pleading, it is 
anachronistic. The definition must be broader than an incontestable pleading.  
Specialist dictionaries may offer better legal definitions. Black’s Law Dictionary speaks of 
‘An assumption that something is true even though it may not be true, made [especially] in 
judicial reasoning to alter how a legal rule operates’.82 Here consciousness is missing. A 
definition which fails to separate mistakes and lies from fictions is of little analytical value.   
Webster’s Law Dictionary has ‘a court’s assumption of a fact known to be untrue in order 
to fit a case into a category recognized by the law, so that relief can be granted and justice 
done’ and also ‘any assumption contrary to fact that is made by the law for reasons of 
policy or practicality’.83 Both falsity and consciousness are present, but supplemented by 
motives and outcome. There is a long tradition of defining fiction by its use or objective 
dating back to the Roman jurisconsults.84 It seems unwise to define fictions by their 
motivations or results. The motivation of judges is often not obvious and the justice of the 
result may be debatable. If we can define fictions by reference to what they are, and avoid 
an inquiry into what caused them or what they cause, we should do so.85 It does not follow 
that we must be blind to the causes or results of fictions. Indeed, these will be evaluated in 
subsequent chapters. The point here is that one’s view of the justification of a fiction is 
different from the identification of it. Evaluation is distinct from definition and definition 
must precede evaluation.    
In conclusion, having replaced the dictionaries, we are left with two elements: falsity and 
consciousness.  
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B. Academic Definitions 
 
1. Milestones in Anglo-American Thought 
Alf Ross claimed that ‘The legal literature for the most part lacks any explicit definition of 
fiction’.86 As Pierre Olivier noted several years later, this was by no means a new 
phenomenon: ‘Roman jurists never discussed the nature of, or endeavoured to explain or 
define the legal fiction’.87 However, as the following whistle-stop tour of academic 
definitions will show, Ross’s was an unduly harsh verdict. 
Olivier’s criticism of the scholarship was more particular: ‘Anglo-American writers do not 
materially contribute towards a better insight into the structure of the fiction’.88 This is an 
uncharitable judgment, but not an incorrect one. This state of affairs is, to my mind, 
attributable to the pragmatic character of English law. Common lawyers have never had a 
taste for philosophy. Legal historian Frederick Pollock has said so more than once: 
English lawyers have never taken dogmatic theories of any kind much to heart. Our 
doctrines get settled either by a gradual process of semi-conscious consent worked 
out in the solution of particular cases, or by the development, in the same manner, 
of conflicting tendencies in professional and judicial opinion until at last a decisive 
practical choice is called for.89 
No one who is familiar with the English judicial mind will be surprised at the 
scantiness of positive utterances on a question of this high order of generality.90 
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[M]ediaeval English lawyers were very like their descendants, and would not 
commit themselves on an abstract question in a general form if they could help 
it.91 
Be that as it may, we are concerned here with English private law and it behoves us to 
focus on the development of the fiction concept in the common law world. 
Writing in the 1590’s, Sir Henry Finch proposed, perhaps for the first time in English legal 
circles, a definition for the now-pervasive fiction: ‘A fained construction, which we call a 
fiction in law, is when in a similitudinary sort the law construeth a thing otherwise than it 
is.’92 The examples which follow indicate that presumptions and deeming provisions were 
included in the definition. Finch could be criticised for failing to distinguish between 
fiction and error, but such criticism would probably be unjust because ‘feigned’ implies a 
deliberate falsification, and hence consciousness, rather than error. Also, the fact that ‘the 
law’, as a system, accepts the feigned construction suggests that no deception is involved, 
but this is less clear. This is a rudimentary definition, which captures falsity, but fails to 
adequately pin down the crucial element of consciousness.    
In his famous Commentary upon Littleton, published in 1628, Sir Edward Coke informs us 
that ‘A … fiction of law shall never worke a wrong or charge to a third person.’93 In his 
report of Mary Portington’s Case (1613), which concerned the fiction of common 
recovery, Coke pointed out that equity always exists in a fiction of law.94 Blackstone 
likewise said, ‘this maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work 
an injury’.95 Sir Matthew Hale defended fictions on the same basis, ‘For they are but 
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expedients without injuring anybody.’96 Michael Lobban found numerous cases 
corroborating this precept.97 It may be supposed that equity, in the sense of justice, was 
seen as integral to the fiction.  
The better view is that the law refused to apply a fiction where it would work an injustice, 
not that a fiction ceased to be one if its application in a particular case would be unjust. 
This is consistent with the principle of not defining fictions by their motivation or result.     
Bentham gave us at least three definitions, in different parts of his oeuvre, all of which 
captured both falsity and consciousness: ‘By fiction … understand a false assertion of the 
privileged kind, and which, though acknowledged to be false, is … acted upon, as if true’; 
more concisely, ‘an assumed fact notoriously false’; or more polemically, ‘a wilful 
falsehood, having for its object the stealing legislative power, by and for hands which could 
not, or durst not, openly claim it’.98 This last deprecatory definition may with all propriety 
be applied to the common recovery, which, as we noted in the previous chapter, knowingly 
subverted the statute De Donis.99 Yet, as a generalisation, it is not true to say that a legal 
fiction by its essence is a usurpation of legislative power. To say so would be to deny the 
freedom of the common law to develop without legislative sanction. So long as the fiction 
in question does not interfere with an enactment, the constitutional order is not undone.      
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John Austin’s definition used different words to express the recurring elements of falsity 
and consciousness: ‘feigning or assuming, “that something that obviously was, was not; or 
that something that obviously was not, was”’.100    
In Ancient Law, first published in 1861, Sir Henry Maine considered legal fictions in the 
context of social evolution. His treatment of the subject is now famous and looks at the 
device from a new angle:   
[A]ny assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law 
has undergone alteration its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being 
modified … The fact is … that the law has wholly changed; the fiction is that it 
remains what it always was.101  
For Maine, the key points were legal change and concealment. This definition, while 
apposite to his analysis of the fiction as a means by which gaps between law and social 
development can be bridged, is at once too wide and too narrow for our purposes. It is too 
wide because the ‘assumption’ is not explicitly false; too narrow because it requires 
attempted or actual deceit. Few would disagree that it was a fiction for Lord Mansfield to 
accept that the island of Minorca lay in the parish of St Mary le Bow in London.102 Yet, it 
is difficult to see how such a blatant fiction could ‘conceal, or affect to conceal’ anything. 
The fiction was, to borrow from Lon Fuller, ‘a plain falsehood, rendered harmless by its 
utter incapacity to deceive’.103 The transparency of the English fictions belies Maine’s view 
that the fiction was somehow a subterfuge; not simply because it was an ineffective 
subterfuge, but because it was never intended to be one. As Austin said, ‘Can it be 
conceited for a moment, by any reasonable person, that fines and [common] recoveries … 
ever deceived anybody, or were intended to deceive?’104 SFC Milsom made the same point, 
with wonted perspicacity: ‘who was to be deceived? Probably nobody. The aim of fictions 
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… is not deception; it is to keep records straight.’105 Whatever may be said of the fiction, 
deceitful it is not. For this reason, Maine’s element of concealment should not form part of 
our definition.106        
In 1907, Roscoe Pound conflated legal fictions with ‘spurious interpretation’, a practice 
‘which has done its legitimate work’ in a pre-legislative era, but was ‘unnecessary and 
unsuited to a developed system of law.’107 Spurious interpretation is to ‘make, unmake, or 
remake, and not merely to discover.’108 In a modern era of legislation, so goes the 
argument, courts have no need of making or unmaking law. 
Regardless of the relative merits of Parliament and judges as law-makers, it is respectfully 
submitted that Pound misapprehends the fiction. A spurious interpretation is an 
interpretation which purports to be true. It is an argument which fails, or ought not, to 
convince. Fictions, by contrast, do not purport to be true and fail to convince: their falsity 
is writ large. The plot of Wuthering Heights is not spurious; it is fictitious. That the East 
Indies are in Islington109 is not a spurious pleading; it is a fiction.       
 
2. Lon Fuller 
At the height of the Great Depression, Professor Lon Fuller published a series of journal 
articles, really one article in three parts, all under the name ‘Legal Fictions’.110 This trilogy 
of 1930-1931 has become the leading work – surely the most cited work – on legal fictions 
in the English-speaking world, if not beyond it.111 One will be hard-pressed to find a work 
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dealing with the concept of the legal fiction that does not mention Fuller. In 1967, the 
articles were re-published in book form, also titled Legal Fictions, with an introduction by 
Fuller and minor amendments. In this dissertation, the book is regarded as authoritative 
and all references to Fuller are to the book.  
One need not be interested in legal theory to enjoy Fuller’s Legal Fictions. To the layman, 
it is fluent, accessible and persuasive. To the theorist, it is original and insightful. Fuller 
relied to his advantage on eye-opening analogies. He added much subtlety and 
sophistication to an old subject, especially as regards the motives for fictions. Fuller 
performed the dual service of bringing fictions into the modern world and opening them to 
a larger audience.  
Having said that, the work suffers from a certain disorganisation of thought. There seems 
to be no common thread as the reader is left the task of reconciling disjointed ideas. The 
last chapter is really a commentary on Vaihinger and it is not clear to what extent Fuller 
adopts Vaihinger’s far-reaching philosophy. This impressive, if unfocussed, work has no 
conclusion and no clear thesis. There is a section entitled ‘Conclusion’,112 but it is a cryptic 
reflection on a potential response to Vaihinger. In the end, Fuller offers not a general theory 
of fictions but a set of useful ideas. It is hard to disagree with Kenneth Campbell’s 
assessment: 
It is difficult to detect an overall thesis. Like Fuller's more famous jurisprudential 
production, The Morality of Law, this book has to be treated as presenting not a full-
blown theory, but a series of aperçus. Many of these do not bear examination. Some, 
however, do.113  
The following paragraphs will vindicate the last two sentences.  
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For the present, we are concerned only with Fuller’s definition of legal fiction: ‘A fiction 
is either, (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, 
or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.’114 The limbs of the definition, it 
should be stressed, are alternative rather than cumulative. This bipartite definition has 
proved to be Fuller’s most controversial contribution to the debate on fictions. Fuller 
himself owned that it ‘seems … to embrace two entirely discordant elements’.115 His most 
strident critic was Pierre Olivier, who, before proceeding to demolish the definition, noted 
it was ‘not a happy one’.116    
 
2.1 First Limb of Fuller’s Definition: ‘A Statement propounded with a Complete or 
Partial Consciousness of its Falsity’ 
Olivier argues it was ‘not correct’ to say that a statement could be propounded with only 
partial consciousness of its falsity.117 One is either aware that a statement is false or one is 
not so aware.118 For Olivier, there is no grey area and thus Fuller’s first limb is nonsensical. 
For Fuller, there plainly is a grey area: 
The line between belief and disbelief is frequently blurred. The use of the word 
‘fiction’ does not always imply that the author of the statement positively 
disbelieved it. It may rather imply the opinion that the author of the statement in 
question was … aware of its inadequacy or partial untruth, although he may have 
believed it in the sense that he could think of no better way of expressing the idea 
he had in mind. We have a fiction, then, when the author of the statement either 
positively disbelieves it, or is partially conscious of its untruth or inadequacy.119 
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It is to be regretted that Fuller did not give an example of the situation he described. I will 
take the liberty to suggest one. It is possible that in straining a legal rule beyond its intended 
application, the judge might be assailed by a nagging suspicion that he is entering the 
twilight zone of fiction, without having ‘complete consciousness’ – that is, the certainty – 
of an untruth. For example, if a statute says that ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs’ and the judge, 
eager to do justice on the facts, interprets the statute to mean that jaguars are also deemed 
to be dogs, on the basis that jaguars are feline or ‘big cats’, the judge may well be ‘partially 
conscious of … untruth or inadequacy’. He will see that he is straining the words to an 
unreasonable degree or imposing on them an unintended meaning. At the same time, he 
has not the complete consciousness of falsehood. Jaguars do belong to the cat family, 
felidae. Merriam-Webster defines ‘jaguar’ as ‘a large, powerful cat... ’120 This judge may 
be said to be in serious doubt as to the truth of his finding, but not in possession of the 
certainty of it. It will also be appreciated that in this situation the ‘truth’ itself becomes 
elusive as ‘truth’ depends on what construction we adopt and is at the very least contextual. 
What may be said with confidence is that the judge is proceeding on a strained or far-
fetched or contrived interpretation. It is either of these adjectives in the definite sense that 
it departs from the lay understanding, the natural and ordinary meaning, of the statement 
‘Cats are deemed to be dogs’. No one reading this sentence would think of lions, panthers 
or jaguars.121    
Real world examples may also be found. Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Richardson v Marsh, Scalia J said:  
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, 
rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief 
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that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state 
and the defendant in the criminal justice process.122  
Fuller is not wrong to allow for this situation and to describe it as ‘partial consciousness’ 
of falsity. Fuller has effectively softened the age-old element of consciousness to include 
not only the certainty of falsity, but also the awareness of a questionable leap of logic, the 
consciousness of serious doubt. It is narrow-minded for Olivier to censure partial 
consciousness as some kind of logical heresy. In my view, Fuller’s is a more nuanced 
understanding of judicial reasoning and should not be dismissed as nonsensical. Indeed, 
the category of Soft Fiction, proposed in Part VII below, is inspired by Fuller’s ideas 
(though he never suggested such a thing). The Soft Fiction is the consciousness not of utter 
falsity, but of a strained, far-fetched or contrived interpretation: the conscious imposition 
of an unnatural meaning on a rule of law. We shall return to this in due course.  
Olivier is, however, correct to point out that ‘Fuller’s definition is wide enough to include 
lies, falsehood and deceit’.123 He then adds, with undisguised disdain, that civilian 
‘Commentators warned against this error more than six centuries ago’.124 Of course, 
making statements with a complete or partial consciousness of their falsity is precisely 
what a liar does. The point is that the court must be conscious of the falsity.125 Fuller would 
no doubt have exclaimed ‘Well, of course!’ if he had heard this objection, but Olivier is 
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2.2 Second Limb of Fuller’s Definition: ‘A False Statement recognized as having 
Utility’ 
Olivier castigates this limb as ‘extremely vague’ and charges that it ‘tells us nothing about 
the construction of the fiction’.126 Moreover, Olivier continues, ‘the statement itself is false, 
since some fictions exist … which are not universally accepted as useful or beneficial – 
and yet are accepted as fictions’.127 Kenneth Campbell, who dissected Fuller’s definition 
several years after Olivier, in 1983, was equally harsh: 
Recognised by whom as having utility for whom? If the answer is, recognised by 
the party relying on it as having utility for him, then once again this fails to 
distinguish a fiction from any opportunistic lie. If it means recognised by the court 
as having utility for the person relying on it, then it does not distinguish it from the 
case where the court appreciates the opportunism of the lie. Does it mean recognised 
by the court as having general social utility? But surely there can be fictions courts 
are bound by authority to continue to recognise even though they have outgrown 
whatever social utility they may once have possessed? So limb (2) of the definition 
meets an even swifter death than limb (1).128  
Fuller’s second limb is bewildering from another angle. Its unqualified simplicity appears 
to contradict Fuller’s statement earlier in his book that ‘a fiction is distinguished from a lie 
by the fact that it is not intended to deceive’.129 Earlier still he equates fiction with ‘a plain 
falsehood, rendered harmless by its utter incapacity to deceive’.130 It is likely, given these 
quotations, that Fuller simply assumed, in formulating the definition, that the statement is 
known to be false by the legal community. But any such assumption is far from explicit in 
either limb of his definition. 
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Fuller explains the second limb of his definition (‘a false statement recognized as having 
utility’) at some length. The burden of the argument is that critics of certain legal devices 
often call these devices ‘fictitious’ as opposed to simply ‘mistaken’, even though they 
know that the proponents of these devices believe there is nothing untrue about them. In 
other words, the critics use the term ‘fiction’ when the element of consciousness is missing. 
To take a topical example of Fuller’s scenario, when William Swadling calls the 
constructive trust a fiction, he does not imagine that judges and lawyers already know the 
constructive trust is a fiction.131 Indeed, he openly acknowledges that ‘The idea that 
constructive trusts are genuine trusts is deeply rooted in the English psyche.’132 This 
situation is markedly different from geographical fictions, where the entire legal 
community recognised the factual falsity of the device. According to Fuller’s 
understanding, Swadling calls the constructive trust a fiction, and not simply a mistake, 
because he recognises that the constructive trust is a falsehood that plays some practical 
role, has some utility (even if he, Swadling, believes there is a better alternative). Hence 
Fuller’s second limb: ‘a false statement recognized as having utility’.  
The problem with Fuller’s second limb is that, by dropping the crucial element of 
consciousness, he blurs, if not downright erases, the line between fiction and mistake. The 
qualification of ‘having utility’ is too inherently uncertain to draw a new line between 
fiction and whatever it is the opposite would now be. And yet, it cannot be denied that in 
common parlance the word ‘fiction’ is also used to describe widely-held beliefs the speaker 
believes to be false. Swadling’s use of the term is a case in point and by no means 
irregular.133 
In constructing a definition, we face a choice between, on the one hand, a definition which 
is narrow enough to distinguish between fiction and mistake; and, on the other hand, a 
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definition which is broad enough to accommodate common usage by including widely-
held but (unconsciously) mistaken beliefs.  
My view is that we cannot dispense with the element of consciousness, even if some writers 
have done so. It is one thing to broaden the understanding of consciousness to include 
doubt, as discussed in relation to Fuller’s first limb. But utterly to eliminate consciousness 
as an element is a step too far. It does not add nuance to the definition: it destroys it. If 
fiction simply becomes an entrenched mistake in the law, it will have lost its peculiarity as 
a legal tool. It will have become no more than an argument somebody disagrees with. This 
dissertation is about fictions properly-so-called, not about genuine disagreements.  
While we should think twice before adopting a definition somewhat at odds with common 
usage, it is preferable for a rigorous examination of fictions to say that some people use the 
term inaccurately than to dilute almost to extinction its own subject matter. It is better to 
refer to widely-held but misguided beliefs as myths or misconceptions. The term ‘legal 
fiction’ should be reserved for consciously-false statements. For these reasons, Fuller’s 
second definition (the alternative second limb) should be rejected. 
       
2.3 The Second Limb strikes again?  
Not everyone shares Olivier’s (and my) view of the weaknesses of Fuller’s second limb. 
In his recent article, ‘New Legal Fictions’, Peter J Smith embraces, wittingly or not, 
Fuller’s second limb. Smith’s expansive understanding of legal fictions includes 
empirically-false suppositions, such as the reliability of eye-witness testimony or the ability 
of jurors to follow directions.134 Unlike Fuller, Smith is explicit in his rejection of the 
element of consciousness: 
[T]here also are … important differences between classic legal fictions and new 
legal fictions. There rarely was any confusion about whether a classic legal fiction 
had been deployed—as it was not intended to deceive—or what it accomplished … 
For new legal fictions, in contrast, there generally is no recognition of the fact that 
                                                            




the premise is false, although the assertions need not consciously be intended to 
deceive. Indeed, what characterizes most new legal fictions is that the learned reader 
of the law would not have explicit or implicit indication that the court is simply 
deeming to be true that about which we know otherwise.135 
It should be noted, parenthetically, that not all of Smith’s ‘new legal fictions’ actually meet 
his own criteria (as these criteria appear in the passage just quoted). For example, Smith 
regards the presumption that everybody knows the law as ‘a type of new legal fiction’.136 
There is, however, wide recognition among the judiciary that this premise is false. It is not 
clear why he classifies it as a ‘new legal fiction’ as opposed to a ‘classic legal fiction’.137       
In any case, Professor Nancy Knauer penned a comprehensive rebuttal of Smith’s ‘new 
legal fictions’. Specifically, Knauer takes issue with Smith on three grounds. First, she 
says, many of the suppositions (that comprise Smith’s ‘new legal fictions’) are doubtful or 
debatable, rather than patently false. This is redolent of Fuller’s notion of partial 
consciousness. Second, these suppositions, are valued for their truth, not their falsity. 
Third, if they are indeed erroneous, the cure is to correct them and there is no value in 
treating them as fictions.138 Confusingly, Knauer defends Fuller’s definition, even though 
its second limb favours Smith’s approach.139 
Knauer also resists attempts by other writers to include within the scope of legal fiction 
discredited legal regimes140 (such as slavery). The argument is the same: the supposed 
fictions are actually believed (however erroneously or immorally).  
In my view, the real criticism of Smith is that he, like Fuller before him (in the second 
limb), threw consciousness overboard. It is one thing to admit of partial consciousness; of 
indifference to the true state of events. To accept as fictitious what is positively believed 
and valued for its truth is to drive a coach and horses through the definition of legal fiction.  
In fairness to Smith, he suggests at various points that judges are aware, or ought to be, of 
the empirical evidence belying the false suppositions.141 This introduces an element of 
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consciousness, or at least constructive consciousness, as to the truth of the supposition. 
Unfortunately, he confirms his thesis is incompatible with our analysis when he declares, 
‘For new legal fictions, in contrast, there generally is no recognition of the fact that the 
premise is false.’142  
Even if Smith did maintain consistently that judges ought to be aware the premise is 
empirically false, this awareness would only reinforce the element of consciousness (albeit 
constructive consciousness). However we look at it, it seems subjective consciousness of 
falsity, whether partial or complete, is an essential element of the definition.  
 
 
2.4 Lessons from Fuller 
To conclude our discussion of Fuller, his definition plainly falls short of the technical, hard 
conception of the legal fiction accepted in jurisprudential circles. In the first limb, Fuller is 
not explicit about consciousness on the part of the wider legal community and ambivalent 
about the degree of consciousness on the part of the court or party making the statement. 
In the second limb, he discards consciousness altogether in favour of ‘utility’.  
However, Fuller’s very aim was to show that the hard definition was perhaps too narrow: 
‘it may be questioned whether current usage confines the concept “fiction” within the limits 
suggested’.143 Fuller is right that ‘fiction’ is used in a wider sense than fiction theorists 
would permit, but his more expansive definition, as we have seen, has no clear boundaries. 
It fails the test of determinacy. It will be suggested below that while the hard definition 
should not be ‘corrupted’ by sacrificing consciousness, our imagination is wide enough to 
sustain, alongside the Hard Fiction, a softer type of fiction, namely the imposition of a 
consciously-unnatural meaning on a rule of law. This Soft Fiction does not correspond 
exactly to either of Fuller’s limbs, but can be said to be inspired by the borderline situations 
that exercised the mind of that great thinker.    
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3. Alf Ross 
In 1969, Danish legal philosopher Alf Ross set out his original take on legal fictions in a 
contribution to an edited book.144 Ross challenged the near-universal understanding of the 
legal fiction as a consciously-false statement. He claimed it was a paradox: if everybody 
knows it is false, how can judges use it to pretend the law is not changing?145 We cannot 
say that no one is deceived by the fiction and at the same time that judges need the fiction 
to uphold the existing structure or ‘keep records straight’.  
One possible answer to Ross’s paradox is that not ‘everybody’ knows that the fiction is 
false. ‘Everybody’ presumably only includes the legal community. It is only the initiated 
who know how to read between the lines and discount certain statements. Outside 
observers may believe that the law is not changing.  
But the more direct answer to Ross’s paradox is that judges (at least English judges) did 
not pretend the law was not changing.146 It is evident that Ross was influenced by Maine’s 
idea that fictions were about concealment147 – a view rejected above.148 When Milsom said, 
‘The aim of fictions … is not deception; it is to keep records straight’,149 he meant it strictly: 
the fiction was necessary for form only. The record had to contain certain words: there was 
nothing else to it. Nobody thought that geographical fictions brought about no change in 
the law. The judges simply contrived to effect change without fundamentally disturbing 
the forms of actions, which were the basis of the legal system. The pretence was of form 
merely. As Professor Baker wrote, ‘The books of the law, the judgments, and the outward 
forms, appear to say one thing, while everyone knows that the law works differently in 
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reality.’150 Ross’s paradox is illusory and rooted in Maine’s (misconceived) notion that 
fictions were intended to genuinely hide changes in the law.   
That said, Ross’s next insight is most valuable. If fictions are not consciously-false 
statements (to his mind), what are they? Ross argued that fictions are ‘posed’ statements.151 
That is, statements that are neither asserted nor confirmed. Ross likened posed statements 
to facts in novels and pleasantries in polite society.152 The speaker simply puts them 
forward without asserting their truth. They may be true but are unreliable. They simply 
hang in the air. Simon Stern referred to Ross’s posed statements as being in limbo.153  
Of Ross’s two analogies (facts in novels and social pleasantries), I think the latter is 
particularly apt. Pleasantries in polite society have to be said but no one takes them 
seriously or much cares about their veracity. When asked by a stranger or an acquaintance 
about my day, I say that my day has been good. I could hardly say that I have had a 
nightmare of a day. Maybe I have in fact had a good day, but my reply is unreliable. In 
either case, this is not considered dishonest. Nobody expects the truth from such small-
talk. It just has to be said for form’s sake and the truth is irrelevant. So too with fictions: 
they just have to be stated for form and their truth is irrelevant. 
What is the take-home message from Ross’s analysis? We already know from our 
discussion of the existence of fictions that they are false in the sense that they contradict 
the physical world. We now add, as foreshadowed by Fuller and expounded by Ross, the 
qualification that the judge and the legal community need not be absolutely conscious that 
there is in fact a contradiction. Instead, they must be indifferent to whether there is a 
contradiction. A fictitious statement is one whose truth is irrelevant rather than necessarily 
false. A judge who doubts his finding but proceeds to rely upon it anyway is indifferent to 
its truth or at least accords it little importance. It is the same indifference which the judges 
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of old showed to the truth of the factual allegations in Old Fictions. They did not know for 
certain that the defendant had not entered with force and arms (surely on some occasions 
the defendant had). They just did not care. It was immaterial. The fiction lies in not caring 
about the facts; not in the absolute knowledge that they are false.154 If asked, one would 
respond that the truth of the statement does not matter. In short, a legal fiction is the 
conscious indifference to a contradiction with the physical world. 
 
4. Pierre Olivier  
In the adapted reprint of his doctoral thesis, published in 1975, Pierre JJ Olivier gave the 
world a thorough survey of historical thought regarding the legal fiction.155 Olivier traces 
the development of what he calls the ‘fiction concept’156 from the legal systems of the 
ancient Levant, through the Greco-Roman period, to the glossators and the school of 
Orléans in the Dark Ages, to the post-glossators and post-Enlightenment German, Dutch 
and Anglo-American jurists. This dissertation could not hope to match the scope and detail 
of Olivier’s exegesis, even if there were any benefit in reproducing the material.  
We have already consulted Olivier on several occasions. There is one more element of 
Olivier’s research which it is fitting to dwell on at this point. Olivier brings to the fore an 
idea which apparently originated with a French bishop and statesman called Pierre de 
Belleperche, who died in 1308. The idea is that ‘the circumstances under which the fiction 
is to be applied must be possible’.157 This means that a court may pretend that an Act of 
Parliament was passed on the first day of the session, but may not pretend a square circle. 
The former is wrong but possible; the latter is wrong and impossible.  
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We do not have to go far to find instances of this approach. In fact, we have already seen 
one in the previous chapter. Following the formal abolition of the fictions of ejectment and 
the implied promise in quasi-contract, English judges demanded that the fictitious fact (ie 
entry in ejectment and promise or contract in quasi-contract) be possible in theory. As 
Viscount Haldane LC said in Sinclair v Brougham (1914), ‘The fiction can only be set up 
with effect if such a contract would be valid if it really existed.’158 In that, at least, the Lord 
Chancellor was a follower of Pierre de Belleperche.  
Whatever the merits of limiting fictions to theoretically-feasible suppositions, it is clear 
that English law has not generally respected any such limitation. As John Chipman Gray 
noted, English fictions were ‘bolder, and if one may say so, more brutal’159 than their 
Roman forerunners (which took the assumptive form). De Belleperche was of course 
interested in civilian fictions. In England, theoretically-impossible fictions like a finding 
that a woman was ordained (benefit of clergy) or a Mediterranean island enclosed within a 
London parish (geographical fictions) were sound law, if unsound logic. Sinclair v 
Brougham and its ilk were anomalous. Indeed, Sinclair v Brougham was held to have been 
wrongly decided so we can discount it as an aberration.160   
There is much to be said for the cavalier attitude of English lawyers to logical 
impossibilities. The whole point of the fiction is that it is false.161 What does it matter how 
false? If we approve of the use of fictions in general as a means to an end, as Roman law 
certainly did, baulking at some fictions on pedantic grounds carries no clear benefit and 
may frustrate the end the fiction was devised to achieve. We saw this so clearly in Sinclair 
v Brougham itself, where the claimants could not recover monies lent pursuant to a void 
loan. The historical attitude of English law to fictions – ‘anything goes’ – underscores the 
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perversity of the error which possessed the generation of Viscount Haldane, who, to be 
more Catholic than the pope, found an imaginary contract to be invalid.  
In conclusion, in English law, fictions have not been, and ought not to be, necessarily 
possible.  
  
VI. Proposed Definition of Hard Fiction 
Fuller believed that the ascertainment of fictions is a matter of degree: ‘we reserve the term 
“fiction” for those distortions of reality which are outstanding and unusual.’162 Professor 
John Miller agreed: ‘The legal fiction shades into other forms of rules by degrees, but the 
concern … is to deal with it in its more distinctive variations.’163   
I beg to differ. I contend it is possible to make a categorical distinction between legal 
fictions and other artificial constructs. 
The reader will be pleased to know that in the preceding pages we have done almost all the 
work of constructing a definition. In dealing with the intellectual challenges and the 
existing definitions, we have incidentally constructed an almost complete definition. All 
that remains is to piece everything together and add some final touches.   
    
A. What do we know so far? 
We started with two indispensable elements for a definition, namely consciousness and 
falsity. We then said, in respect of the Hard Fiction, that there are degrees of falsity and 
that we adopt the most stringent degree, which we have called a contradiction with the 
physical world. Turning to consciousness, we rejected calls to drop it altogether, but 
accepted that consciousness of falsity does not mean certain knowledge of falsity but 
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indifference to truth. Putting these ideas together in one sentence, we understand the Hard 
Fiction to be something which is consciously decided irrespective of the facts. But what is 
this ‘something’ on which the fiction is based? 
  
B. The Basis of the Hard Fiction: Fact or Law 
If falsity means contradiction with the physical world, it follows that the ‘something’ must 
be capable of contradicting the physical world. To contradict the physical world, that thing 
must be factual. Purely legal concepts, which have no parallel in the physical world to 
contradict (eg a company, a trust), cannot be fictitious.164 It is clear then that the basis of 
all legal fictions must be some issue of fact. We have now identified a third element of the 
definition, namely that the statement has to be factual.  
The following two examples illustrate the point. Vi et armis was a fiction because entry 
with force and arms is an event in the physical world and hence a fact. By contrast, the 
abolition by Parliament of the sealing requirement for deeds,165 did not produce a fiction 
because a ‘deed’ (in the sense of document) is a purely legal creature. It has no meaning 
outside the law and thus cannot contradict the physical world.166  
Unfortunately, it is not always so easy to distinguish between fact and law. It might even 
be argued that a deed, having for hundreds of years meant ‘sealed document’, had become 
a fact to laymen, such that a deed without a seal was like a table without legs. This is a 
philosophical quagmire167 which is beyond the scope of this work. To short-circuit this 
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problem, it is proposed that an issue is to be considered factual or legal if it is so considered 
in the eyes of the law. For this last insight I am indebted to Dr Campbell, who argues that 
a statement is ‘a legal fiction only if and insofar as it is an assertion of that which the law 
itself classifies as a question of fact.’168  
And so, since the formal requirements of deeds are obviously a question of law (in the eyes 
of the law), the problem is avoided. By contrast, the law did not regard entry with force 
and arms as a matter of law, but as a factual allegation, leaving it to the jury. Hence unsealed 
deeds are not fictitious deeds, but entry vi et armis was fictitious. 
In conclusion, we can now say that the basis of the fiction is some matter of fact which is 
up for determination. 
  
C. The Basis of the Hard Fiction: Statement, Assumption or Issue?  
Most definitions describe a fiction as a ‘statement’, an ‘assertion’ or an ‘assumption’.169 
Del Mar says that ‘[t]o call a fiction a “statement” seems artificial, especially in the 
adjudicatory context where it is surely more usefully understood as a device of 
reasoning’.170 Olivier argues that a fiction is an assumption and not a statement because it 
is ‘a process of thought which may be subsequently expressed as a statement, but it is not 
in the first place a statement’.171  
I believe that neither ‘statement’ nor ‘assumption’ is the proper basis for the Hard Fiction. 
‘Assumption’ often implies justifiable or credible grounds. Thus, the assumptions in, say, 
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statistical studies or economic models, are chosen because they are generally true or 
reliable enough; not because they are known to be false. Assumptions, like hypotheses, are 
mostly chosen for their probable truth. The word ‘assumption’ is therefore ill-suited to 
serve as the basis of the Hard Fiction, which is known to be false.       
I have chosen the more general term ‘issue’ in preference to statement or assertion. This is 
because it is not always straightforward, or helpful, to reduce the fiction to a particular 
form of words. The constructive trust has been said to be a fiction, but the concept of the 
constructive trust in English law is not represented by any particular statement or assertion. 
We could come up with a statement to describe the trust, but it would be one of many 
possible formulations. We would be better advised to speak of the trust as a concept – 
which it really is – than as a statement. Then we would ask, without semantic distractions, 
whether the trust is a factual issue and consciously contradicts the physical world. The 
answer of course is no.           
  
D. Definition of Hard Fiction  
We have established that a Hard Fiction is (i) an issue (ii) of fact (iii) which is false in the 
sense that it is decided irrespective of a contradiction with the physical world (iv) with the 
full knowledge of the legal community.        
It may be tempting to suppose that element (iii) makes element (ii) otiose. If falsity can 
only arise out of a contradiction with the physical world, it is not necessary to require in 
addition an issue of fact. For how can a legal issue contradict the physical world? The 
argument is that element (iii) does all the work of element (ii).  
Unfortunately, upon further consideration, we do need element (ii). This is because of the 
special category of legal terms which have lay or factual equivalents. The most obvious 
example is the contract. While a lawyer is likely to see the contract as a legal concept, a 




Indeed, an agreement between people is a fact in the physical world (though whether the 
law recognises it is a separate question).  
A contract, then, exists in both a legal and a factual sense. If we apply our definition without 
element (ii), which requires us to ask whether the law sees the contracts as an issue of fact 
or law, we might reach strange conclusions. For example, the requirement of intention to 
create legal relations might mean that what is considered by laypeople to be an agreement 
is no binding agreement in law. Well, here we have a contradiction with the physical world, 
with the full knowledge of the legal community. Is that a legal fiction? Surely we are not 
prepared to say that it is. 
This is why it is necessary to separately establish that the existence of a contract is an issue 
of law (in the eyes of the law) before we even come to the element of falsity. All four 
elements are necessary: a Hard Fiction is (i) an issue (ii) of fact (iii) which is false in the 
sense that it is decided irrespective of a contradiction with the physical world (iv) with the 
full knowledge of the legal community.       
In short, a Hard Fiction is: 
 A factual issue consciously decided irrespective of the facts.  
Henceforth, this is the only formulation we will use for the Hard Fiction.  
The application of this definition entails consideration of three distinct questions, which 
will be taken in this order, whenever we apply the definition: 
a. is the issue of fact or law (the factual requirement)? 
b. is the issue decided irrespective of the facts (the falsity requirement)? 






VII. Proposed Definition of Soft Fiction 
We have said that the technical definition insisted upon by legal theorists is sound logically 
but fails to capture all the shades of legal reasoning.  
The Hard Fiction is about an inconsistency with the physical world. True, an indifference 
to whether there is in fact an inconsistency is sufficient; but the Hard Fiction still requires 
a potential inconsistency to which the judge is indifferent. An inconsistency with the 
physical world is therefore at the root of the Hard Fiction. And this inconsistency is 
obvious. It is not a matter of opinion or argument. For if the judge believes there is no 
inconsistency, he is not conscious of an inconsistency.     
The Soft Fiction, by contrast, does not rest on an obvious inconsistency. It refers, instead, 
to what Fuller called ‘partial consciousness’; that is to say, serious doubt but not the 
certainty of falsity (here used in the sense of contradiction with the physical world). We 
have used the example of a judge construing ‘cats’ to include ‘jaguars’ to exemplify this 
phenomenon. It is also possible, by way of another illustration, to discern a Soft Fiction in 
the Old Fiction of vi et armis. This factual allegation was made up of two separate elements: 
force and arms. There was no doubt that the defendant did not need to be armed. Therefore, 
the allegation as a whole was a Hard Fiction. However, if we look at the allegation of force 
on its own, Professor Ibbetson has shown that the violence implied in ‘force and arms’ was 
interpreted to mean ‘very little more than an invasive interference with the plaintiff’s land, 
goods, or person’.172 In other words, the allegation of force had been watered down; so 
much so that a strained or unnatural meaning, though literally not false (since interference 
requires some exertion of force) had been imposed on the words of the writ. As Ibbetson 
found, ‘If all that was needed was an unwanted tap on the shoulder or toe on the doorstep, 
then practically any physical interference could be brought within the scope of the 
action.’173 And so, in our terms, ‘armis’ was a Hard Fiction because the judge was 
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indifferent to the absence of arms, but ‘vi’ was only a Soft Fiction because the judge was 
not indifferent to the absence of force: some minimal force there had to be. The judge just 
strained the word ‘force’ beyond its natural meaning in context.  
To conclude, what distinguishes the Soft Fiction from the Hard Fiction is that the Hard 
Fiction involves falsity (in the sense of indifference to a contradiction with the physical 
world) whereas the Soft Fiction involves a consciously-strained interpretation. This 
consciousness is not normally revealed in the judgment, as indeed the consciousness of 
many Hard Fictions is not. But the artificiality is such that, if pressed, the judge would have 
to admit that the interpretation was not the intended one.174 One such judge was Lord 
Evershed MR who, dismissing a creative suggestion by counsel, said, ‘I think myself that 
such a conclusion is startling. Indeed, I venture to doubt whether to anybody but a lawyer 
such a conclusion would even be comprehensible – at least without a considerable amount 
of explanation.’175 This serves as an excellent description of what would have been a 
consciously-unnatural interpretation – a Soft Fiction.   
There are also cases where judges did not baulk at the consciously-unnatural interpretation. 
The phenomenon of judges consciously straining the meaning of words for some higher 
purpose (which we have called a Soft Fiction), was laid bare by Lord Denning MR in 
George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd (1982).176 The Master of the 
Rolls described the treatment of exclusion clauses before the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977. Below are extracted several passages of the speech, not just for their moving 
eloquence, but because it is a real-life description of the most important idea in this chapter 
– the Soft Fiction: 
None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had – when I was called to the 
Bar – with exemption clauses. They were printed in small print on the back of tickets 
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and order forms and invoices. They were contained in catalogues or timetables. 
They were held to be binding on any person who took them without objection. No 
one ever did object. He never read them or knew what was in them. No matter how 
unreasonable they were, he was bound. All this was done in the name of ‘freedom 
of contract.’ But the freedom was all on the side of the big concern which had the 
use of the printing press. No freedom for the little man who took the ticket or order 
form or invoice. The big concern said, ‘Take it or leave it.’ The little man had no 
option but to take it. The big concern could and did exempt itself from liability in 
its own interest without regard to the little man. It got away with it time after time. 
When the courts said to the big concern, ‘You must put it in clear words,’ the big 
concern had no hesitation in doing so. It knew well that the little man would never 
read the exemption clauses or understand them. 
 It was a bleak winter for our law of contract… 
Faced with this abuse of power – by the strong against the weak – by the use of the 
small print of the conditions – the judges did what they could to put a curb upon it. 
They still had before them the idol, ‘freedom of contract.’ They still knelt down and 
worshipped it, but they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They used it 
to stab the idol in the back. This weapon was called ‘the true construction of the 
contract.’ They used it with great skill and ingenuity. They used it so as to depart 
from the natural meaning of the words of the exemption clause and to put upon them 
a strained and unnatural construction.177 
And so, a Soft Fiction is: 
 A factual issue decided by a consciously-unnatural interpretation.  
Henceforth, this is the only formulation we will use for the Soft Fiction.  
                                                          




Like the Hard Fiction, it entails consideration of three distinct questions, which we will 
take in this order, whenever we apply the definition: 
a. is the issue of fact or law (the factual requirement – identical to the first 
requirement of the Hard Fiction)? 
b. is the issue decided by an unnatural interpretation (the unnatural interpretation 
requirement)? 
c. is the issue consciously so decided (the consciousness requirement – identical to 
the third requirement of the Hard Fiction)?  
It will be observed that the only difference between Hard and Soft Fictions lies in the 
second requirement: falsity versus unnatural interpretation. Note also that while the third 
element of consciousness is identical in terms, the consciousness is of different things. In 
the case of the Hard Fiction, it is consciousness of deciding the issue irrespective of the 
facts. In the case of the Soft Fiction, it is consciousness of deciding the issue by an 
unnatural interpretation.      
Finally, the Hard and Soft Fictions are mutually exclusive. The same device cannot be both. 
If a device is so false as to be a Hard Fiction, it cannot also be a mere unnatural 
interpretation. So if we are satisfied that a device is a Hard Fiction, there is no need to ask 
whether it is a Soft Fiction. 
   
VIII. Case Studies 
In this part of the chapter, we will apply the definitions of Hard and Soft Fiction to two 
contemporary legal devices: the reasonable man and the tortious defence of volenti non fit 
injuria. By putting these two legal devices to the test, we will achieve the dual goal of 
seeing how the new definitions work in practice and finding whether each device is a Hard 




It is concluded that the reasonable man is not a fiction at all and that volenti non fit injuria 
is a Soft Fiction.  
 
A. First Case Study: The Reasonable Man  
The horse omnibus service which used to run between Knightsbridge and Clapham 
was discontinued in 1914. Lord Bowen, who is credited with the invention of its 
most famous passenger and lived, I think, near the Knightsbridge end of the route, 
died in 1894. And yet in courts of common law all over the world, the ghostly creak 
of the wheels and the crack of the driver’s whip are still to be heard. Like the Flying 
Dutchman, it seems condemned to travel for all eternity… Let us get on board … 
and see who is travelling today.178     
In two recent decisions, Healthcare at Home v Scottish Health Service (2014) and Helow 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2008), two members of the highest court in 
the land described the reasonable man as a fiction.179 No reason is given in their respective 
judgments; it is taken for granted. It is necessary therefore to speculate. Perhaps the reason 
is indeed obvious: the reasonable man does not exist. He does not exist on two levels. First, 
there is no ‘reasonable man’ who watches pre-contractual negotiations, or construes the 
terms of the contract, and is then asked what he understood the parties to mean. More 
vividly perhaps, to take the oft-invoked scene, first painted by Mackinnon LJ in Shirlaw v 
Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd (1939), there is no person who suggests an express term to 
the negotiating parties, only to be ‘testily suppress[ed] … with a common “Oh, of 
course!”’180  
                                                          
178 Lord Hoffmann, ‘Anthropomorphic Justice: The Reasonable Man and His Friends’ (1995) 29 The Law 
Teacher 127, 127. 
179 Healthcare at Home (n 25) (Lord Reed); Helow (n 25) (Lord Hope). 




On another level, the reasonable man has no existence at all since no particular person can 
ever be identified as the reasonable man – however reasonable such a person may be. The 
reasonable man has been described as ‘the man on the Clapham omnibus’,181 and more 
recently as the ‘man on the underground’.182 However, as Lord Reed said in Healthcare at 
Home, ‘it would be misconceived for a party to seek to lead evidence from actual 
passengers on the Clapham omnibus as to how they would have acted in a given 
situation’.183 That is, none of the people on the bus is the reasonable man. He is any man 
and no man. If we keep referring to the judgment of someone who does not exist, do we 
not play with fiction?  
Having seen that two justices of the Supreme Court believe the reasonable man to be 
fictitious, and having postulated a case for such a position, let us now put the reasonable 
man to the test by applying the definitions. 
  
1. Is the Reasonable Man a Hard Fiction?  
 
1.1 The Factual Requirement  
The first question is whether the reasonable man is an issue of fact. Since the distinction 
between fact and law is likely to be problematic in many contexts, it will be considered 
here at some length, though in the context of the reasonable man.    
The modern statement of the principles of contractual interpretation, laid down by Lord 
Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society 
(1997), is probably the most-used bit of contract law these days. This statement defers 
repeatedly to the reasonable man and thus offers us a prime example of the test. Relevantly, 
it reads:   
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(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would reasonably have been available to the parties … 
 
(2) The background … includes absolutely anything which would have affected the 
way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a 
reasonable man… 
 
(4) … The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose 
between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even … to 
conclude that the parties must … have used the wrong words or syntax…184 
So, when the court asks itself what the reasonable man would understand, is it asking a 
question of law or fact? The starting point is that how a man understands a document is a 
matter of fact. We can only discover the answer by asking the man what he understood. 
Supposing the reasonable man to be just a type of man, it follows that the test is factual.  
It may be objected, however, that this comparison is flawed. The reasonable man is 
objective: he embodies a legal standard, namely what a person ought to have understood 
rather than what he actually understood. In Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943), Lord 
Macmillan said that ‘The standard of foresight of the reasonable man is … an impersonal 
test. It eliminates the personal equation…’185 In dispensing with the services of the 
reasonable man in frustration cases, Viscount Radcliffe stated, in Davis Contractors Ltd v 
Fareham Urban UDC (1956), that the reasonable man ‘represents after all no more than 
the anthropomorphic conception of justice … and must be the court itself’.186 This 
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statement was quoted approvingly by Lord Reed in Healthcare at Home.187 Therefore, the 
argument runs, what the reasonable man ‘understands’ is a matter of law, not of actual, 
factual understanding. This is reflected in the law of evidence. A witness cannot give 
evidence as to what is reasonable in the circumstances.188 That would be opinion, not fact.   
Upon further inquiry, however, this argument founders. True it is that what the reasonable 
man would do is a question for the judge and not the witnesses, but that does not make it 
ipso facto a question of law. Judges decide factual questions as well. How then does the 
judge decide what a reasonable man would understand the particular document to mean? 
Would the judge find the answer in a textbook? Would she find the answer in a statute 
book? Can she deduce it from legal principles alone? Of course not: she will only find the 
answer in the facts of the case – or the facts of analogous previous cases. This is because 
the answer to the question what a reasonable man would understand is factual. And if the 
answer is factual so is the question.    
If we return to ICS v West Bromwich itself, we will see that what the reasonable man 
understands depends, heavily, on the facts. Everything turns on background knowledge 
and the words in context. Lord Hoffmann, in applying his own principles, took into account 
that the disputed text ‘was obviously intended to be read by lawyers’189 and that such 
lawyers would find one of the two constructions ‘extremely odd’.190 Evidently, we are 
dealing with a case-by-case factual decision, not a question of law, the answer to which 
automatically applies to all cases of a certain type. An analogy may be found in the 
distinction between terms implied in fact and in law. The latter means terms automatically 
inserted into all contracts of a certain type, whereas the former depends simply on the facts 
of each case.191    
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More broadly, the reasonable man in the cases is far from being an impersonal or abstract 
legal concept – Viscount Radcliffe’s ‘anthropomorphic conception of justice’.192 In fact, it 
is highly sensitive to the facts. As Lord Hoffmann wrote extra-judicially, ‘a good deal of 
what Lord Macmillan [in Glasgow Corporation] calls the personal equation is by no means 
eliminated’.193 The examples then invoked by His Lordship show that the reasonable man 
is not imposed on the facts but rather created by them. In Daly v Liverpool Corporation 
(1939), the Court refused to hold a hapless old lady liable for contributory negligence for 
failing to notice an approaching bus: 
Although her inability to see the bus and … to take the necessary action would not 
have occurred in younger people, what she actually did was the best she could. I 
cannot believe that the law is quite so absurd as to say that if a pedestrian happens 
to be old and slow and a little stupid and does not possess the skill of the hypothetical 
pedestrian, he or she can only walk about his or her native country at his or her own 
risk.194  
The House of Lords, in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (1939), 
likewise treated the reasonable man as a creature of the facts, not as a legal concept 
descending from Justice Holmes’s legendary ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky’:195  
What is all-important is to adapt the standard of what is negligence to the facts, and 
to give due regard to the actual conditions under which men work in a factory or 
mine, to the long hours and the fatigue, to the slackening of attention which naturally 
comes from constant repetition of the same operation, to the noise and confusion in 
which the man works, to his pre-occupation in what he is actually doing at the cost 
perhaps of some inattention to his own safety.196 
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It follows that the standard of care expected of (in tort), or the understanding of terms by 
(in contract), the reasonable man is dictated by the facts of the case. The law has no position 
on what a document phrased in a particular way ought to mean to a reasonable man or how 
a reasonable man ought to act. It depends on the facts. It is therefore better to say that the 
reasonable man test is an issue of fact.     
But does not the application of any test depend on the facts of the case? What else can it 
depend on? If dependence on the facts proves conclusively that a question is factual and 
not legal, all questions are factual and the distinction is destroyed. Not so. Let us take 
sufficiency of consideration. It is true that to find whether the alleged consideration in any 
case is sufficient we need to know what the alleged consideration consisted of (the facts). 
But that is not the question. The question of sufficiency of consideration is what constitutes 
sufficient consideration, not whether the facts in this or that case disclose sufficient 
consideration. There exists a body of cases, going back to the late sixteenth century, 
classifying, sometimes incoherently, benefits or detriments as sufficient or insufficient 
consideration.197 So, promising to do what the promisor is already bound to do by statute 
or public duty is not good consideration,198 but promising to do what the promisor is already 
bound to do under a contract with a third party is good consideration.199 This is entirely a 
matter of legal choice or policy, not the facts of the case. That ‘natural love and affection’ 
is not good consideration does not depend on the facts of the case.200 That the adequacy of 
consideration is immaterial does not depend on the facts of the case.201 We do not need the 
facts of the case to answer the question ‘what constitutes sufficient consideration’. What 
constitutes sufficient consideration is a legal question whereas whether a given 
consideration is sufficient is a factual question.   
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And so, the distinguishing characteristic of legal questions is that they can be answered 
without specific reference to the facts of the case. Factual questions, as their name suggests, 
can only be determined by factual examination.  
Returning to the reasonable man, if the question were ‘Which standard is applied to the 
interpretation of contractual terms, objective or subjective?’, then the question would be 
legal. We would answer that the standard is the reasonable man and not the parties’ own 
beliefs or intentions. But when we come to apply the test of the reasonable man, we already 
know what the standard is. The only thing that remains is to resolve a question of fact: what 
the reasonable man would understand. This is a question of fact.     
The answer to the question whether the reasonable man is an issue of fact is yes. Therefore, 
the factual requirement is satisfied.  
 
1.2 The Falsity Requirement 
Advancing now to the second requirement, we ask whether the reasonable man test is 
applied irrespective of the facts. This would be the case if, to continue with ICS, the House 
of Lords did not actually concern itself with how a reasonable man would read the 
document (like the King’s Bench did not inquire into force and arms) or was satisfied with 
dubious evidence (such as the neck verse for the benefit of clergy). However, as we have 
seen, the House of Lords was greatly interested in how a reasonable man would understand 
the words. Lord Lloyd, in dissent, also asked himself what ‘the ordinary investor to whom 
the claim form is addressed’202 would understand. This is a representative example of the 
application of the test across all cases. Therefore, the test of the reasonable man is decided 
in accordance with the facts. It does not satisfy the falsity requirement.   
 
                                                          




1.3 The Consciousness Requirement 
Since there is no falsity of which one can be conscious, it is unnecessary to consider the 
third requirement of consciousness. The reasonable man is not a Hard Fiction. 
 
2. Is the Reasonable Man a Soft Fiction? 
We already know the factual requirement, which is also the first requirement of the Soft 
Fiction, to be satisfied. We can therefore jump to the second requirement, namely unnatural 
interpretation. There is no hint in the cases or commentary that the reasonable man test is 
given a strained or far-fetched or contrived interpretation. The test is in any event so 
amorphous and pliable, so lacking in fixed content, that it is hard to strain. To apply the 
test unnaturally, courts would have to regard as reasonable what would be ordinarily 
considered unreasonable or at least scarcely reasonable. There is no evidence of such 
practice. Having concluded that the second requirement is not satisfied, there is no need to 
visit the third requirement of consciousness. The reasonable man is not a Soft Fiction. 
The view presented here is that, contrary to popular opinion, the reasonable man is not a 
legal fiction of any kind.              
 
3. Assessment 
Having fed the reasonable man to the definition and received an answer at the other end, it 
is now appropriate to take a reality check. After all, the definition was always going to 
yield an answer. The question is whether the answer, apart from being technically correct 
according to our assumptions, stands to reason. Does it make sense that the reasonable 
man, who we know does not exist in the physical world, is not fictitious?  
This conclusion, I argue, agrees with common sense. Asking what the reasonable man 




simply a way to illustrate that the question of reasonableness is not judged from the 
subjective point of view of the parties but from the objective point of view of a disinterested 
observer. There is no fiction because we never rely on the existence of an actual reasonable 
man. We do not posit anything that is untrue. The man is just an unnecessary vehicle for 
the question of what is objectively reasonable. This is why Lord Hoffmann, a champion of 
the objective approach, could advocate the retirement of the reasonable man without fear 
of contradiction.203 To ask the reasonable man is to ask what is reasonable. To ask what is 
reasonable cannot be fictitious.  
 
B. Second Case Study: Volenti non fit Injuria  
 
1. Overview of the Defence 
The maxim ‘volenti non fit injuria’ literally means ‘no injury is done to the willing’. It is a 
tort defence,204 relevant mostly to negligence. Broadly, it stands for the principle that ‘One 
who has invited or assented to an act … cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as 
a wrong.’205 Specifically, the defence can be said to have three elements. First, the claimant 
must be fully aware of the risk. Second, the claimant must agree (expressly or impliedly) 
to absolve the defendant from liability for his conduct. Third, this agreement must be truly 
voluntary in the sense that it is free of any pressure or necessity.206  
It should be noted that while the volenti defence often overlaps with contributory 
negligence (in that the claimant takes a risk), the two defences are not co-extensive. 
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Agreeing to run a risk is not necessarily negligent and acting negligently does not 
necessarily amount to a waiver of liability.207 It is also noteworthy that contributory 
negligence can be a partial defence208 whereas volenti is a complete defence.209            
Of the three elements of the volenti defence – knowledge, agreement, voluntariness – the 
second is the most crucial for our purposes. This is because it is the requirement of 
agreement to waive liability that might have generated a fiction. It is one thing to knowingly 
assume a risk. It is quite another thing to agree to absolve the defendant from liability. 
Whenever we get into a car we willingly and informedly take the risk of a car accident, but 
that is a far cry from releasing negligent drivers from liability in the event they injure us.210 
Considering also that people do not usually think in terms of discharging others from 
liability,211 the requirement of agreement sets a high, almost insurmountable bar for 
defendants.  
Nevertheless, the requirement to agree to waive a claim has been affirmed in a string of 
high-level judgments. In Nettleship v Weston (1971), Lord Denning MR stated: 
Knowledge of the risk of injury is not enough. Nor is a willingness to take the risk 
of injury. Nothing will suffice short of an agreement to waive any claim for 
negligence. The plaintiff must agree, expressly or impliedly, to waive any claim for 
any injury that may befall him due to the lack of reasonable care by the 
defendant…212 
In Morris v Murray (1990), Stocker LJ stated: 
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[I]n order to defeat an otherwise valid claim on the basis that the plaintiff was volens 
the defendant must establish that the plaintiff at the material time knew the nature 
and extent of the risk and voluntarily agreed to absolve the defendant from the 
consequences of it…213   
Endorsements of the agreement requirement abound.214 At the time of writing it is still 
cited with approval.215 Let us see how it was applied in several hard cases. 
 
2. The Problematic Cases 
In Titchener v British Railways Board (1983),216 a girl of fifteen was hit by a train in the 
suburbs of Glasgow. She had exploited a gap in the fence along the railway to cross the 
lines. The girl, who was seriously injured, sued the Railways for failing to maintain the 
fence.217 The House of Lords found unanimously that there was no breach of duty and in 
any case that the volenti defence was available.  
Discussion of the defence was cursory and left many questions unanswered. On what basis 
did the House find that a teenage girl ‘had exempted [the Railways] from any obligation 
towards her’?218 Was it the fact that she crossed the lines in full awareness of the danger? 
Did a fifteen-year-old impliedly agree to relieve the Railways of a statutory duty by 
committing a folly? Anthony Jaffey, who reviewed the defence in 1985, was unpersuaded 
by the Law Lords’ reasoning: 
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It is hard to see however how the plaintiffs entering on the defendant's land with full 
knowledge of the danger can amount to an agreement with, or promise to, the 
defendant. At what moment were the Railways relieved of their obligations in 
relation to the safety of the plaintiff? At the moment she passed through the gap in 
the fence, or perhaps a split second before that? We are clearly in the realm of fiction 
if a person's conduct in voluntarily taking a known risk is treated as an implied 
agreement with the person who created the danger.219 
In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell (1964),220 two brothers were testing 
explosives in a quarry, in the service of the appellant. They had been instructed to do so 
from a faraway shelter but the cable was too short. A third employee was dispatched to get 
a longer cable. Several minutes passed. The brothers grew impatient and agreed to test the 
charges anyway, out in the open. This modus operandi placed the brothers in personal 
contravention of the regulations.221 It was also proved that the employer had in the 
preceding months gone to great lengths to forbid precisely this conduct, educate the 
workers about its dangerousness and publicly discipline any employee who disobeyed the 
prohibition. Despite the risk of injury being low, both brothers were injured in the 
explosion. One brother then sued the employer for being vicariously liable for the other 
brother’s contributory negligence.  
The House of Lords held per curiam that volenti was a complete defence to the claim. As 
sensible as this outcome may seem, the questions which arose in Titchener as to the 
agreement requirement apply equally here. The claimant assumed a patent risk in full 
awareness that it was forbidden by his employer as well as illegal. But we know that is not 
enough. Did he also agree to waive the right to compensation? Many people would say 
that, to put it bluntly, he just took a stupid risk, heedless of the legal consequences.    
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Morris v Murray (1990)222 involved probably the most reckless pastime imaginable. The 
claimant had a friend who could fly light aircraft. After an afternoon of heavy drinking 
with said friend, the claimant agreed to take a joy-ride on the friend’s plane. The friend, 
who was by then very drunk, just managed to get the plane airborne before crashing, killing 
himself and severely injuring the claimant. The claimant sued the pilot’s (ie friend’s) estate 
in negligence.  
All justices of the Court of Appeal agreed the claimant was volens. The colossal 
recklessness of the claimant dominated the reasoning. Sir George Weller said: ‘It is 
difficult to conceive of anything more dangerous than to fly with a pilot who has consumed 
the equivalent of 17 whiskies.’223  
That is a point one can hardly disagree with. But strictly speaking, the magnitude of the 
risk and the foolhardiness of the claimant do not of themselves mean he agreed to absolve 
the pilot from liability. The Court of Appeal did not directly confront this issue, though the 
agreement requirement had been recited in full.224 The conduct, it seems, spoke for itself.  
However, if the agreement requirement is automatically satisfied whenever the risk taken 
is very great, the requirement is not about agreement to waive liability at all, but simply 
about the measure of the risk.225 Yet this is precisely what we have been told not to believe 
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3. Is Volenti Non Fit Injuria a Hard Fiction? 
 
3.1 Factual Requirement 
Whether the claimant’s conduct satisfies the three elements of the defence is quite clearly 
a matter of fact. Lord Esher MR, in his statement of the defence in Yarmouth v France 
(1887), removed all doubt: 
[M]ere knowledge of the danger will not do: there must be an assent on the part of 
the workman to accept the risk, with a full appreciation of its extent, to bring the 
workman within the maxim Volenti non fit injuria. If so, that is a question of fact.227 
 
3.2 Falsity Requirement 
For this requirement to be satisfied judges must decide one or more of the elements of the 
defence irrespective of the facts. We have focussed on the element of agreement. Given 
the ambiguity of implied agreement, it is not fair to say that judges just disregard the facts 
before them. It is arguable that by committing to an exceedingly dangerous course of 
action, the claimant has impliedly given up a right of action. In Shatwell, the case involving 
the brothers in the quarry, Lord Donovan said: 
When George invited James to join him in testing the electrical circuit without 
taking shelter George knew the risk he was running and accepted it voluntarily. He 
did not, of course, in express language, waive such rights as he might have against 
James if the risk matured and he was injured. But in my opinion that must be taken 
to be the tacit effect of the agreement between the two of them to test the circuit in 
                                                          




the open. The situation lacks nothing of the elements necessary to support the plea 
of volenti non fit injuria.228 
For all the queries we have raised, this wide interpretation of the agreement requirement 
cannot be dismissed as simply wrong. Lord Donovan did not ignore the facts.  
Lord Pearce went even further in explaining why there was in fact an implied agreement: 
On the facts it was an implied term (to the benefit of which the employers are 
vicariously entitled) that George would not sue James for any injury that he might 
suffer, if an accident occurred. Had an officious bystander raised the possibility, can 
one doubt that George would have ridiculed it?229 
This argument is open to some objections. For one thing, it is not clear into what contract 
this waiver of liability was to be implied. The brothers were not negotiating a contract of 
any kind. A contractual analysis would be artificial on these facts.230 For another thing, 
Lord Pearce’s argument requires us to adopt an objective understanding of the agreement 
requirement such that a claimant could consent to a waiver he did not remotely consider, 
let alone intended.231  
But whatever we think about the merits of the argument, we can be satisfied that the 
agreement requirement is not applied irrespective of the facts. If anything, Lord Pearce 
relied on the facts to argue the requirement was fulfilled. He may be right or he may be 
wrong. But a Hard Fiction, we remember, is not an argument we disagree with. It is a 
blatant indifference to the facts.  
In any case, adopting a wide interpretation of ‘implied’ agreement, it is arguable that there 
is no inconsistency with the physical world; no falsity at all. As has been pointed out, the 
inconsistency on which the Hard Fiction is based is not one open to argument. It is not a 
                                                          
228 Shatwell (n 209) 693. 
229 ibid 688. 
230 See also Simons (n 211) 224–225. 




matter on which fair minds may disagree. It is not an unconvincing argument on the facts. 
It is an unarguable falsehood. As long as the proposition is arguable, even remotely, there 
cannot be a Hard Fiction. In the case of volenti, it is arguable that a claimant who embarks 
on a suicidal course thereby implicitly agrees to surrender a right of action. The falsity 
requirement is not made out.    
  
3.3 Consciousness Requirement   
Since there is no inconsistency with the physical world, there cannot be consciousness of 
such an inconsistency. The consciousness requirement is also unsatisfied.  
Ergo, the defence volenti non fit injuria is not a Hard Fiction.      
 
4. Is Volenti Non Fit Injuria a Soft Fiction? 
 
4.1 Factual Requirement 
As we have seen in the context of the Hard Fiction, the factual requirement is satisfied. 
 
4.2 Unnatural Interpretation Requirement 
Is the interpretation by successive courts of the agreement requirement as extending to 
situations where there was no actual agreement a strained, far-fetched or contrived 
interpretation? Is it like those forced interpretations of exclusion clauses recalled by Lord 
Denning in George Mitchell?232  
                                                          




It has been argued here that the courts’ interpretation of volenti can be defended on the 
basis that the agreement may be implied and that the implication can be an objective one – 
having nothing to do with the claimant’s state of mind or intentions. However, even an 
objective implication must have some basis in the facts. It is difficult to point to any act of 
the claimants in the cases we have discussed which indicated agreement – unless the very 
magnitude of the risk per se implies a waiver of liability. Such a proposition is arguable in 
the sense that it is not definitely wrong, but it does rob the agreement requirement of its 
substance and defeats the distinction the authorities draw between willing assumption of 
risk and agreement to waive a claim. If risk without more fulfils the agreement requirement, 
it is only a risk requirement.  
The wide interpretation of the agreement requirement is not false in the same way that 
Minorca in London or imagined ouster or fake priests were false. We cannot say it is 
definitely wrong. But it is certainly a stretch. Moreover, it is a stretch that does not sit well 
with official judicial orthodoxy on this very point. It is, in other words, an unnatural 
interpretation.     
It must also be remembered that judges have a natural, and proper, desire to get the ‘right’ 
result on the facts. To reach this result, the law, in some cases, is invoked by way of post-
rationalisation, sometimes even manipulated. Reading the judgments in question, one can 
understand the judges’ predicament. Take Shatwell, which involved the brothers in the 
quarry:  
My Lords, the employers had striven without compromise to prevent shot firers 
testing in the open. They had done everything that they could to enforce the safety 
rules. They had been influential in tightening up the regulations imposed on the shot 
firers personally, they had publicly punished and degraded a shot firer who tested 
in the open, and they had in consequence faced trouble with the union. They had 
arranged a system of work and pay designed to discourage the cutting of time and 




it they deliberately broke the statutory regulations which were laid on them 
personally, and together tested in the open. As a result they blew themselves up. 
They were trained, trusted, certificated men and it would have been absurd to have 
someone to watch over them. 
Although in this action George alone is the plaintiff, each should be entitled, on the 
plaintiff's argument, to get damages from the employers on the ground that the 
other's negligence and breach of statutory duty renders the employers vicariously 
liable. And whatever precautions the employers had used to prevent the two men 
testing in the open, they would, if the men had managed to evade those precautions 
and blown themselves up, still be liable vicariously to the men for their negligence 
in doing so. That result offends against common sense.233 
Plainly, to visit liability upon the exemplary employer by a technical trick of respondeat 
superior seemed unjust. The court needed a way out. The defence of volenti clearly 
suggested itself on the facts and fitted almost perfectly. It seemed designed for this very 
situation. If avoiding an absurd outcome meant pushing the boundaries of the defence, so 
be it.  
Similarly, in Morris (involving the drunk pilot), the judges could not bring themselves to 
award compensation for an act which they regarded as the height of irresponsibility. If it 
meant stretching the defence, so be it. After all, the common law has never been stagnant. 
It develops with each set of facts. Thus an unnatural interpretation, permissible but tenuous, 
was adopted in preference to an unsatisfactory result.         
The unnatural interpretation requirement is met. 
 
 
                                                          




4.3 Consciousness Requirement 
It now falls to be decided whether the several judges who heard the cases in question were 
conscious that they were stretching the agreement requirement beyond its natural meaning. 
If pressed, would Lord Donovan (for instance) admit that, ‘Yes, it was a bit of a stretch’? 
Would His Lordship admit that he stretched the requirement so far as to effectively neuter 
it? It seems clear that Lord Donovan understood the practical effect of the extension; that 
he knew what he was doing; that he really meant to say that when the risk was so great the 
agreement requirement was constructively fulfilled – or, put differently, dispensed with.  
That is not to say that Lord Donovan would have admitted he was wrong. Indeed, I do not 
say he was wrong. The point is that he must have known, and any jurist who cared to 
examine the subject would have known, that the agreement requirement was downgraded 
by a strained, far-fetched or contrived interpretation. There was consciousness of an 
unnatural interpretation.  
Volenti non fit injuria is a Soft Fiction.  
 
5. Final Note 
Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw take the view that agreement is not a necessary 
ingredient of the defence.234 This is because the facts of recent cases cannot be reconciled 
with such a stringent requirement. I do not dispute this last point. Indeed, this conclusion 
is a corollary of the argument that the agreement requirement has been fictionalised. To 
say that a requirement has been fictionalised is to say that it does not exist in practice – at 
least in its original form. In my view, however, it is better to say that the requirement is a 
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Soft Fiction than to deny its existence altogether. My reason for this is that the cases – even 
those cases where the fiction is in operation – still insist on the presence of an agreement 
to absolve the defendant from liability.235 The practical effect of the Soft Fiction is that the 
agreement requirement is replaced with a high threshold for the risk assumed by the 
claimant.  
It is arguable that the requirement of agreement has been even further diminished. In Blake 
v Galloway (2004),236 adolescents played a game of throwing twigs at each other. One 
sustained an eye injury and sued his assailant in negligence and battery. The volenti defence 
succeeded. It is suggested that such play, though it involved some risk, was not reckless or 
even unusual. It is certainly not in the same league as boarding a plane with an inebriated 
pilot or detonating explosives unshielded. Has the agreement requirement been 
emasculated to the point where any risk will do?  
In my view, we should approach Blake v Galloway with caution. The Court of Appeal 
found there was no breach of duty so volenti was not discussed in relation to negligence.237 
Volenti did, however, negate battery on the facts; but then battery is defeated by consent 
simpliciter.238 There is no need for an agreement to exclude liability. So Blake v Galloway 
was not a case of the full-blown defence being applied. As such, the case had nothing to 
do with the agreement requirement.     
It appears that the best view is that the defence of volenti non fit injuria will apply only in 
cases of exceptional recklessness.239 In these cases, it will apply with the help of a Soft 
Fiction, whereby the exceptional recklessness manufactures an implied agreement to waive 
liability.              
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In the previous chapter we discussed fictions under the Old System. This chapter began 
with the observation that the abolition of the Old System created a new paradigm where 
fictions were conceptual rather than procedural. This paradigm shift presented a challenge: 
how to isolate conceptual fictions from the rest of the law. What indeed was the fiction 
when it ceased to be a non-traversable pleading (or equivalent)? We met this challenge by 
proposing two definitions of legal fiction: a Hard Fiction, built upon manifest falsehood, 
and a Soft Fiction for unnatural interpretations. In reaching this outcome, we defended the 
fiction from various theoretical assaults and examined existing definitions.      
This duality of Hard and Soft Fictions is offered as a more nuanced alternative to the 
seemingly endless debate in search of the fictional holy grail, the one-and-only, make-or-
break formula for legal fiction. The definitions recommended here will, it is hoped, bring 
clarity and consistency to the identification of fictions, an exercise hitherto dogged by 
obscurity and disagreement. Legal fiction would then become a term of art, understood by 
all in the same way, capable of being deployed with the exactitude so beloved of lawyers 
and so necessary for the coherent development of the law.   
In applying the new definitions of Hard and Soft Fictions, we learnt that the reasonable 







NEW FICTIONS EXPLORED 
 
 
In writing of the legal fiction it is easy to slip into the 
past tense. We have … a feeling that the fiction belongs 
to a stage in the development of the law which is now 
safely passed … Yet a moment's reflection is sufficient 
to show that there is little basis for this feeling. 
 
          Lon Fuller1 
  
                                                          





The first chapter was an account of fictions under the Old System. The second chapter was 
an attempt to clarify the nature of fictions under the New System, our system. We 
concluded that fictions existed in two forms – Hard and Soft. This third chapter is devoted 
entirely to the study of contemporary fictions. We will go through a list of contemporary 
devices thought to be fictions. One by one, we will describe the operation of each device; 
then check whether it is really a fiction (on our definitions); if so, consider alternatives; 
and, finally, evaluate the fiction. This last step is a normative judgment: is it good for the 
law to have this fiction in view of the alternatives?           
The following (potential) fictions will come under the spotlight: (i) the equitable maxim 
that equity treats as done that which ought to be done; (ii) estoppel; (iii) volenti non fit 
injuria (revisited for evaluation); (iv) the single meaning rule in defamation; (v) the 
common intention constructive trust; (vi) remoteness in negligence; and (vii) reading down 
exclusion clauses. The list is by no means exhaustive but space is limited. These (alleged) 
fictions have been chosen for their variety and their importance to private law.  
 
II. A Common Misunderstanding concerning the Evaluation of Fictions 
Unlike justice or art, fictions are not pursued for their own sake. None of the fictions we 
have encountered so far, Old or New, was created because lawyers liked fictions and 
wanted to have more fictions in the law. Fictions were tolerated because they accomplished 
something external to themselves. For example, in the case of geographical fictions, judges 
prevented the defendant from traversing the misstatement of place, not because they 
thought the misstatement good in itself, but as a means to an end, namely the extension of 
English law to places outside England. The distinction between means and ends is crucial 




In evaluating fictions, it is important to beware of the following pitfall. Evaluating a fiction 
(a means) is not the same as evaluating its result (an end). For example, suppose we are 
evaluating the geographical fictions of old. We should not fall into the trap of evaluating 
the result of the geographical fictions (ie whether it is good for the law that an overseas 
action should be triable in the common law courts). That may be a good or bad thing. But 
if it is a good thing, it does not follow that the fiction is a good way of achieving it. 
Conversely, if it is a bad thing, it does not follow that it is a bad thing because it is a fiction. 
A non-fictitious rule with the same effect would have just as bad a result. There are two 
separate questions here. One is the question of result: is it good for the law that a foreign 
action should be triable in the common law courts. The other is the question of means: is 
the fiction a good way of achieving a given result.  
If we are evaluating geographical fictions and not the result thereof, the arguments we use 
must relate to the merits of the fiction itself. A legitimate argument against the geographical 
fiction would be that it is unprincipled, inelegant and brings the law into dispute. A 
legitimate argument in favour of the fiction would be that it is efficient in the sense that it 
gets the job done with minimal disturbance to existing law. Another legitimate argument 
for the fiction would be that there was no other way, as the system then stood, to achieve 
the desired result. These would be arguments about the merits of the fiction. An illegitimate 
argument against the fiction would be that English courts should not usurp the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts. An illegitimate argument for the fiction would be that English subjects 
deserve English justice wherever they may be. These last two arguments are about the 
result, which can be achieved with or without the fiction. Such result-based arguments only 
obscure the debate about the use of the fiction.  
Because it is natural to view the fiction and its result as one subject of assessment, and 
indeed to judge things by their results, this conflation of the merits of the fiction with the 
merits of its product is tempting. We must guard against this temptation. When it comes to 




To be sure, the separation of fiction and result should not be carried too far. I should not 
be taken to say that if we do eventually decide that it is wrong to try foreign actions in 
common law courts, we should still not abolish the geographical fiction (because fiction 
and result are separate). Of course, in such a case, we would support the abolition of the 
fiction along with the extra-territorial jurisdiction we have decided against. After all, the 
fiction directly results in the extension of jurisdiction (the misstatement of place avoids the 
issue). The point is that we would support the abolition of the fiction not because it is a 
fiction, and because we believe fictions are bad, but simply because we do not think English 
courts should be intervening in foreign actions. Indeed, we would abolish this extra-
territorial jurisdiction just the same if it were not founded on a fiction.    
To summarise, in evaluating a fiction, we cannot take into account the merits of the desired 
result of the fiction.        
 
III. Classifications of Fictions 
In the previous two chapters we introduced three different classifications of fictions. It 
would not be amiss to pause to review these classifications and the relations between them. 
First, we distinguished between Old Fictions and New Fictions. This is simply a matter of 
date. All fictions prior to the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 are Old and all later 
fictions are New. As we have seen, even the fictions that outlived the Old System changed 
in character (they were no longer non-traversable pleadings or the like).2 We shall call this 
classification the ‘Age Classification’.        
The second classification was between Jurisdictional, Auxiliary and Essential Fictions. The 
Jurisdictional Fiction does not affect the substance of any action, but simply which court 
the action may be brought in. An example of a Jurisdictional Fiction is the writ of 
quominus, which did not change the nature of debt claims. It simply permitted them to be 
                                                          




brought in the Court of Exchequer, where the claimant could take advantage of the superior 
enforcement process of that Court.3 The Auxiliary Fiction affects the substance of the law, 
but without disturbing its conceptual basis. As we recall, it is a mere incantation or text for 
form’s sake, legal lip-service, that no lawyer takes seriously as the reason for the result of 
a case. An example of an Auxiliary Fiction is the benefit of clergy. No one thought that a 
sham reading test was the real reason criminals were spared the gallows. But it did change 
criminal law by exempting a large class of people from the death penalty.4 The Essential 
Fiction affects the substance of the law through doctrine. Unlike Auxiliary Fictions, 
Essential Fictions are seen as a conceptual basis for the result of a case. An example of an 
Essential Fiction is quasi-contract. Lawyers believed that certain situations should be 
treated as analogous to contract.5 The law was changed and the reason for the change and 
the fiction were one. We will call this classification the ‘Effect Classification’.  
The third classification was the recognition of two definitions of fictions, Hard and Soft. 
This is the ‘Nature Classification’. A Hard Fiction, we remember, is a factual issue 
consciously decided irrespective of the facts. A Soft Fiction is a factual issue decided by a 
consciously-unnatural interpretation. 
As for the relations between these three classifications, there is no necessary link between 
them. They are independent of each other. In practice, there are some correlations. For 
example, Old Fictions tend, overwhelmingly, to be Hard Fictions. Still, it does not mean 
that a fiction must be Hard to be Old.6 The classifications are discrete. We will revisit the 
correlations between the classifications in the next chapter. 
We are now ready to meet the New Fictions. 
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IV. Equity treats as done that which ought to be done  
 
A. Description 
This is one of the maxims of equity. As with all maxims, it is too broad to be read literally 
– as Lord Esher MR pointed out, somewhat crossly, in 1887: 
I detest the attempt to fetter the law by maxims. They are almost invariably 
misleading: they are for the most part so large and general in their language that 
they always include something which really is not intended to be included in them.7 
Lord Wright echoed these sentiments in 1940: 
Indeed these general formulæ are found in experience often to distract the court’s 
mind from the actual exigencies of the case, and to induce the court to quote them 
as offering a ready made solution.8 
We will be well-advised to heed these warnings in the present discussion. As Professor 
Graham Virgo wrote, a maxim is ‘a way of summarizing some complex principles or rules 
in a pithy statement’.9 What then is the rule summarised in the maxim? The rule is that 
equity will deem a specifically-enforceable obligation, yet to be performed, to have been 
performed. Lindley LJ stated the principle in Re Anstis (1886):  
Equity, no doubt, looks on that as done which ought to be done; but this rule, 
although usually expressed in general terms, is by no means universally true. Where 
the obligation to do what ought to be done is not an absolute duty, but only an 
obligation arising from contract, that which ought to be done is only treated as done 
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in favour of some person entitled to enforce the contract as against the person liable 
to perform it.10 
But what is the practical meaning of something being treated as done, an obligation treated 
as performed? In practice, the maxim is invoked in cases involving a duty to transfer 
property.11 In such cases the maxim results in a constructive trust over the property in 
favour of the party ultimately entitled to receive the property.12 Indeed, the obligation will 
be deemed performed as soon as it is undertaken. For example, if Alice is under an 
obligation to transfer property to Ben; and Ben is entitled to specific performance of this 
obligation (say under a contract for the sale of land); Alice will hold the property on trust 
for Ben immediately Alice assumes the obligation.13 This is so even if the time for 
performance under the contract has not arrived and even if Alice has not done anything 
wrong (eg breached the contract).14  
It is as if equity is impatient and cannot wait for Alice to actually transfer the property so 
it deems the property to have been transferred instantly. A split in ownership results: Ben 
is now the owner in equity but Alice remains legal owner. Ergo Alice holds the property 
on trust for Ben. As AJ Oakley noted, the effect of the maxim is ‘to separate the legal and 
equitable ownership of the property’.15        
While the rule as stated is apparently of general application, these days it has two main 
applications.  
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1. First Application: Disposition of an Interest in Land 
It is no coincidence that the maxim should pertain to land transactions. Unlike most 
contracts, contracts relating to an interest in land are by default (though not invariably) 
specifically enforceable.16 As already noted, specific enforceability is a precondition for 
the operation of the maxim (where there is a contract).17  
This brings the maxim into the sphere of day-to-day conveyancing. Dispositions of an 
interest in land, especially the sale of land, normally take place in two stages. At first the 
parties enter into a contract. Sometime later, at ‘completion’, the agreement is performed 
with the vendor conferring the interest and the purchaser paying the price. At common law, 
needless to say, the interest does not pass until completion (and, in many cases, 
registration18). In equity, however, by dint of the maxim, the purchaser is deemed to receive 
the equitable title, automatically so to speak, upon the formation of a valid contract.19 This 
is because, as soon as the contract is made, the vendor has a specifically-enforceable 
obligation to confer title on the purchaser. Equity then ‘treats as done that which ought to 
be done’: the vendor is deemed to have conferred title and the purchaser to have paid the 
price. The result is a constructive trust of the land with the vendor as trustee and purchaser 
as beneficiary.  
This particular constructive trust that subsists between vendor and purchaser is one of the 
oldest in English law. It was already recognised in 1651.20 The application of the maxim to 
                                                          
16 This is because land is unique. Damages are therefore an inadequate remedy. However, specific 
performance will still be subject to the requirement of writing in s 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellanous 
Provisions) Act 1989 and the usual defences to specific performance: Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, 
Land Law (7th edn, OUP 2011) para [8-012]. See also McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield (n 11) 300.  
17 Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co v Snider [1916] 1 AC 266 (PC) 272 (Lord Parker). 
18 If it falls within s 27 of the Land Registration Act 2002 (eg fee simple, lease for over seven years or 
easement).  
19 Validity includes the requirement of writing in s 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellanous Provisions) Act 
1989. On some views, it also includes the requirement that the vendor has made, or the purchaser accepted, 
title. This latter requirement is discussed below.  
20 Oakley (n 15) 275, citing Lady Foliamb’s Case (1651), unreported, which is in turn cited in Davie v 




conveyancing has many aliases, including ‘the equitable doctrine of conversion’,21 ‘the 
doctrine of anticipation’22 and ‘the rule in Walsh v Lonsdale’ (1882).23        
It should be noted under the rubric of land dispositions that the maxim works its magic also 
in the absence of a contract. In Mountney v Treharne (2002),24 a district judge ordered a 
husband to convey a matrimonial home to his wife. The husband was then declared 
bankrupt, before the transfer was effected. The Court of Appeal held that the trustee-in-
bankruptcy took the property subject to the wife’s equitable estate – since equity deemed 
the transfer from husband to wife to have been effected instantly, that is before the 
bankruptcy.25  
 
2. Second Application: Bribes and Secret Commissions 
The maxim has also been found useful where an agent takes a bribe or secret commission. 
The difference between the two, incidentally, is that a bribe is given dishonestly to secure 
a favour. A secret commission is simply a benefit received by an agent without the 
knowledge of the principal, even if the purpose is not corrupt.26  
This second application of the maxim is nicely illustrated by Attorney-General for Hong 
Kong v Reid (1993).27 Mr Reid was an unscrupulous Acting Director of Public Prosecutions 
for Hong Kong. In breach of his fiduciary duty to the Crown, he obstructed the prosecution 
of several suspects in exchange for money bribes. The ill-gotten gains were then invested 
in real estate in his native New Zealand. Reid was convicted and sentenced to eight years’ 
                                                          
21 Simon Gardner and Emily MacKenzie, An Introduction to Land Law (Hart 2015) 116; Oakley (n 15) 
275ff. 
22 McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield (n 11) ch 9. 
23 (1882) 21 Ch D 9 (Ch). 
24 [2002] EWCA Civ 1174, [2003] Ch 135. 
25 ibid [76] (Jonathan Parker LJ). 
26 Peter Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ (1993) 1 Restitution LR 7, 7 fn 2. 




imprisonment. In civil proceedings, the Crown claimed ownership of the properties in New 
Zealand. The Privy Council agreed: 
As soon as the bribe was received [by Reid] it should have been paid or transferred 
instanter to the person who suffered from the breach of duty [ie the Crown]. Equity 
considers as done that which ought to have been done. As soon as the bribe was 
received, whether in cash or in kind, the false fiduciary held the bribe on a 
constructive trust for the person injured.28 
The specifically-performable obligation was to pay the bribe to the government (because 
the breach of fiduciary duty created an obligation to account for the value of the bribe).29 
Equity deemed it done, whereupon Reid held the bribe on trust for the government. 
Whatever he then did with the monies, he did as trustee for the government. When he 
bought land with the trust monies, the government was the equitable owner of the land in 
New Zealand.   
This advice of the Privy Council was not followed by the Court of Appeal in Sinclair 
Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (2011).30 However, in FHR European 
Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (2014), the Supreme Court approved Reid 
and overruled Sinclair.31 The Reid conclusion, that a ‘false fiduciary’ holds bribes (and 
indeed traceable assets) on constructive trust for his principal, is good law.32 This is because 
equity treats as done that which ought to be done.33        
                                                          
28 ibid 331 (Lord Templeman). 
29 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 144–145 (Lord Russell); FHR (n 12) [6] (Lord 
Neuberger P). 
30 [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch 453 [76]-[87] (Lord Neuberger MR). 
31 FHR (n 12) [50] (Lord Neuberger P). Interestingly, Lord Neuberger, as President of the Supreme Court, 
overturned his own decision as Master of the Rolls in Sinclair, ibid. 
32 Swadling argues the case was a misapplication of the maxim: William Swadling, ‘The Vendor-Purchaser 
Constructive Trust’ in Simone Degeling and James Edeman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook 
Co 2005) 473–474. 
33 While the Supreme Court did not explicitly rely on the maxim, the maxim was, I submit, implicit in, and 




3. Cautionary Note 
As potent as the maxim is, its power is not without limit. It cannot be used to create property 
ex nihilo. If Alice assigns to Ben property that does not yet exist, the maxim does not 
operate to complete the transaction by creating the property and transferring it to Ben. 
Instead, nothing happens until the property is actually created (if at all), at which point the 
maxim springs into action and gives Ben an equitable right in the newly-created property.34 
This is because, as we have seen, the maxim splits ownership into legal and equitable 
interests. It does not create property where none exists. 
This language of magic, deeming and ‘treating as if’ certainly has the whiff of fiction about 
it, bringing to mind the peevish observation of AP Herbert’s Lord Mildew: ‘There is too 
much of this damned deeming’.35 But before we can be sure that the maxim is a legal fiction, 
we must apply the definitions we formulated in the previous chapter.  
       
B.  Is the Maxim a Hard Fiction?  
In Wall v Bright (1820), Sir Thomas Plumer MR called the vendor-purchaser constructive 
trust a ‘fiction of equity’.36 In Shaw v Foster (1872), Lord Hatherley LC used the same 
words to describe the same device: a ‘fiction of Equity which supposes the money to be 
paid away with one hand and the estate to be conveyed away with the other.’37 But judicial 
opinion is not in itself determinative. As the last chapter demonstrated, the word ‘fiction’ 
means different things to different people and there is not even judicial consensus as to the 
meaning of the term. Here we will analyse fictions according to the model developed in 
the previous chapter. And so, we address ourselves to the familiar questions. 
                                                          
34 Virgo (n 9) 39. 
35 AP Herbert, More Uncommon Law (Methuen 1982) 80. 
36 (1820) 1 Jac & Walk 494, 37 ER 456 (Ch) 459. 




1. Factual Requirement 
The maxim deems as done specifically what has not been done. The husband did not 
transfer the house to his wife, but he was held to have done so. The agent did not transfer 
the bribe money to his principal, but he was held to have done so. Here the word ‘transfer’ 
is used in its everyday practical sense: a willed human act of handing-over. Whether or not 
a person transfers something in this sense is a fact in the physical world. It may be that the 
law, in some situations, implies a transfer; but, if so, the transfer is ‘implied’ because there 
was no actual transfer; because there was no fact in the physical world. This suggests the 
maxim falsifies a fact in the physical world and thus fulfils the factual requirement.   
Sceptics may argue that ownership is a matter of law and so the passing of ownership is 
also a matter of law. According to this view, a transfer occurs whenever the law says it 
does. If the law says that the house changed hands without the husband lifting a finger, it 
is otiose to look for some human act. Inasmuch as the maxim governs the passing of 
property, the argument goes, the operation of the maxim is a point of law and has nothing 
to do with fact.        
In my opinion, this sceptical argument is only specious. It looks at the result of the maxim, 
which is the unwilled passing of property or creation of an equitable interest. It ignores the 
fact that the result is reached through the fiction. The maxim is only triggered in the first 
place because something has not been done. Whether something has been done is 
indubitably a question of fact. The maxim then deems the undone to be done. It is all about 
the failure to do, which is factual.  
Even more damning to the sceptical view is the reverse proposition: if there were no 
question of fact – to wit, nothing to do – there would be no need for the maxim. There 
would be nothing to treat as done. The maxim only exists because there is a factual 
question. So much is conceded in the words of the maxim itself. It is concluded that the 
issue is factual. 




2. Falsity Requirement 
To satisfy the falsity requirement the factual issue must be decided irrespective of the facts. 
There is no doubt that the question whether property is transferred is decided irrespective 
of the facts. The maxim, like a deeming provision, tells us to treat A as B. In fact, it goes 
further in terms of falsity than the ordinary deeming provision. It tells us to treat A as the 
opposite of A. This element of the definition is clearly present.   
 
3. Consciousness Requirement 
As for consciousness, too, it cannot be doubted that the judges who apply the maxim know 
they are falsifying the facts by treating the undone as done. This conscious treatment is 
apparent in the maxim itself.  
All elements of the hard definition are fulfilled. The maxim ‘Equity treats as done that 
which ought to be done’ is a Hard Fiction. It is unnecessary to ask whether it is a Soft 
Fiction. As we established in the previous chapter, if a device is a Hard Fiction it cannot 
also be a Soft Fiction.    
 
C. Effect Classification 
The maxim is not a Jurisdictional or an Auxiliary Fiction. It has nothing to do with any 
court’s jurisdiction and it is not meaningless text for form’s sake.38 It is an Essential Fiction 
because it expresses the justification for the result of the case. As we have seen in Mountney 
v Treharne, the true reason the wife was held to have received the house though the 
husband had not transferred it was that he ought to have transferred it. The fiction is the 
                                                          
38 The fiction would be meaningless text for form’s sake (and therefore Auxiliary) if the beneficiary of the 




consummation of that obligation and therefore closely tied to the reason for the result of 
the case. The maxim is an Essential Hard Fiction.     
     
D. Difficulties in Application 
We now know how the maxim generally works and that it is a New Essential Hard Fiction. 
We turn now to its practical consequences. What happens when we apply this Hard Fiction 
to a variety of cases? The answer is clear: the maxim has brought about serious 
complications. So far, in the interest of explication, we have spared the reader the various 
uncertainties and peculiarities surrounding the maxim. Now is the time to discuss these. 
For reasons of space, we will deal with only three of the complications relating to the 
vendor-purchaser constructive trust. These are by no means the only complications arising 
from the maxim.39     
 
1. First Complication: Nature of the Trust 
We have seen that the effect of the maxim is to separate legal and equitable ownership and 
create a constructive trust in favour of the person ultimately entitled to receive property. 
Let us again consider the first application of the maxim, namely the vendor-purchaser 
situation. Let us also suppose that there is a written contract signed by both parties whereby 
the vendor agrees to sell, and the purchaser to buy, an estate in fee simple. On close 
reflection, the scenario reveals a few oddities.  
                                                          
39 Even the requirement of specific performance has been doubted: Simon Gardner, ‘Equity, Estate 
Contracts and the Judicature Acts: Walsh v Lonsdale Revisited’ (1987) 7 OJLS 60. For other complications, 
see DWM Waters, The Constructive Trust (Athlone Press 1964) 125–141. For complications arising from 
the second application (to bribes), see Millett (n 26); Peter Watts, ‘Bribes and Constructive Trusts’ [1994] 
LQR 178; Peter Watts, ‘Tyrrell v Bank of London - an Inside Look at an Inside Job’ [2013] LQR 527; 
Graham Virgo, ‘Profits Obtained in Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Personal or Proprietary Claim?’ [2011] CLJ 




First, it is odd that the purchaser should get an equitable estate before he has paid the price. 
But this follows if the trust is created immediately upon the making of a valid contract. It 
seems as though the maxim only completes the vendor’s obligation under the contract (to 
confer title) but not the purchaser’s obligation (to pay). This imbalance is easily put right. 
The authorities tell us that the vendor-trustee is automatically given a lien on the property 
for the price.40  
But the oddness does not stop there. The reality of the conveyancing process is that the 
vendor normally continues to reside in the property (or collect rent if he is a lessor) until 
completion. This means that the purchaser, though a beneficiary under the trust of the 
property before completion, is not a beneficial owner (at least in the usual sense of the 
term). This is not only anomalous, but also at variance with the principle of equity that the 
trustee, being a fiduciary, cannot benefit from the trust.41 McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield 
summarised the position of the parties under the trust as follows: 
Until full payment of the purchase money on completion, the trustee (the vendor) 
remains in possession, has a significant interest in the land, is entitled to income 
generated from the land, and is responsible for outgoings. The purchaser (the 
beneficiary under the trust) becomes entitled to capital benefits, such as any increase 
in the value of the land. In principle, risks pass to the purchaser, although these may 
be passed back to the vendor by the terms of the contract.42  
Dr Peter Turner, in a meticulous study of the vendor-purchaser constructive trust, described 
it as a composite of equities that arise at different points, and upon different conditions, 
between the formation and performance of the contract. According to Turner’s illuminating 
account, ‘The equities that arise between vendor and purchaser aggregate together as 
                                                          
40 Lysaght v Edwards (n 12) 506 (Sir George Jessel MR); London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v 
Laplagrene Property Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499 (Ch) 514 (Brightman J); Oakley (n 15) 275; McFarlane, 
Hopkins and Nield (n 11) 299. 
41 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell); FHR (n 12) [5] (Lord Neuberger P). 




equitable property that is distributed between vendor and purchaser.’43 He identified four 
main equities that made up the purchaser’s interest: 
(1) an interest in land, enforceable against third parties, that the purchaser may: 
a) use to claim priority over holders of rival interests in enforcing the 
vendor’s promise to convey the land to the purchaser; and 
b) assign, charge, devise, and pass (as land) on intestacy; 
(2) an equitable right that the vendor exercise due care to preserve and maintain 
the land pending completion; 
(3) an equity to rents and profits received by the vendor between the agreed time 
for completion and the actual date of conveyance; and 
(4) a lien for repayment of the purchase price in the event of non-performance.44  
The judicial views of the position of the vendor were catalogued by Lord Collins in 
Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd v Scott (2014): 
The position of the vendor as trustee has been variously described as: (1) ‘something 
between what has been called a naked or bare trustee, or a mere trustee (that is, a 
person without beneficial interest), and a mortgagee who is not, in equity (any more 
than a vendor), the owner of the estate, but is, in certain events, entitled to what the 
unpaid vendor is, viz, possession of the estate’ and ‘a constructive trustee’: Lysaght 
v Edwards … [per] Sir George Jessel MR; or (2) ‘constructively a trustee’: Shaw v 
Foster … per Lord O'Hagan; (3) ‘a trustee … with peculiar duties and liabilities’: 
Earl of Egmont v Smith … per Sir George Jessel MR; (4) ‘a trustee in a qualified 
sense only’: Rayner v Preston … per Cotton LJ; and (5) ‘a quasi-trustee’: 
Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland … per Lord Greene MR.45 
                                                          
43 PG Turner, ‘Understanding the Constructive Trust between Vendor and Purchaser’ [2012] LQR 582, 
584. 
44 ibid 585–586 (footnotes omitted). 




It is plain that the operation of the maxim, at least in the case of the vendor-purchaser 
situation, has created a complex legal relationship. While it is classified generally as a 
constructive trust, it is in fact a sui generis constructive trust of an exotic nature. 
Commentators have described or decried it as ‘curious’,46 ‘an equitable riddle’,47 ‘extremely 
unusual’,48 even ‘fundamentally implausible.’49          
 
2. Second Complication: Timing  
Adding to the complexity of this many-headed trust is the question of when exactly each 
head of this equitable Hydra comes into existence. It is stated in the general description 
above that the constructive trust materialises as soon as a valid contract is constituted. This 
statement implicitly adopts Turner’s view that, despite there being several equities which 
may or may not arise at different times, a trust of some kind exists ‘at every stage’ from 
formation of contract to final performance.50 The view that a trust arises at the moment of 
contract is shared by Graham Virgo,51 Simon Gardner and Emily MacKenzie.52 However, 
AJ Oakley,53 Ben McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins, Sarah Nield54 and, it appears, DWM 
Waters55 believe that a trust only arises once the vendor has made, or the purchaser 
accepted, title; but then the trust is backdated to the time of contract.  
Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge and Martin Dixon have points of agreement with the 
aforementioned authors but seem to regard the equitable interests that arise at different 
times (eg upon contract, establishment of title, part-payment of the price, completion date) 
                                                          
46 Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge and Martin Dixon, The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2012) [15-053]. 
47 Turner (n 43) 605. 
48 Oakley (n 15) 277. 
49 Gardner (n 39) 64. 
50 Turner (n 43) 597. 
51 Virgo (n 9) 38.  
52 Gardner and MacKenzie (n 21) 116. 
53 Oakley (n 15) 282–285. 
54 McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield (n 11) 298. 




as different trusteeships, themselves quite uncertain in scope.56 James LJ thought that the 
trust arose ‘when the contract is performed by actual conveyance, or performed in 
everything but the mere formal act of sealing the engrossed deeds’, but then applied 
retroactively from the time of contract.57 Dr Waters traced the shifting judicial positions on 
the timing issue from Lord Keeper Wright to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke; from Master of 
the Rolls Plumer to Vice-Chancellor Kindersley to Lord Chancellor Hatherley; culminating 
in Sir George Jessel’s influential judgment in Lysaght v Edwards58 as Master of the Rolls.  
The question of timing is not merely academic. In the Jerome v Kelly (2001-2004) 
litigation, the timing of the trust affected the date of ‘disposal’ of an asset for purposes of 
capital gains tax.59 The Special Commissioners held there was a disposal, were reversed by 
the High Court, which was in turn reversed by the Court of Appeal, only to be reversed by 
the House of Lords (holding there was no disposal).60  
Of course, the question of when the trust arises may be less important than the timing of 
the various equities that, per Turner, make up the irregular relationship between vendor 
and purchaser. The point of highlighting these difficulties is not to improve on Turner’s 
analysis, which seems to me the most precise. Indeed, we lack the space to plumb the 
depths of these interesting questions. The point is to showcase the complexities that this 
seemingly simple fiction – that ‘Equity treats as done that which ought to be done’ – has 
spawned. DWM Waters has gone so far as to call the attempt to resolve the timing issue 
futile: ‘a linguistic merry-go-round. For the problem is insoluble and insoluble it 
remains.’61      
 
                                                          
56 Harpum, Bridge and Dixon (n 46) [15-052]-[15-056]. 
57 Rayner v Preston (1880-81) LR 18 Ch D 1 (CA) 13. 
58 Lysaght v Edwards (n 12). 
59 Specifically, under s 27(1) of the Capital Gains Tax Act 1979.  
60 [2001] STC (SCD) 170 (Special Commissioners); [2002] EWHC 604 (Ch), [2002] STC 609; [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1879, [2003] STC 206; [2004] UKHL 25, [2004] 1 WLR 1409. 




3. Third Complication: Effect on Third Parties 
So far we have considered the relationship between vendor and purchaser. Now we ask: to 
what extent do the various equities that arise in favour of the purchaser bind third parties? 
After all, the distinguishing feature of property rights is that they are capable of binding 
strangers. Say Alice has a specifically-performable contract to transfer land to Ben. We 
know that, before legal title is transferred, Alice holds the land on constructive trust for 
Ben. If, during this time, Alice transfers the land to Charlie, can Ben claim the land from 
Charlie? Can Ben, during the subsistence of the trust, transfer his equitable interest, 
whatever it is, to David, or bequeath it to Ed? Can Ben, during the life of the trust, lease 
his interest to Fred? Traditionally, the answer to these questions was thought to be positive62 
(though the usual formalities applied63).      
Recently, however, in Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd v Scott (2014), the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that Ben could not grant an (equitable) lease to Fred. That is, the 
purchaser-beneficiary under the constructive trust could not grant a lease to a third party. 
Lord Collins, with whom Lord Sumption agreed, stated: 
[I]n my judgment, the appeal should be dismissed on the principal ground that the 
[purchaser] acquired no more than personal rights against the [vendor]... Those 
rights would only become proprietary and capable of taking priority over a mortgage 
when they were fed by the … acquisition of the legal estate on completion…64 
While the decision involved statutory interpretation, Lady Hale DP concluded that the Land 
Registration Act 2002 merely reflected the position under the general law.65 It would appear 
therefore that the interest held by the purchaser is not a right in rem after all. His rights are 
purely contractual. If he has no property, can he properly be called a trust beneficiary? Is 
                                                          
62 Gardner and MacKenzie (n 21) 119. See eg Shaw v Foster (n 12) 333 (Lord Chelmsford). 
63 Thus, for example, for Ben’s interest to bind Charlie (Alice’s disponee), Ben has to register the interest 
or be in apparent occupation.   
64 Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd v Scott (n 45) [79]. 




there a trust at all? This decision casts doubt on the very essence of the vendor-purchaser 
constructive trust.66      
Professor Richard Nolan has counselled against classifying the beneficiary’s interest as 
either exclusively in rem or in personam: some aspects of the interest are proprietary, others 
personal.67 Even so, we may query whether the beneficiary under the vendor-purchaser 
constructive trust has any proprietary interest. Nolan argues the ‘key feature’ of a 
proprietary interest is ‘the ability to exclude others from some defined enjoyment of an 
asset’.68 It does not appear that the purchaser-beneficiary can exclude others from 
enjoyment of the property. He does not even enjoy it himself. The vendor retains the 
beneficial interest until the trust dissolves by the performance of the contract. On Nolan’s 
persuasive definition, then, this relationship is not proprietary.69 This is consistent with 
Southern Pacific. The maxim has undeniably led to complications. The very name of 
vendor-purchaser constructive trust may be a mistake.      
 
E. Evaluation 
In the preceding sections we explained the operation of the maxim ‘Equity treats as done 
that which ought to be done’, established that it is a Hard Fiction and discussed some 
uncertainties concerning its application. In the light of this discussion, we now come to 
evaluate this fiction. To recap: we have seen that the fiction addresses situations where an 
obligation relating to property is pending. In every case where the fiction applies we have 
a transferor and an intended transferee. As we have seen, the fiction creates a constructive 
trust in favour of the intended transferee. It is assumed below that the transfer is specifically 
enforceable.     
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1. The Aim of the Fiction 
In part II above, I was at pains to show that the value of a fiction was not to be confused 
with the value of the result of the fiction. The value of the fiction can only be judged as a 
means of achieving a given result or aim. Therefore, in order to assess the fiction, we must 
first identify the aim of the fiction. Then we can ask whether the fiction is the best way of 
achieving this aim.    
It is submitted that the aim of the maxim is to protect the ‘performance interest’, so called 
by Professor Daniel Friedmann. The learned author was concerned with contractual 
obligations, but his comments are valid a fortiori for absolute duties as well:   
The essence of contract is performance. Contracts are made in order to be 
performed. This is usually the one and only ground for their formation. Ordinarily, 
a person enters into a contract because he is interested in getting that which the other 
party has to offer and because he places a higher value on the other party's 
performance than on the cost and trouble he will incur to obtain it. This interest in 
getting the promised performance (hereafter the ‘performance interest’) is the only 
pure contractual interest.70 
Turner borrows the terminology from Friedmann to argue that the vendor-purchaser 
constructive trust protects the performance interest in the underlying property transaction.71 
Actually, the protection of the performance interest is the aim of the maxim in general (not 
just in the vendor-purchaser context). This is apparent in Lord Diplock’s speech in Harvela 
Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) Ltd (1985):    
Just as damages at common law for breach of contractual obligations are intended 
to put the party not in breach in the same position, so far as money can do so, as if 
                                                          
70 Daniel Friedmann, ‘The Performance Interest in Contract Damages’ [1995] LQR 628, 629 (footnote 
omitted). See also Nicholas J McBride, ‘Duties of Care - Do They Really Exist?’ (2004) 24 OJLS 417, 417 
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the contractual obligations had been performed by the other party, so too the 
equitable remedy of specific performance is intended to put both parties in the same 
position as if their respective contractual obligations had been timeously performed 
by both of them. This finds expression in the maxim ‘equity treats as done that which 
ought to have been done.’72 
In practice, the protection of the performance interest in property transactions normally 
means the protection of the fragile interest of the intended transferee. We do not want the 
transferor’s conduct to destroy or diminish this interest. An example of this concern was 
Mountney v Treharne, discussed above, where the result of the maxim was to protect the 
wife’s interest in the yet-to-be-transferred matrimonial home from falling into the 
husband’s bankrupt estate. That would, in all likelihood, have resulted in a serious 
diminution of the interest.  
Likewise, we do not want the transferor to benefit from conduct which destroys or 
diminishes the transferee’s interest. An example of this concern was Reid. There the result 
of the maxim was to ensure that the corrupt official could not, by failing to account for the 
bribe to the Crown, deny the Crown a traceable proprietary interest.  
Underneath these concerns lies the belief, well-founded or not, that an obligation to transfer 
property is worthier of protection than other obligations; for the maxim does not operate 
where there is no property. The extent of this protection may be unclear, but there can be 
no doubt that protecting the performance interest is the general aim of the fiction.  
There is admittedly a legitimate argument as to whether it is right to protect the intended 
transferee’s interest (eg vis-à-vis the transferor’s creditors or subsequent actual 
transferees), or indeed whether it is proper to undermine the formalities of land registration. 
But we know now that such arguments are irrelevant. We are assessing the fiction as a 
                                                          





means to a given end and not the end itself. So the question, properly framed, is whether 
the maxim is the best way to protect the performance interest.  
 
2. The Case for the Fiction 
The solution the fiction represents is to put the parties, to the extent possible, in the 
positions they would have been in had they performed their respective obligations. It is to 
give the transferor and transferee the intended interests in substance, or the consequences 
of the interests, while relegating the legal transfer to a mere technicality that should not 
affect the outcome. This is accomplished by the unimaginative trick of pretending that the 
obligations have been performed. That the trick is so obvious is, I say, an argument for the 
fiction. It recommends a solution that it is clear, simple and convenient.  
More importantly, we know that the maxim is an Essential Fiction. This means that it is 
the real reason for the result of the case. The pretence that the intended transferee has the 
interest is not meaningless text, lip-service or verbal flourish. When we say that we treat 
the intended transferee as if he has the interest, we really mean that and believe that this 
should be the case. For this reason, this fiction should not share in the opprobrium that 
some have heaped on certain Old Fictions which were ridiculous in appearance and whose 
substance had nothing to do with the true reasons for the determination of cases. Thus, at 
the risk of an oxymoron, this fiction is a ‘genuine’ one. It genuinely represents our view of 
what should be and seems an epigrammatic way of expressing this view. It is the opposite 
of a superficial fix. While the fiction is superficially untrue, it emanates from, or reflects, 
a deeper truth.  
Given its simplicity and genuine content, the maxim is prima facie a sensible way to 
achieve the stated aim of protecting the performance interest. 





3. The Case against the Fiction 
It is hard to deny that the fiction, as a standalone rule, is vague. The maxim that ‘Equity 
treats as done that which ought to be done’ is broadly phrased and lacks the specificity of 
most rules. It reveals little about its application and raises more questions than it provides 
answers. The courts have had to imbue it with content in different contexts – and not 
without difficulty.  
Of course, few areas of the law are free of uncertainty, whether they are fictitious or not. 
But in general, it should be accepted that a fictitious solution is more likely to bring about 
complications in application than a non-fictitious solution. This is because of the 
contradiction with reality inherent in the fiction.  
The maxim has indeed sown complications in the law. These complications show no sign 
of being uprooted. They include the nature of the trust, its timing and the effect it has on 
third parties. It seems, at least in the case of the vendor-purchaser constructive trust, that a 
trust does not quite fit the reality of the situation and has to be forced upon it. In the result, 
we find ourselves with a strange, bespoke trust, where the trustee holds the beneficial 
interest.  
Be that as it may, the complications should not be overstated. In many instances, the fiction 
achieves its aim quite smoothly. In the case of the husband and wife (Mountney v 
Treharne), it was convenient to assume that she had the interest and no complications arose 
therefrom. In the case of the corrupt official (Reid), it was also convenient to assume that 
the Crown had beneficial ownership. We run into problems in more complex situations, 
such as the sale of land, where, in the period between contract and intended completion, 
the intended transferee has the interest for some purposes but not for others. The intended 
transferee has the interest for the purpose of devising the land and asserting ownership 
against subsequent transferees of the vendor, but not for the purpose of occupation or rent. 




Ultimately, the gravamen of the case against the fiction is that it obfuscates the law. We 
start from a false premise so it is no surprise that we end up with a muddled result. The 
fiction, at least in the vendor-purchaser context, has bequeathed generations of lawyers a 
legal Gordian knot that we are still struggling to untie.     
 
4. Weighing the Fiction against the Alternatives 
How do we reach the same result of protecting the performance interest without a fiction? 
At the simplest level, we could make a rule that as soon as there is a specifically-
enforceable obligation to transfer property the intended transferee obtains an equitable 
interest in the property. This would achieve the same result as the fiction without a fiction. 
It is not clear, though, why such a rule would be intellectually superior to the maxim. It 
also lacks the explanatory power of the maxim.   
Furthermore, it is hard to see how a non-fictitious rule that imposes a constructive trust will 
avoid any of the complications. Exactly the same consequences will ensue. It follows then 
that the complications we discussed do not stem from the fiction, but from the underlying 
situation or the broad type of solution (ie the trust).  
It would be possible to avoid these complications by codifying the vendor-purchaser 
constructive trust and clearly answering all the questions about its nature, timing and effect 
on third parties. But even with codification, it is not clear why the change from a fictitious 
to a non-fictitious rule as such answers any of the questions, or advances us so far as an 
inch in answering them. In this case at least, it is difficult to impute to the fiction any 
negative effects, except perhaps general vagueness. It is not even embarrassing as other 
fictions are. On the contrary, it has persuasive force and elegance.       
But there is another alternative. We could be more daring and make a rule that cuts out 
equity – and the problematic constructive trust – altogether. We can do so by granting the 




law and equity, will need to reconcile these new legal rights with the absence of any transfer 
at common law and the non-compliance with legal formalities. This can in turn be 
addressed by reforming the law of property and the formalities. Clearly, this more daring 
approach to eliminating the fiction will require a root-and-branch rethinking of proprietary 
transfers, if not property law as a whole. That may be more than we bargained for when 
we set out to protect the performance interest.  
To conclude our discussion of alternatives, the first (minimalist) alternative to the fiction 
(a rule creating the trust without a fiction) has no clear advantage over the fiction and the 
same disadvantages. The second alternative to the fiction (which entails a re-
conceptualisation of legal transfers) will create more complications for the law than the 
fiction has. It is a Pandora’s Box that nobody wants to open. It appears that the fiction has 
the virtue of efficiency: it is the least disruptive and effortful solution to the problem at 
hand; the shortest route to the destination. At worst, it is just as good, or just as problematic, 
as either of the alternatives. At best, it is a more efficient and self-explanatory solution. 
A final point is that the vagueness of the fiction is not all bad: it allows courts to fit the 
maxim to different situations. A more rigid rule might cause greater friction since it is 
harder to adapt.      
 
5. Conclusion  
The maxim ‘Equity treats as done that which ought to be done’ is a New Essential Hard 
Fiction. While it has its drawbacks, it is suggested here that it is better than the alternatives 










Estoppel means that a party cannot deny a point of fact or law which that party, or the court, 
has affirmed. In the words of Sir Edward Coke, ‘a man’s own act … closes his mouth to 
allege or plead the contrary’.73 Estoppel is of ancient origin and manifold. Lord Denning 
MR charted the rise and divergence of estoppel:   
It was brought over by the Normans. They used the old French ‘estoupail.’ That 
meant a bung or cork by which you stopped something from coming out. It was in 
common use in our courts when they carried on all their proceedings in Norman-
French... 
From that simple origin there has been built up over the centuries in our law a big 
house with many rooms. It is the house called Estoppel. In Coke's time it was a small 
house with only three rooms, namely, estoppel by matter of record, by matter in 
writing, and by matter in pais.[74] But by our time we have so many rooms that we 
are apt to get confused between them. Estoppel per rem judicatam, issue estoppel, 
estoppel by deed, estoppel by representation, estoppel by conduct, estoppel by 
acquiescence, estoppel by election or waiver, estoppel by negligence, promissory 
estoppel, proprietary estoppel, and goodness knows what else.75  
                                                          
73 Co Litt 352a. 
74 The reference is to Co Litt 352a. As Coke explains in that passage, ‘record’ meant the court records and 
certain certified documents; ‘writing’ meant different types of deeds; ‘pais’ meant different types of 
conduct. See also Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 (HCA) 430 (Mason and Deane JJ).  
75 McIlkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] QB 283 (CA) 317. This case was part of the 
infamous Birmingham Six saga. Here, estoppel per rem judicatam was used to dismiss the appellants’ claim 




Estoppel by contract, lately discovered, may be added to the list.76 Returning now to Lord 
Denning: 
These several rooms have this much in common: They are all under one roof. 
Someone is stopped from saying something or other, or doing something or other, 
or contesting something or other. But each room is used differently from the others. 
If you go into one room, you will find a notice saying, ‘Estoppel is only a rule of 
evidence.’ If you go into another room you will find a different notice, ‘Estoppel 
can give rise to a cause of action.’ Each room has its own separate notices. It is a 
mistake to suppose that what you find in one room, you will also find in the others.77 
Nevertheless, eighteen months later, Lord Denning attempted to extrapolate a common 
principle (at least for estoppels based on mutual assumption): 
All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. 
When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption 
– either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no 
difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of 
them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or 
unjust to allow him to do so.78 
It will profit us nothing, in our present endeavour, to describe in detail each species of 
estoppel. The main differences between the estoppels lie in the conditions under which 
                                                          
76 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 1221, [2010] 2 CLC 705 177 
(Aikens LJ). See also Jo Braithwaite, ‘The Origins and Implications of Contractual Estoppel’ [2016] LQR 
120. 
77 McIlkenny (n 75) 317. 
78 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd 
[1982] QB 84 (CA) 122; cf Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (A Firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 39–40 (Lord Goff); 
PLG Brereton, ‘Equitable Estoppel in Australia: The Court of Conscience in the Antipodes’ (Australian LJ 
Conference: Celebrating 80 Years, Sydney, 16 March 2007) 5: ‘there is no overarching doctrine of common 




they arise. For example, promissory estoppel79 requires detrimental reliance and does not 
require a contract, whereas contractual estoppel requires a contract but not detrimental 
reliance.80 There is also an issue as to whether an estoppel is a sword as well as a shield.81 
But the bottom line is always the same: estoppel prevents a party from proving the true 
state of affairs. It is a gag. 
 
B. Applications 
The power of estoppel is perhaps best illustrated by the startling facts of Ashpitel v Bryan 
(1863).82 This case concerned a bill of exchange drawn by a dead man. It was in truth a 
conspiracy by two of his kin. John Peto, a businessman, died intestate leaving stock-in-
trade. A relative, John Bryan, wanted those goods and conspired with the late Peto’s son, 
James Peto, to make it look as if the father had sold the stock-in-trade to Bryan in his 
lifetime. That would prevent the goods from falling into the deceased’s estate. So the 
conspirators prepared a bill of exchange, ostensibly drawn by the late John Peto, for goods 
sold, indorsed to Peto junior and accepted by John Bryan. The result was a simple debt 
owed by John Bryan to James Peto – but the trick was to save the goods from intestacy. 
Bryan took possession of the goods but refused to pay. He opportunistically claimed the 
bill was improperly indorsed, indeed impossibly indorsed, by a deceased John Peto. But 
Bryan was estopped (by an estoppel in pais) from relying on the death and was ordered to 
pay.83 The Court of King’s Bench did not let Bryan have it both ways.  
                                                          
79 A brainchild of Lord Denning when a mere Denning J (see High Trees in n 81). As Master of the Rolls, 
he said of his innovation: ‘This caused at the time some eyebrows to be raised in high places. But they have 
been lowered since.’: D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617 (CA) 624-625. 
80 JP Morgan Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) [556] (Gloster J). 
81 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 (HCA) 445 (Deane J); Central London 
Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 (KB) 134 (Denning J); Combe v Combe [1951] 
2 KB 215 (CA) 219–220 (Denning LJ). 
82 (1863) 3 B&S 474, 122 ER 179 (QB). 




A more mundane, yet more questionable,84 application of estoppel is the advice of the Privy 
Council in Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello (2013). This Gibraltarian appeal related to the oft-
used contractual acknowledgement that money consideration has been received. Here the 
acknowledgement was in the form: ‘In … consideration of the sum of £499,950 … (receipt 
and payment of which the assignor hereby acknowledges)’.85 In fact, the consideration was 
never paid, the transaction being part of some complex restructuring. When the payee went 
into bankruptcy, the official trustee demanded the consideration of the payor. The trustee 
failed before the Privy Council.86 This time it was estoppel by deed.87 Standing in the shoes 
of the payor, the official trustee was estopped from denying the words of the deed.  
In the same vein, the Court of Appeal has held that ‘no reliance’ clauses raise a contractual 
estoppel (provided the clause itself is valid under consumer legislation).88 This recent line 
of authority is controversial89 because it has abandoned the requirements of reliance and 
unconscionability, which limit estoppel by representation or convention. It thereby created 
a contractual estoppel, which is supported by a contract alone (like estoppel by deed, but 
subject to consideration90). The full impact of contractual estoppel on consumer law is yet 
to be discovered.91 What is clear is that estoppel is thriving in the twenty-first century.   
 
 
   
                                                          
84 See eg KR Handley, ‘Reinventing Estoppel in the Privy Council’ [2014] LQR 370. 
85 [2013] UKPC 22, [2014] AC 436 [8] (Lord Toulson). 
86 ibid [59] (Lord Toulson). 
87 ibid [24], [46] (Lord Toulson). 
88 Springwell (n 76) [171] (Aikens LJ); Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 511 [57] (Moore-Bick LJ). 
89 Nelson Goh, ‘Non-Reliance Clauses and Contractual Estoppel: Commercially Sensible or Anomalous?’ 
[2015] JBL 511; Braithwaite (n 76). 
90 Though in Prime Sight v Lavarello (n 85) there was no actual consideration, it being the subject of the 
estoppel. In other words, a constitutive requirement of contractual estoppel was fulfilled only through 
reliance on the estoppel.  




C. Is Estoppel a Hard Fiction? 
 
1. Factual Requirement 
If estoppel is a gag, is it an issue of fact or law? The answer lies, I believe, in our 
understanding of ‘legal issue’, as discussed in the previous chapter.92 To restate, the 
distinguishing characteristic of legal questions is that they can be answered without specific 
reference to the facts of the case. Factual questions, by contrast, can only be determined by 
examination of the facts. A legal question, like what standard of proof applies, or what kind 
of thing constitutes sufficient consideration, is not about what the parties say. It is a 
question internal to the law and independent of any parties and any dispute. If a legal issue 
is independent of the parties and what they say, it follows that preventing a party from 
saying something cannot be a matter of law.  
True it is that the party is gagged by operation of law, but this cannot be the criterion 
because all fictions are in that sense operations of law. The distinction made here is 
between, say, the trust as an institution on one hand and estopping a party from denying a 
trust on the other hand. The former is an issue of law, internal to the law and independent 
of any specific parties or disputes. The latter is dependent on the parties and the dispute 
and has no bearing on the trust as an institution. It is factual.  
To those who say that estoppel is merely an exclusionary rule of evidence, I would answer 
that that is neither here nor there. It was argued in the last chapter that rules could be 
fictitious so to say that something is a rule is not an objection.93 The rule of estoppel is that 
the court ignores the truth. Why would rules of evidence be inconsistent with fictions – if 
an untruth is imposed thereby? We are not interested in the mechanics, but in the substance. 
The rule of estoppel ignores the truth just as much as the rule that ‘Cats are deemed to be 
dogs’. Those who wish to be pedantic may say that estoppel, rather than being a fiction, 
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necessarily creates a fiction. I would regard this as a distinction without a difference. The 
rule contains the fiction within it. It forces the fiction. The factual requirement is made out.   
 
2. Falsity Requirement 
On our understanding, falsity means that the issue is decided irrespective of a contradiction 
with the physical world. It will be readily seen that the whole point of estoppel, wherein 
lies its force and utility, is to prevent the truth of the physical world from being proved, 
relied upon, given effect. The court comes very close to the figurative shutting of the ears. 
Indeed, if it were not the truth we were shutting out, there would rarely be need for estoppel. 
If the father in Ashpitel v Bryan had been alive at the time of the bill, there would have 
been nothing to estop. If the consideration had been paid in Prime Sight v Lavarello, 
estoppel would never have been raised. It is the truth that hurts and must be suppressed. 
This is why John Rastell’s definition of estoppel in his lexicon, Les Termes de la Ley, nails 
estoppel, whereas modern definitions only describe it: ‘Estoppel is, when one is … 
forbidden in law to speak against his own act or deed, yea, though it be to say the truth’.94  
Estoppel has the purpose and effect of suppressing the truth. The court proceeds on a factual 
basis which is false in the sense that it contradicts the physical world. Estoppel satisfies the 
falsity requirement.  
 
3. Consciousness Requirement 
Do the judges who proceed irrespective of the facts as a result of estoppel do so knowingly? 
They most assuredly do. In most cases, they know the basis to be positively false, as in 
Ashpitel v Bryan and Prime Sight v Lavarello. There are many more cases but we will not 
multiply examples. The consciousness requirement is fulfilled.   
                                                          




In conclusion, estoppel is a Hard Fiction. It is not necessary to inquire whether it is a Soft 
Fiction as the definitions are mutually exclusive.  
It is worthy of note that estoppel closely resembles those Old Fictions that functioned as 
non-traversable pleadings. A non-traversable allegation was a statement that the defendant 
was not allowed to deny. This is precisely what an estoppel is. It is still a New Fiction,95 in 
its present incarnation, but it may be seen as an echo of the Old System in our ever-
changing world.   
     
D. Reality Check 
Estoppel fits very smoothly into our definition of Hard Fiction. The parallel with the non-
traversable pleading vindicates this conclusion. And yet, estoppel is not usually regarded 
as a fiction by the legal community, despite the liberality with which the term is used. 
Fuller expressly distinguished between fiction and estoppel.96 So did Lord Millett, extra-
judicially.97 All this while legal devices such as companies, trusts and the reasonable man 
are routinely called fictions (unhelpfully in my view). Estoppel, a supposedly clearer 
fiction, is overlooked. JW Carter and John Baker are notable exceptions in this regard.98 
William Swadling comes very close to saying estoppel is a fiction.99 Generally, however, 
estoppel does not make the list.100 Our conclusion that estoppel is a Hard Fiction seems out 
of kilter with conventional wisdom. This should give us pause. At the very least, it calls 
for an explanation.  
                                                          
95 By our classification, a fiction is New if it exists under the New System.  
96 Fuller (n 1) 73–75. 
97 Millett (n 26) 21 fn 71. 
98 JW Carter, ‘Discharge as the Basis for Termination for Breach of Contract’ [2012] LQR 283, 301; JH 
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99 William Swadling, ‘Constructive Trusts and Breach of Fiduciary Duty’ [2012] Trust & Trustees 985, 
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This is a necessarily speculative exercise, but I would venture the following explanation. 
Estoppel does differ from the usual fictions in that it is not an institution like a trust; nor a 
concept like consideration; nor a test like the reasonable man; nor an allegation like vi et 
armis. Instead, it is an inability to say something. It may be that people do not call estoppel 
a fiction because it is not a thing that can exist or not exist and therefore be real or unreal. 
The question of its reality does not even arise.  
Our definition is not so limited. It looks at the substance of the legal decision. If a factual 
issue is decided consciously irrespective of the facts, a Hard Fiction is at play and that is 
all. I see no reason to abandon this definition (of the Hard Fiction) in light of the peculiarity 
of estoppel just observed. Au contraire: suddenly treating non-traversable allegations as 
not fictitious – after centuries of treating them as fictions – would call for an explanation.  
Further to the hypothesis urged above, there is, I believe, another reason why estoppel is 
rarely called a fiction. This reason is probably more important than the first. It is simply 
that, in current usage, lawyers reserve the term ‘fiction’ for things they dislike.101 It has 
become a legal term of abuse or, at least, a catchphrase for disapproval.102 Since estoppel 
is generally regarded as a good and sensible thing, there is no motive to call it a fiction. 
Our definition, however, should not bend to one’s opinion of the device. It should aim at 
objectivity. 
We knew at the outset that our definition may not always agree with common usage. This 
is one of those instances of disagreement. For the reasons above; and mainly because I 
cannot conceive why we should suddenly stop calling non-traversable allegations fictions; 
I suggest that estoppel is indeed a Hard Fiction.     
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E. Effect Classification 
Estoppel is not a Jurisdictional Fiction because it does not affect the choice of court. It is 
not an Auxiliary Fiction either because it does not consist of pure lip-service, meaningless 
text, that has nothing to do with the reason for the result of the case. In fact, estoppel has 
no text at all and there is nothing random about it. It is grounded in principle.  
In respect of estoppel per rem judicatam, the principle is the finality of litigation. In 
Thrasyvoulou v Secretary of State for the Environment (1989), Lord Bridge opined: 
The doctrine of res judicata rests on the twin principles which cannot be better 
expressed than in terms of the two Latin maxims ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis 
litium’ and ‘nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.’ These principles are of 
… fundamental importance…103 
These maxims may be freely rendered as ‘it is in the public interest that litigation should 
have an end’ and ‘nobody should be vexed twice for the same cause’. It is only right then 
that ‘When a litigant has obtained a judgment in a Court of justice … he is by law entitled 
not to be deprived of that judgment without very solid grounds.’104  
In respect of other estoppels, the principle is fairness in the form of consistency. A party 
cannot play fast and loose with the ground rules. To paraphrase Dr Jo Braithwaite, a party 
cannot contract on one basis and litigate on another.105 We return to Lord Denning MR for 
an authoritative statement:   
I go back to the general principles governing estoppel … It is a principle of justice 
and of equity. It comes to this: when a man, by his words or conduct, has led another 
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to believe in a particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when 
it would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so.106 
Estoppel is founded on principle. It is the reason, or a reason, for the result of the case. In 
Prime Sight v Lavarello, the Board held that the consideration should be treated as paid 
even though it had not been paid because the parties themselves had so treated it and 
expressed this agreement in a deed. As the true reason for the result of a case, estoppel is 
an Essential Fiction. 
To conclude the descriptive part of our discussion of this fiction, estoppel is a New 
Essential Hard Fiction.      
 
F. Evaluation 
In evaluating the fiction of estoppel we ask whether it is a good means of accomplishing 
its twin aims of finality in litigation and fairness as consistency. Actually, both aims are 
about consistency: consistency of legal determinations and consistency of dealings. The 
fundamental aim of estoppel may therefore be said to be consistency.  
Estoppel achieves its aim of consistency rather simply. Once the relevant estoppel is 
triggered, it imposes consistency by refusing even to entertain inconsistencies. If a fact is 
inconsistent with the accepted state of affairs, it cannot be heard. It is a blunt instrument, 
but it is effective in achieving the goal.   
We will not make the mistake of confusing the evaluation of the fiction with the evaluation 
of its aim. We will not ask, to name one example, whether the enforcement of ‘no reliance’ 
clauses against vulnerable consumers is good or bad. This line of argument is illegitimate 
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because it questions the result of the fiction. We assume the result, which upholds the aim 
of fairness as consistency, and look for the best way to achieve it.    
Of course, we can argue about the requirements of the various estoppels and whether they 
uphold the aim of consistency. One can also ask if we really need so many estoppels or 
should unite them in a single coherent doctrine.107 These questions are legitimate because 
they concern the way in which we achieve the aim. But let us suppose that we conclude 
that this or that requirement should be changed, or that the estoppels should be merged. 
The solution will be to change the requirements or harmonise them. It will not be that 
estoppel will cease to be what it is now, namely a gag. At most, these changes will 
determine when the gag is applied. Inasmuch as the fiction is in the gag, none of these 
interesting arguments about the requirements of different estoppels bears on the fiction; let 
alone on whether it is a good means of achieving the aim of consistency.        
Estoppel as such does not come under attack. It is widely recognised as a valuable tool.108 
It is based on sound principle and public policy. It gives effect to these considerations 
efficiently and straightforwardly: efficiently, because gagging avoids changing the content 
of the law; straightforwardly, because the application is so simple, like the non-traversable 
pleading. It has not led to significant complications. For Lord Denning, the estoppel 
doctrine was ‘one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law’.109 Lord Wright 
agreed with Sir Frederick Pollock that it was ‘beneficial’ and ‘perhaps the most powerful 
and flexible instrument to be found in any system of court jurisprudence’.110 
Those who follow in the footsteps of Jeremy Bentham111 and oppose fictions categorically 
should take note of estoppel. Here we have a perfectly defensible fiction. It is actually 
difficult to find fault with it. The neo-Benthamites may reply that estoppel is not a fiction, 
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but then they would have to explain why vi et armis is a fiction and estoppel is not when 
both are non-traversable allegations.  
Of course, estoppel does not prove the opposite – that all fictions are good. It only shows 
that we should not take an extreme position, that fictions are either all bad or all good. We 
need to judge each fiction on its merits. As we will discuss in the next chapter, it may be 
that we should have a preference or a default position. For example, the default position 
might be that fictions should be avoided unless they are indispensable. For the moment, all 
that we have established is that fictions should not be automatically rejected for being 
fictions. 
Harvard law professor Jeremiah Smith, a neo-Benthamite, personified the automatic-
rejection school. A century ago, he called for a bonfire of the fictions:  
We believe that, at the present day, the use of fiction in law should be entirely 
abandoned … if a fiction does not, in any degree or to any extent, represent a legal 
truth, then its continued use can result only in evil. If, on the other hand, it represents 
… some clumsily concealed legal truth, then it is capable of being translated into 
the language of truth, and we should adopt Mr. Bentham's remedy – ‘Burn the 
original, and employ the translation in its stead.’112   
In view of our analysis, we should reject this school of thought represented by Jeremy 
Bentham and Jeremiah Smith. In fact, there is good reason to believe that following it to 
the letter will damage the law. The obliteration of all fictions will doubtless include 
beneficial fictions (like estoppel) and in any event cause much unnecessary trouble and 
confusion.   
To conclude our evaluation of estoppel, it is a New Essential Hard Fiction, which should 
definitely be retained.  
                                                          




VI. Volenti non fit Injuria 
This tort defence was a case study in the last chapter.113 It was found to be a Soft Fiction. 
We revisit it now to decide whether it should be retained. We will therefore skip the 
description and the application of the definitions and go straight to classification and 
evaluation. 
 
A. Effect Classification  
The volenti defence is an Essential Fiction because it is the conceptual reason for the result 
of the case. As we saw, the judges specifically relied on it to argue that the claimants could 
not and should not recover. The conceptual reason the claims in Titchener, Shatwell and 
Morris failed was the extreme recklessness on the part of the claimants. That reason is the 
volenti principle in its strained, Soft Fiction form.     
Bringing the three classifications together, volenti non fit injuria is a New Essential Soft 
Fiction.  
 
B. Evaluation  
To assess the success or failure of the fiction we need to know what it is supposed to do. 
An understanding of the aim of the fiction will also protect us from the error of evaluating 
the aim instead of the means to achieve it.  
It is evident from the detailed discussion in the previous chapter114 that the reason for 
straining the volenti principle was to prevent extremely reckless claimants from recovering 
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compensation for their own recklessness. It seemed ridiculous and unjust. The aim of the 
fiction, then, is to bar recovery by extremely reckless claimants.  
If the aim and effect of the fiction is to create an exception to one of the elements of the 
defence (agreement not required where the negligence is extreme), why not officially 
recognise the exception? Instead of acknowledging the exception, judges continue to state 
the law without the exception. At the same time, they strain the facts in order to satisfy the 
agreement requirement, thereby creating a Soft Fiction. The choice is between openly 
introducing an exception and straining the facts.   
It cannot be argued that the recognition of the exception will introduce uncertainty or have 
unintended consequence because we already live with the consequences. In practice the 
rule has already been changed: extremely reckless claimants cannot recover. There are, 
however, negative consequences in refusing to officially recognise the change in the law. 
It means that in order to know the law, we need to discount the official judicial statements 
of the law and to read between the lines. It requires a close analysis of the case law and a 
skepticism towards stated orthodoxy. Knowing where the law now stands means 
disbelieving it. This fosters uncertainty and ambiguity, even among judges.  
In the nature of things, straining a fact is more uncertain than the falsification of it. In terms 
of certainty, it is better to know that the answer to a question is the opposite of the truth 
than a strained truth. The rule that ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs for the purposes of pet tax’ 
is far more certain than the rule that ‘The definitions of some pets can be strained for the 
purposes of pet tax’. Note that the former is more certain than the latter even though, or 
perhaps because, it is more clearly fictitious. This is a crucial difference between the Hard 
Fiction and the Soft Fiction. The Soft Fiction is more elusive, more amorphous, more 
susceptible to manipulation than its older sister. As we will see in the next chapter, this 
insight will be a central plank of the overall conclusion of this dissertation.  
In the meantime, let us concentrate on the volenti defence. The choice was between the 




unmodified defence. The fiction does not serve us in any way, but it does us a disservice 
in obfuscating the reasoning in the cases. It creates a need for judicial acrobatics and 
unconvincing arguments. Of course, there is no deceit. Consciousness (on the part of judges 
and lawyers) is a requirement of the Soft Fiction. The judges know they are straining the 
facts and we know they are straining the facts. But it is a consciousness of the ‘wink-wink’ 
kind, not the open kind of the Hard Fiction. We need to disbelieve the judges’ own 
statements of the law to obey the law,115 which is not the case with the Hard Fiction. That 
is a not a process of reasoning that becomes our legal system. Volenti non fit injuria should 
be abolished to the extent that it is fictitious and replaced with an exception.        
 
VII. The Single Meaning Rule 
A. Description 
The single meaning rule applies in the tort of defamation. Briefly, the tort has three core 
elements: (i) publication by the defendant (ii) of a statement referring to the claimant (iii) 
which is defamatory of the claimant.116 ‘Defamatory’ means ‘substantially affects in an 
adverse manner the attitude of other people towards [the claimant], or has a tendency so to 
do’.117 Defamation in permanent form is called libel and is actionable without proof of 
special damage. Defamation in impermanent form is called slander and requires special 
damage, except as it relates to criminality or one’s calling (where it is actionable per se).118 
Several defences are available.119  
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There is a cognate tort known as malicious falsehood. Its elements are: (i) a falsehood (ii) 
maliciously published by the defendant (iii) which actually damaged the claimant.120 The 
relevance of this similar but distinct tort will shortly become apparent.  
The single meaning rule concerns the meaning of the impugned words in defamation. The 
rule says that the impugned words can only have one reasonable meaning.121 Conversely, 
this means that a statement cannot be understood in different ways by different people 
acting reasonably. As far as English law is concerned, one statement has one meaning.  
This may be seen as the necessary consequence of the objective approach to interpretation. 
For if the reasonable man (or ‘right-thinking man’ as he is known in defamation122) 
understands the statement to mean X, then X is the objective meaning. The objective 
meaning is singular just as the man is singular. We do not have several right-thinking men, 
each forming his own ‘right’ understanding.  
The locus classicus of the single meaning rule is the judgment of Diplock LJ in Slim v 
Daily Telegraph (1968): 
Libel is concerned with the meaning of words. Everyone outside a court of law 
recognises that words are imprecise instruments for communicating the thoughts of 
one man to another. The same words may be understood by one man in a different 
meaning from that in which they are understood by another and both meanings may 
be different from that which the author of the words intended to convey. But the 
notion that the same words should bear different meanings … conflicts with the 
whole training of a lawyer. Words are the tools of his trade. He uses them to define 
legal rights and duties. They do not achieve that purpose unless there can be 
attributed to them a single meaning as the ‘right’ meaning. And so the argument 
between lawyers as to the meaning of words starts with the unexpressed major 
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premise that any particular combination of words has one meaning which … is 
capable of ascertainment as being the ‘right’ meaning by the adjudicator...123 
The House of Lords endorsed this view in Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
(1995): 
[A]lthough a combination of words may in fact convey different meanings to the 
minds of different readers, the jury … is required to determine the single meaning 
which the publication conveyed to the notional reasonable reader and to base its 
verdict and any award of damages on the assumption that this was the one sense in 
which all readers would have understood it.124 
The problem with the single meaning rule, as conceded in the passages just quoted, is that 
many statements are inherently ambiguous. They are capable of being reasonably 
understood in more than one way. Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v Asda Stores Ltd 
(2009) is a case in point.125 In 2007, Asda launched a new line of food products under the 
name ‘Good for you’. What was special about these products was that they contained no 
artificial colours or flavours and were conspicuously marketed as such. The packaging 
included such text as ‘no artificial colours or flavours, no aspartame & no hydrogenated 
fat’; ‘No hidden nasties’; ‘zero sugar zero aspartame’. Aspartame is an artificial sweetener 
used as a sugar substitute.  
The claimant was a distributor of aspartame. It sued Asda for malicious falsehood. The 
claimant argued that the reasonable meaning of ‘No hidden nasties’, combined with ‘no 
aspartame’ and juxtaposed with ‘Good for you’, was that aspartame was dangerous to 
health. Asda contended that the reasonable meaning was that the products were for 
consumers who found aspartame objectionable.  
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So what was the single meaning of ‘nasty’ or of being contrasted with ‘good for you’? Is 
there a single meaning? Can reasonable minds differ on this point? The judgment of 
Tugendhat J in the case is a candid exposition of the single meaning rule in action:  
I would accept that a substantial number of consumers would understand the words 
on the food packaging to mean that aspartame is potentially harmful or unhealthy… 
However, I also find that a substantial number of consumers would understand that 
these words … are not seriously meant to convey information, but rather … to attract 
as customers those who are already inclined to hold the view (reasonably or 
otherwise) that there is something objectionable about aspartame. 
... Both views would, in my view, be open to a reasonable person to hold. So I have 
to decide which is to be the single meaning.126 
The judge chose the latter, innocuous meaning.127 The case was decided on the basis that 
that was the only meaning. The decision was reversed on appeal, but on the ground that the 
single meaning rule did not apply to malicious falsehood.128 This remains the case. In 
defamation, the single meaning rule is alive and well. At any rate, Ajinomoto shows us that 
the single meaning rule can be the difference between winning and losing.   
 
B. Is the Rule a Hard Fiction?   
In Ajinomoto, Sedley LJ and Rimer LJ both referred to the single meaning rule as a 
‘fiction’.129 Other judges have also explicitly described the rule as fictitious.130 It was a 
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‘legal fiction’ for Professor John Murphy as well.131 Nicholas McBride and Roderick 
Bagshaw seemed to concur in this conclusion,132 as did Andrew Scott.133 The authors of 
Hepple and Matthews’ Tort Law described the rule as ‘an extraordinarily unrealistic 
assumption both as a matter of linguistic and philosophical theory and as a matter of 
everyday experience’.134 These opinions deserve great respect and point to a wide 
acceptance that the rule is fictitious. But they are not dispositive of the question. We will 
now apply our definition of Hard Fiction. 
     
1. Factual Requirement 
In the previous chapter,135 when looking at the reasonable man, we concluded that the 
question ‘What is the standard of contractual interpretation?’ was a legal question because 
the answer to it (‘The reasonable man’) was independent of the facts of any case. We also 
concluded that the question ‘What would the reasonable man understand?’ was a factual 
question because the answer depended on the facts of the case.  
Similarly here, the question ‘What is the standard of statement interpretation?’ is a legal 
question, independent of the facts of any case, the answer to which is ‘An objective single 
meaning’ (which, actually, is equivalent to the reasonable man standard). Continuing the 
analogy, the question ‘What is the single meaning?’, like the question ‘What would the 
reasonable man understand?’ is a factual question, dependent on the facts of the case, to 
which the answer is such or such specific meaning. 
At the risk of repetition, the law’s decision to adopt the single meaning rule, or the 
reasonable man, as a standard of interpretation is legal. But the decision on the single 
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meaning – what it is – is factual in every case. Otherwise judges would not have recourse 
to the words in context. Tugendhat J’s painstaking factual examination of the packaging of 
Asda’s products in Ajinomoto confirms that the meaning of the offending words, decided 
under the single meaning rule, is an issue of fact.136  
Moreover, it is instructive that the question of meaning can be decided by jury. In fact, 
from Fox’s Libel Act 1792137 until the Defamation Act 2013 meaning lay with the jury. 
Under the new regime, a jury will only be convoked in exceptional circumstances.138 Still, 
that the meaning of the statement has long been, and still can be, tried by jury is consistent 
with the conclusion that meaning is a question of fact.139 The factual requirement is 
satisfied.   
 
2. Falsity Requirement 
The single meaning rule is false in our terms if it is decided irrespective of a contradiction 
with the physical world. The rule contradicts the physical world if it can be shown that 
statements can have more than one reasonable meaning.  
In an historical study of defamation, Professor Paul Mitchell describes the single meaning 
rule as ‘an apparently unrealistic attitude to interpreting defamatory words’ and notes that 
it is at odds with academic linguistic analysis.140 Andrew Scott, in a book chapter on the 
single meaning rule, draws attention to the inherent ambiguity of meaning: ‘the same form 
of words is semantically capable of bearing a number of slightly differing, and 
progressively more serious, interpretations. The words may elicit a number of “shades of 
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meaning”’.141 He then gives an example of the inferences readers may draw from a purely 
factual statement: 
[T]he statement ʻX is helping police with their inquiries into a murderʼ could be 
taken to mean any or all of the following: that X murdered someone else, that he or 
she was complicit in the murder, that he or she knew about the murder, that the 
police believe that he or she might know something about the murder or about its 
surrounding circumstances, or that he or she was a forensic psychologist involved 
in suspect profiling.142 
The list can be expanded. The statement can likewise mean that X is a suspect. It is easy to 
forget that the statement can also mean no more than what it says: X is helping police with 
their inquiries. We may say that some of these meanings are less reasonable than others; 
even discount some completely. But it would be hard to say that only one of the meanings 
is reasonable.  
The cases tell a similar story. Bonnick v Morris (2002) was a Jamaican appeal to the Privy 
Council regarding a newspaper report written by Morris about Bonnick.143 Bonnick had 
just been fired as the managing director of a company. The report contained a direct 
quotation from an unnamed ‘authoritative source’, criticising Bonnick’s decision to sign 
certain contracts. The quotation was: ‘nobody … could be so mad as to agree to that’. The 
report went on to say: ‘Bonnick's services as managing director were terminated shortly 
after the second contract was agreed’.144  
Bonnick sued in defamation, alleging that the last-quoted statement meant that he had been 
sacked for impropriety or incompetence. Morris, the journalist, argued that it was a simple 
statement of fact without implication – he signed the contract and then he was fired. The 
‘reasonable’ meaning in this case turned on how much one read into the statement; what 
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voluntary connections one made with the surrounding statements; and what gaps one 
decided to fill. 
The trial judge found for Bonnick.145 The Jamaican Court of Appeal reversed on meaning 
and also accepted the defences of justification, honest comment and qualified privilege 
(which had been rejected at first instance). Forte P dissented on meaning.146 The Privy 
Council restored Langrin J’s finding on meaning but dismissed the claim on the ground of 
qualified privilege. Lord Nicholls commented on the disagreement between the judges as 
to meaning:  
This divergence of view is neither surprising nor unusual. Language is inherently 
imprecise. Words and phrases and sentences take their colour from their context. 
The context often permits a range of meanings, varying from the obvious to the 
implausible. Different readers may well form different views on the meaning to be 
given to the language under consideration.147 
If we return to the celebrated judgment in Slim, Diplock LJ was even more explicit: 
[O]ne man might be reasonable in drawing one defamatory inference from the 
words and another man might be reasonable in drawing another defamatory 
inference. Where, as in the present case, words are published to the millions of 
readers of a popular newspaper, the chances are that if the words are reasonably 
capable of being understood as bearing more than one meaning, some readers will 
have understood them as bearing one of those meanings and some will have 
understood them as bearing others of those meanings.148   
Taking a broader perspective, the language chosen in many instances is deliberately 
ambiguous. Satirical or subversive literature is more likely to be subtle than direct in its 
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criticism. Visual art is famously ambivalent. Humour feeds on innuendo and double-
entendre. Journalists may use oblique references precisely to avoid liability. 
Understatement is common in spoken and written English. The idea that statements are, as 
a rule, capable of only one reasonable meaning is too simplistic.     
To conclude, the single meaning rule is that a statement can only have one reasonable 
meaning. In fact, many statements bear more than one reasonable meaning. The rule 
therefore contradicts the physical world. The falsity requirement is satisfied.  
 
3. Consciousness Requirement 
It is relatively easy to establish the judges’ awareness of the falsity of the single meaning 
rule. This is because they are so open about it. In Slim, as we have seen, Diplock LJ 
accepted that ‘one man might be reasonable in drawing one defamatory inference from the 
words and another man might be reasonable in drawing another defamatory inference’149 
and described ‘the meaning ascribed to words for the purposes of the tort of libel’ as ‘so 
artificial’.150 In Bonnick, Lord Nicholls called the same ‘highly artificial’.151 In Charleston, 
the highest court in the land emphatically approved of Diplock LJ’s candid statement of 
the fiction, noting that ‘readers of mass circulation newspapers vary enormously in the way 
they … interpret what they read’.152 In Ajinomoto, Sedley LJ said that ‘The fiction that there 
is a single reasonable reader, so that words, duly taken in context, have only one meaning, 
has remained embedded in the law of defamation.’153 In the same case, Rimer LJ 
acknowledged that ‘The court … satisfies itself with the fiction, contrary to its own finding, 
that the entire consuming public will interpret the defendant’s packaging as bearing a single 
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… meaning.’154 There is no doubt that judges know that the single meaning rule is 
inconsistent with reality. The consciousness requirement is satisfied.  
We conclude therefore that the single meaning rule is a Hard Fiction. It is therefore 
unnecessary to check whether it is a Soft Fiction. The conclusion that the rule is a legal 
fiction accords with the prevailing judicial and academic view.155  
  
C. Effect Classification 
The single meaning rule is not a Jurisdictional Fiction because it has nothing to do with the 
choice of court. Nor is it an Auxiliary Fiction as it is not meaningless text. The parties do 
not allege that there is a single meaning simply to pay lip service. The single meaning is 
indeed the meaning which the court proceeds upon as the only meaning.156 The whole point 
of the fiction, for better or for worse, is to isolate one meaning as the true meaning. The 
single meaning rule is the true reason for the result of the case. It is therefore an Essential 
Fiction. 
Bringing together our three classifications of fiction, the single meaning rule is a New 
Essential Hard Fiction. 
    
D. Evaluation 
 
1. Judicial Opinion 
Judges have been vocal in their criticism of the single meaning rule. In fact, some judges 
denounce the rule even as they are applying it. The very statement of the fiction by Diplock 
LJ in Slim ended with a cry for help: ‘I venture to recommend once more the law of 
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defamation as a fit topic for the attention of the Law Commission. It has passed beyond 
redemption by the courts.’157 That was in 1968. In 2010, Sedley LJ found himself in no 
better position:  
The choice we are presented with is constrained by an immovable object, the single 
meaning rule … as Diplock LJ said in the Slim case … it has passed beyond 
redemption by the courts … the rule itself is anomalous, frequently otiose and, 
where not otiose, unjust.158  
In Vodafone Group plc v Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd (1996), Jacob J, 
with characteristic honesty, said: ‘As a comparative stranger to this branch of the law I find 
the “one meaning rule” strange’.159 In Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer plc (2013), Arnold 
J observed that ‘the single meaning rule which exists in English defamation law is widely 
regarded as anomalous’.160 The prevailing view of the fiction within the judiciary appears 
to be negative.  
At the same time, one judge, a voice in the wilderness, rallied to the defence of the fiction. 
Sitting as a Non-Permanent Justice of the Final Court of Appeal of Hong Kong in Oriental 
Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao Holdings Ltd (2012), Lord Neuberger mounted a spirited 
defence of the single meaning rule.161 Fainter endorsements of the fiction were offered by 
Lord Nicholls162 and Laws LJ in other cases.163  
Before we consider the arguments for and against the single meaning rule, we must first 
identify its aim. We know that we cannot question the aim of a fiction in the process of 
evaluating it. Without knowing the aim, we cannot evaluate the utility of the fiction in 
achieving the aim.   
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2. The Aim of the Fiction 
The tort of defamation is about harmful words. The mechanism by which the meaning of 
words is decided is of the highest importance. In evidence to the Joint Committee on the 
Draft Defamation Bill (which became the Defamation Act 2013), Tugendhat J said that in 
libel actions ‘very often if not always the most important issue is meaning’.164 In Merivale 
v Carson (1887), Bowen LJ considered the question of meaning to be uppermost: ‘We must 
begin with asking ourselves, what is the true meaning of the words used in the alleged 
libel?’165 His brother, Lord Esher MR, was of the same mind.166 Andrew Scott agrees.167 
We saw earlier that even a matter-of-fact statement (‘X is helping police with their 
inquiries’) can breed a host of interpretations. We saw also the challenge of hermeneutics. 
How is the sacred meaning, on which the tort is based, to be extracted from this quagmire? 
The law needs a mechanism to cut through the mire. This mechanism is the single meaning 
rule. It presents a simple, perhaps simplistic, solution to the problem of meaning: choose 
the most reasonable meaning; ignore all other meanings. The cases testify that the single 
meaning rule is seen by judges as a solution to the problem of meaning. By way of 
introducing the rule, Lord Neuberger said: ‘the first question to be considered must, of 
course, be: what did the statement mean?’168 The classic judgment in Slim and the advice 
in Bonnick also present the rule as the lawyer’s answer to the problem of meaning.169 The 
aim of the fiction is thus to solve the problem of meaning; that is, to determine the meaning 
of the impugned statement.  
The single meaning rule is not the only solution to the problem of meaning that the law 
could have settled upon. There is nothing inevitable about it. Other solutions include 
treating all meanings that are judged ‘reasonable’ in the way the single meaning is treated 
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now; to recognise only meanings that pass some quasi-quantifiable measure like 
‘understood by a substantial number of recipients’; to assign probability values to each 
reasonable meaning and award damages accordingly; or make it an empirical, subjective 
exercise by dropping ‘reasonableness’ altogether and admitting evidence as to what 
recipients actually understood170 (which might again lead to multiple meanings).     
The question before us, in evaluating the fiction, is whether the fictitious solution of the 
single meaning is the best solution to the problem of meaning, in view of the alternatives. 
We will now set out the arguments.    
 
3. The Case for the Fiction 
The first argument in favour of the single meaning rule is that (far from being ‘anomalous’) 
it is standard and unremarkable in other areas of the law. This is the basis of Lord 
Neuberger’s defence of the fiction in Oriental Daily. When we construe a contract, or a 
statute, or a notice, it is taken for granted that in the end the law will only enforce one 
meaning – the meaning that is deemed reasonable. This is so even if as a matter of 
‘linguistic philosophy’ the words admit of more than one meaning.171 There is thus nothing 
exceptional in ascribing a single meaning to words. 
The second argument, which flows from the first, is that the alternative to a single meaning 
is chaos. Lord Neuberger explained the danger at some length: 
While the consequences of applying the rule may sometimes seem a little harsh, if 
a court could hold that a provision in a statute, a contract or a notice could, as a 
matter of law, have more than one meaning, it would self-evidently lead to chaos 
and uncertainty in many cases, both in outcome and in procedure. 
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… If the single meaning rule did not apply in defamation, it would similarly lead to 
greater uncertainty in outcome and increased legal expenses. Instead of a statement 
with two possible meanings giving rise to a problem requiring a binary resolution, 
it would give rise to a problem which had a multiplicity of potential answers, along 
what might be seen as a continuous spectrum. Abolition of the single meaning rule 
would also lead to the dispiriting, expensive, and time-consuming prospect of many 
witnesses being called by each party, to explain how they understood the statement 
in question.172 
Lord Nicholls really captured the chaos argument when he said that ‘readers … vary 
enormously in the way they read articles … It is, indeed, in this very consideration that the 
law finds justification for its single standard’.173 It is because there are so many possible 
meanings that we need a single meaning.  
Another argument in favour of the single meaning fiction comes from the submissions of 
counsel for the defendant in Ajinomoto.174 It is an argument of public policy. Defamation 
law is a delicate balance between freedom of expression and good name. If the single 
meaning fiction is abolished, there will be meanings galore and the claimant’s hand will be 
strengthened. The more meanings there are, the more likely it is that one of them is 
defamatory. All claimants will have to do (so it is feared) is to articulate one possible 
defamatory meaning that passes some low threshold of reasonability. Sedley LJ 
paraphrased counsel’s argument (which he ultimately rejected):   
[The single meaning rule] moves the law into the middle ground between the 
author’s intent, a test highly favourable to defendants, and multiple meanings, a test 
which puts all the cards in the claimant’s hand. Having ruled out untenable 
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meanings, the court proceeds by fixing on the most tenable one and trying out the 
question whether it is libellous. This is practical and fair.175  
According to this third argument, the single meaning fiction is a pragmatic compromise 
between values. Put less kindly, it represents a kind of rough justice.  
Finally, in Curistan v Times Newspapers Ltd (2008), Laws LJ opined:  
The single meaning rule is, I think, not so much a rule of policy as a function of the 
need to understand and interpret expressions in the context in which they appear; 
and this is a matter of common sense and fairness.176 
This is the last argument for the fiction that will be considered here. 
 
4. The Case against the Fiction 
The basic argument against the single meaning rule is that it turns a blind eye to the facts. 
In other words, the primary argument against the fiction is that it is a fiction. Obviously, 
this is a circular objection to fictions. Nevertheless, if we face a choice between truth and 
fiction, all other things being equal, we should – of course – choose truth. Valuing truth is 
an axiom of reason. We will pursue this line of thought in the next chapter. For now it 
suffices to say that the mere fact that a device is fictitious is an argument against it; by no 
means a conclusive or compelling argument; maybe not even a strong one; but it is a 
negative. If all other arguments cancel each other out, we will always prefer to avoid fiction 
than to indulge it. 
The deeper argument levelled against the single meaning rule is that it produces unjust 
outcomes. This is apparent in Ajinomoto. The trial judge found two reasonable meanings: 
one damaging (aspartame is unhealthy), one innocuous (the product is for people who wish 
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to avoid aspartame). The judge chose the latter as the single meaning. On appeal, Sedley 
LJ condemned the rule:  
On the judge's unchallenged findings, the meanings which reasonable consumers 
might put on the claimant's health-food packaging include both the damaging and 
the innocuous. Why should the law not move on to … the consequential damage 
without artificially pruning the facts so as to presume the very thing—a single 
meaning—that the judge has found not to be the case?177 
If the purpose of the action is to protect people’s reputation from unjustified harm, why 
should publishers not be liable for the reasonable interpretations of their publications? 
Olsson J, in the Supreme Court of South Australia, agreed with earlier Australian authority 
that ‘to insist upon an innocent interpretation where any reasonable person could, and many 
reasonable people would, understand a sinister meaning is to refuse reparation for a wrong 
that has in fact been committed’.178 And so, to return to Sedley LJ, the injustice of the single 
meaning rule lies in ‘denying any remedy to a claimant whose business has been injured in 
the eyes of some consumers on the illogical ground that it has not been injured in the eyes 
of others’.179 None of the aforementioned alternative solutions to the problem of meaning 
produces this injustice. The unfairness can only be imputed to the fiction of single meaning.  
There is a third argument against the single meaning rule. Courts seem to accept that, 
historically speaking, the use of civil juries in defamation is at least partly responsible for 
the existence of the rule.180 Now that juries have been all but eliminated from defamation 
litigation by the Defamation Act 2013,181 the historical basis for the rule has been 
removed.182 The rule, it is argued, should go the same way.    
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We begin with the jury argument because it can be summarily disposed of, clearing the 
way for the real issues. Nowadays the jury is not normally a factor in defamation trials. If 
it has ever been a justification for the fiction,183 it is no longer. If the fiction seeks to justify 
itself, it will have to look elsewhere.  
We turn now to the argument made in passing by Laws LJ in Curistan that the fiction is 
justified ‘as a function of the need to understand and interpret expressions in the context in 
which they appear’.184 With respect, it is simply not true that the single meaning rule is 
about understanding words in context. The rule is not that the interpretation must be 
contextual. The rule is that there is only one reasonable meaning. It is submitted that this 
justification is factually incorrect.  
Next, we deal with the argument that the single meaning rule is necessary to strike a fair 
balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation. This argument can 
also be dealt with relatively quickly. It is premised on the assumption that, in a world of 
multiple meanings, claimants will have an unfair advantage. In my view, claimants will 
have an advantage, compared with the status quo, but it will not be unfair. As Sedley and 
Rimer LJJ and Olsson J said, I should not be allowed to publish material which is 
defamatory in the eyes of the reasonable man. That there is another reasonable 
interpretation is beside the point. I should be liable for the defamatory meaning. The idea 
that I should be able to persist in my conduct, defaming with impunity the defendant in the 
eyes of reasonable men and women, is not a ‘fair balance’. Damages can be reduced to 
reflect the fact that some recipients are deemed to have formed the non-defamatory 
reasonable meaning. It is difficult to see how the present all-or-nothing system is a 
‘balance’ of any kind. I would dismiss the fair balance argument.      
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But the fiction is not yet beaten. Lord Neuberger’s argument that single meaning is an 
accepted theory of common law interpretation is a formidable proposition. The burden of 
this argument is that words in the defamation context should be interpreted in the same 
way that words are interpreted in the contractual and statutory contexts: the court considers 
the words from the perspective of the reasonable man and identifies a single meaning.  
Andrew Scott says that this argument is ‘for the most part … manifestly misdirected’.185 
Scott’s rebuttal is that there is no analogy between the interpretation of words in defamation 
and the interpretation of words in contracts and statutes. This is because the meaning of a 
contract or a statute is a matter of law, whereas the meaning of words in defamation is a 
matter of fact.186 If Scott is right about this distinction, Lord Neuberger’s argument by 
analogy falls to the ground.  
I seriously doubt that Scott is right. In the last chapter, I took great pains to argue that the 
test of the reasonable man (holding up contractual interpretation as an example) is a factual 
test.187 The standard of interpretation is a question of law, but what the words of a particular 
provision mean is a question of fact. On this conception of law versus fact, interpretation 
of contracts and statutes is just as factual as interpretation in defamation.   
Even if this conception is open to question, what is not open to question is that both tests 
of interpretation (defamation and contract/statute) involve asking what the reasonable man 
would understand. I do not see why the same question should be factual in one context but 
legal in another. It is true that contracts and statutes are inherently legal documents, 
whereas the words in defamation are rarely found in legal documents. But the question is 
still the same: what the reasonable man would understand by the words. It is the same 
exercise and the same assessment. Either both tests are legal or they are both factual. Scott’s 
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differentiation between interpretation in defamation and interpretation in other areas is 
difficult to sustain.  
If this is true, Lord Neuberger’s argument by analogy remains formidable. If we impose a 
single meaning on words in a contract, why should we not follow our own example in 
defamation? After all, the imposition of a single meaning on contracts and statutes is 
uncontroversial.  
I would submit that there is at least one reason for having one rule for contracts and statutes 
and another for defamation. In contracts and statutes, we must have one meaning. In 
defamation, we do not. If a contract or statute has two or more inconsistent meanings, it is 
unenforceable. Rights and obligations either exist or they do not. Provisions either cover 
certain events or they do not. There is no room for pluralism. In defamation, the impugned 
words are not enforced. There is no hindrance, practical or logical, to the recognition of 
multiple meanings. 
I would offer another, less definite, reason for treating defamation differently from 
contracts and statutes. The problem of meaning arises in large part because of the subtleties 
of language. A satirical poem like Alexander Pope’s Rape of the Lock or John Dryden’s 
Absalom and Achitophel is rife with innuendo, caricature and allusive references to people 
and events. It is precisely the reticence of the language wherein lies its genius. But what is 
clever in a Pope or a Dryden is negligent in a draftsman. Contracts and statutes are not 
written to be allusive or equivocal, but to be clear and precise. To be sure, contracts and 
statutes have been known to be ambiguous.188 But the problem of meaning arises in 
defamation more acutely than in contracts and statutes. This is because legal drafting is not 
artistic, or even journalistic.189 It makes sense then for the law of defamation to adopt a 
more liberal standard of interpretation than the law of contract or statutory interpretation.   
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What remains of Lord Neuberger’s argument by analogy? It seems that the analogy with 
contract and statute is quite limited. Yes, the reduction of words to a single meaning is 
normal in English law. But the reason such a reduction is necessary in other areas (ie words 
have to be enforced) is absent in defamation. Conversely, the reason the reduction is largely 
unproblematic in contract and statute (ie the language tends to be bland and exact) is absent 
in defamation. What is more, there is no positive reason to import the single meaning rule 
from contract into defamation. Why not import the non-singular standard of interpretation 
from the law of trademarks or passing-off,190 which, incidentally, is more relevant? In the 
final analysis, the argument by analogy fails. 
The last pro-fiction argument we have to consider is the threat of chaos: will the 
proliferation of meanings in defamation complicate and increase the costs of litigation? 
Andrew Scott contends, quite persuasively, that the abolition of the rule will not have the 
dreaded effect.191 Most importantly, the abolition of the single meaning rule does not 
compel us to abandon the objective approach to interpretation. The various alternatives to 
the rule enumerated above192 include other objective approaches such as deeming any 
meaning which is reasonable and defamatory to have harmed the reputation of the claimant. 
Damages can be adjusted down if there are other reasonable meanings that are not 
defamatory. This approach is not empirical and will not result in the calling of witness after 
witness on the question of meaning (as Lord Neuberger prophesied).  
Furthermore, under current practice, the court already canvasses a range of meanings, put 
forward by the parties. In Ajinomoto, for example, the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
both grappled with four possible meanings of the impugned labels, three put forward by 
                                                          
touches’: Daniel J Wakin, ‘Scalia Defends Government’s Right to Deny Art Funds’ New York Times (New 
York, 23 September 2005) <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/23/nyregion/scalia-defends-governments-
right-to-deny-art-funds.html> accessed 13 February 2017. 
190 ‘Substantial proportion of the public’: Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] 
EWCA Civ 159, [2004] ETMR 56 [82] (Jacob LJ); Interflora (n 160) [224] (Arnold J) (reversed on other 
grounds). 
191 Scott (n 133) 49–50. 




the claimant and one by the defendant.193 The point is that abolishing the fiction will not 
introduce more meanings into the discussion and thereby complicate everything. The 
multiple meanings are already part of the discussion.  
On the other hand, it is possible that the abolition of the rule, which will tilt the balance in 
favour of claimants (arguably rightly), will embolden unworthy claimants and open the 
floodgates. Observers are already concerned about the chilling effect of the tort and what 
some see as its abuse by the wealthy.194 In this respect, the abolition of the fiction might 
make a bad situation worse.   
The truth is that we do not know what the effects of abolition will be. Necessarily, the 
answer we give must be hypothetical. The only way to discover the effects of abolition is 
to abolish the rule and see what happens. Prophecies of doom often fail to materialise, but 
there is a risk that an ill-advised change in the law will solve one problem at the cost of 
creating others. That is the strength of the status quo; it is the evil we know.  
If the only argument marshalled against the fiction was that it was a fiction, the spectre 
raised by Lord Neuberger and others would be reason enough, in my mind, to act 
conservatively, retain the fiction and avoid unnecessary upheavals. Indeed, in ordinary 
circumstances, I would not counsel change for pure intellectual satisfaction. The common 
law, like nature’s organisms, has evolved in a particular way for certain reasons. In the 
famous words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience’.195 It is the sum of innumerable cases, decided by different judges on 
different facts in different eras, and in jurisdictions from British Columbia to New Zealand. 
We must accept a degree of incongruity in such an edifice. It is a wonder that it works at 
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all. I believe the common law deserves our respect. We should correct its harmful 
aberrations, but be slow to ‘rationalise’ it from above for purely theoretical reasons.196  
That being said, the reasons in this case are not purely theoretical. We do not seek to abolish 
the fiction simply because it is a fiction or because we have found another way to try 
defamation, which we think is superior. The problem with the single meaning rule is that 
it is capable of real injustice which (partially) frustrates the tort. People can get away with 
publishing statements which defame others in the eyes of right-thinking members of 
society. This should not be tolerated.  
The question we posed to ourselves at the start of this evaluation was whether the fictitious 
solution of single meaning is the best solution to the problem of meaning, in light of the 
alternatives. The answer is no. It would be better to abolish the single meaning rule and 
replace it with one of the other objective solutions.  
   
VIII. Common Intention Constructive Trust 
A. Description 
This much-discussed device lies at the intersection of equity and land law. It is a special 
type of constructive trust, whereby a registered owner of land holds part of it for another, 
usually a cohabitant. It arises where the cohabitants, normally partners, had a ‘common 
intention’ that, in return for contributions by both, beneficial ownership would be shared.197 
If this beneficial ownership is not already reflected in the registered ownership, equity 
intervenes to impose a constructive trust to give effect to the beneficial ownership.198 Like 
all constructive trusts, it is imposed because the conscience of the trustee is bound. The 
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registered owner is conscience-bound to give effect to the common intention. In light of 
the contributions made by the cohabitant, it would be unconscionable for the registered 
owner to deny the cohabitant the intended beneficial interest.199  
The common intention constructive trust typically becomes relevant following the 
breakdown of a domestic relationship, where one partner seeks ownership of part of the 
family home. Even so, the breakdown is irrelevant in terms of property rights: the trust 
exists regardless of the breakdown.200 These days, this kind of trust is most relevant for 
cohabiting couples who are neither married nor in a civil partnership because they have no 
recourse to the redistributive powers in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973201 and must fall 
back on the general law.202   
This niche of trust law is concerned with two key questions: (i) is there a trust at all; and, 
if so, (ii) in what proportions is beneficial ownership held? The cases speak of this duality 
as a two-stage test and reiterate that the two stages are very different.203 At the first stage, 
for there to be a trust at all, we must find an actual understanding between the cohabitants. 
This is the eponymous common intention. It may be express or implied, but it must be 
actual. It is not what the judge thinks would have been fair or what reasonable parties would 
have agreed.204 
By contrast, at the second stage, to determine the size of the beneficial shares, we seek the 
answer in the intentions of the parties as manifested in their conduct; but if no allocation 
can be deduced therefrom, the court is permitted to decide for itself what is fair and 
reasonable.205 In the words of Lord Walker and Lady Hale in Jones v Kernott (2011): 
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‘where it is clear that the beneficial interests are to be shared, but it is impossible to divine 
a common intention as to the proportions … the court is driven to impute an intention to 
the parties which they may never have had’.206 The difference between the two stages is 
stark: the first stage is an inference or nothing; the second stage is an inference or, failing 
that, an imputation.  
Judges have gone out of their way to stress the difference between an inference and an 
imputation.207 For Lord Walker, ‘of all the questions to be asked about “common intention” 
trusts … the most crucial is whether the court must find a real bargain between the parties, 
or … impute a bargain’.208 This difference is also crucial for our purposes. Lord 
Neuberger’s articulation of the difference, below, in his dissent in Stack v Dowden (2007), 
won the strong approval of Lord Kerr in Jones v Kernott:209   
The distinction between inference and imputation may appear a fine one … but it is 
important … An inferred intention is one which is objectively deduced to be the 
subjective actual intention of the parties ... An imputed intention is one which is 
attributed to the parties, even though no such actual intention can be deduced from 
their actions and statements, and even though they had no such intention. Imputation 
involves concluding what the parties would have intended, whereas inference 
involves concluding what they did intend.210 
To conclude, the common intention constructive trust will only arise if the common 
intention actually existed. If no common intention can be found, there is no trust – no matter 
how unfair such an outcome would be to the party who has made contributions but is not 
on the register. However, as soon as we conclude that there was a common intention, there 
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will be a constructive trust even if we cannot know what the shares were intended to be. In 
such a case, the court will make its own judgment in allocating the shares.  
A note on terminology is in order. Given the current emphasis on finding an actual intention 
in the parties’ dealings (the first stage), commentators like Graham Virgo doubt that the 
common intention constructive trust is still a constructive trust. They prefer to view it as 
an express trust. There is much to be said for this viewpoint. However, this taxonomical 
dispute has no bearing on our discussion. This is not the place to resolve it. Since the most 
senior judges continue to refer to the common intention trust as a constructive trust, I will 
do so too.211  
  
B. Is the Common Intention Constructive Trust a Fiction?  
Having by now applied the definitions step-by-step, somewhat laboriously, five times, we 
will dispense with the formal structure from now on.  
The prime suspect for fiction in the context of the common intention constructive trust is 
the imputation in the second stage. We invent intentions rather than find them. Some 
commentators have certainly taken the view that the second stage is ‘entirely fictional’.212 
The problem with this view is that there is no falsity. The issue would be falsely decided if 
the court ‘found’ an intention that never was. But the court does no such thing. The judge 
simply says, ‘I don’t know what the intention was, so I’ll tell you what I think is right’. It 
cannot be that a judge transparently deciding what is fair is a legal fiction. In the absence 
of the falsity requirement, there can be no Hard Fiction.  
Could it be that the common intention constructive trust is a Soft Fiction? Well, it is 
possible that the evidential basis for the inference in the first stage (finding an actual 
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common intention) is in practice so tenuous that it is not an inference but an imputation. If 
true, this strained inference might be a Soft Fiction. To say that the inference is a Soft 
Fiction, we need a trend in the case law of judges ‘inferring’ a common intention on the 
flimsiest grounds.  
In Pettitt v Pettitt (1969), Lord Diplock noted the ‘numerous cases decided in the last 20 
years … in which in the absence of evidence that spouses formed any actual intention … 
the courts have imputed an intention to them’.213 This trend continued into the seventies 
and eighties.214 It is exemplified by two cases. In Eves v Eves (1975), the man told the 
woman she was getting no share in the house on the (false) pretext that, being under 21, 
she could not own property.215 The Court of Appeal inferred a common intention (that she 
would have a share) because the man’s excuse was invalid and insincere. ‘It seems to me’, 
said Brightman J, ‘that this [excuse] raises a clear inference that there was an understanding 
between them that she was intended to have some sort of proprietary interest in the house: 
otherwise no excuse would have been needed’.216 Lord Denning MR and Browne LJ 
concurred.217 The quality of this reasoning is much to be doubted. If I reject a bargain for a 
bad reason, surely I cannot be taken to have accepted it. Yet Brightman J found a ‘clear’ 
inference of an agreement in the very refusal thereof.  
In Grant v Edwards (1986), the man again expressly refused to give the woman a share; 
this time because it would prejudice the woman’s divorce proceedings with her then-
husband.218 And again the Court of Appeal inferred a common intention despite, or indeed 
from, the refusal.219 Mustill LJ thought that ‘the nature of the excuse … must have led the 
[woman] to believe that she would in the future have her name on the title’.220 
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Simon Gardner, writing in 1993, found the reasoning in these cases ‘fallacious’: ‘It is hard 
to think that the judges concerned really believed in it. One can only conclude that they too 
were engaged in the business of inventing agreements on women's behalf’.221 John Mee, 
writing in 2007, likewise believed the courts made it ‘very difficult for a defendant to resist 
a claim’.222  
It seems arguable that the inference requirement, at least in the pre-Kernott days, was a 
Soft Fiction because it was a factual question, which the courts consciously answered in a 
strained, unnatural way. This Soft Fiction should be classified as Essential because it went 
to the core of the action. The inference was not meaningless text. In the difficult cases, 
judges went to great lengths to argue that there was in fact an inference.  
Be that as it may, there seems to have been an about-face in English law following the 
elucidation of the inference/imputation distinction in Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott. 
In two recent cases,223 the Court of Appeal rebuked the trial judge for conflating imputation 
with inference. In Capehorn v Harris (2015), Sales LJ said: 
As regards [the property], the judge made clear findings that … there was no 
agreement that Mr Harris would have any beneficial interest in it … Yet despite all 
this … the judge asked herself the question: ‘… whether the extent of Mr Harris’s 
contribution to the business … should be sufficient to impute an intention to the 
parties…’  
She concluded that … she ‘should impute to the parties … an acceptance of the fact 
that Mr Harris, by reason of his contribution of the business … has acquired a 
beneficial interest in [the property]’ of 25 per cent. 
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In my judgement, the judge erred ... She imputed an intention to the parties for the 
first stage of the two-stage analysis rather than identifying an actual agreement made 
by them ... No actual agreement … was ever made … as the judge’s findings 
elsewhere in the judgment made clear.224 
A few months later, the Court of Appeal met with the same issue in Barnes v Phillips 
(2015).225 Here Lloyd Jones LJ was unsure what the trial judge had decided: 
[T]he judge has moved directly from … concluding that there was ‘no specific 
agreement’ to considering what intention must be imputed as to the shares … As we 
have seen, the judge was well aware of the structure laid down in Jones v Kernott 
within which the issues should be addressed ... He cannot be taken to have departed 
from it in the radical manner submitted by the appellant. Moreover, he must have 
appreciated that there would be no point in discussing the shares in which the 
property is held following variation if no common intention to vary had been 
established. In these circumstances, it is at the very least strongly arguable that the 
judge must be taken to have concluded that there was such a common intention. 
Nevertheless, this stage of the reasoning is totally absent from his judgment.226 
Faced with this lacuna, and a possible elision of the two steps, His Lordship examined the 
facts himself and concluded that a common intention should be inferred.227   
The latest case law makes it impossible to still regard the inference as a Soft Fiction. At 
most, the current case law can be said to show that there is a temptation to impute instead 
of infer, but appellate courts resist any slippage. Even if there is slippage in the eyes of 
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some,228 it is not conscious on the part of the judiciary. The unnatural interpretation and 
consciousness requirements are not satisfied. Today, the inference is not a Soft Fiction.  
It may be added, by way of postscript, that Nick Piska maintains that the 
inference/imputation distinction is itself illusory.229 This is because the parties’ actual, that 
is subjective, intentions are anyway determined objectively by their conduct. So even in 
inferring actual intentions we are imputing objective intentions. To which I would respond 
that even if Piska is right, there is still a chasm of difference between finding intentions on 
the basis of conduct and finding intentions on the basis of fairness, which is not ‘finding’ 
at all.  
As a second postscript, it should be recorded that further skepticism towards the 
inference/imputation dichotomy may be found in Lord Collins’s speech in Jones v Kernott: 
‘what is one person’s inference will be another person’s imputation’.230 Even the leading 
joint judgment of Lord Walker and Lady Hale in that case makes this concession: ‘while 
the conceptual difference between inferring and imputing is clear, the difference in practice 
may not be so great’.231 Given the breadth of the judicial discretion to infer a common 
intention, these observations are probably true. Still, for a Soft Fiction we need not a tricky 
or grey area, but an unnatural interpretation (which is not the same as a borderline case) 
consciously imposed on the facts. The recent cases point decidedly in the other direction.  
In conclusion, the common intention constructive trust is neither a Hard nor a Soft Fiction. 
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C. Evaluation  
The heresy of imputation in the first stage was stamped out by the Supreme Court in Jones 
v Kernott. The abolition of the Soft Fiction by the judiciary notwithstanding, we can learn 
important lessons from evaluating it. In hindsight, was it a good idea to eradicate that laxity 
in drawing inferences?  
Emphatically, it was. We may believe that a constructive trust should be based on a factual 
inference or we may believe that it should be based on the court’s assessment of 
deservedness.  But whatever we decide, we should do what we have decided. We should 
not say one thing and do another. If the courts, in their wisdom, have decided that the first 
stage is an inference, an inference it should be. When lower courts trump up inferences, or 
indeed, as we have seen, deduce agreements from the refusal to agree, they betray the 
doctrine of precedent. When any court imposes an unnatural interpretation on a rule of law 
(ie develops a Soft Fiction), legal certainty is compromised. The courts say one thing but 
do the opposite. This system of adjudication is hard to defend.  
It may be retorted that this objection could have been urged against the fictions we voted 
to keep. Not so: estoppel, for example, does not undermine the certainty of transactions. 
The opposite is true: estoppel per rem judicatam ensures certainty. ‘Equity treats as done 
that which ought to be done’, likewise, is not a case where the courts say one thing and do 
the opposite. This argument will be further expounded in the next chapter. The conclusion 
of this evaluation is that it was right to abolish the fiction of inference in the first stage of 








IX. Remoteness in Negligence 
A. Description 
Remoteness in tort is a vexed issue. The problem is this: to what extent are negligent people 
liable for the consequences of their negligence? It is easy to say that they should be liable 
for all the damage they have caused. The problem is that a chain of factual causation – 
cause and effect – is potentially infinite.232 It may involve intervening acts, unforeseeable 
occurrences and unusually vulnerable victims. As a matter of factual or ‘but for’ causation, 
all the events in the chain would not have occurred but for the seminal negligent act. So at 
what point along the causal chain of increasingly remote consequences do we refuse to 
visit liability on the tortfeasor?  
The modern test was laid down by Viscount Simonds, delivering the advice of the Privy 
Council in The Wagon Mound (No 1) (1961): ‘whether the damage is of such a kind as the 
reasonable man should have foreseen’.233 In other words, the kind of damage has to be 
reasonably foreseeable. If it is not, the damage is too remote and irrecoverable.  
Dr Janet O’Sullivan has advanced the argument that the courts have so watered down the 
foreseeability requirement that virtually any damage, no matter how unforeseeable, can 
satisfy the test.234 The primary example cited by O’Sullivan is the replay of The Wagon 
Mound (No 1), namely The Wagon Mound (No 2) (1966).235 The Wagon Mound was docked 
in Sydney Harbour. Furnace oil leaked from the ship into the harbour. The oil ignited and 
two nearby ships were damaged by fire. The owners of the damaged ships sued for 
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negligence. In the Privy Council, the question was whether the risk of fire was too remote. 
Walsh J, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, had made these findings:  
(1) Reasonable people in the position of the officers of the Wagon Mound [who 
were responsible for the spillage] would regard the furnace oil as very difficult to 
ignite upon water. (2) Their personal experience would probably have been that this 
had very rarely happened. (3) If they had given attention to the risk of fire from the 
spillage, they would have regarded it as a possibility, but one which could become 
an actuality only in very exceptional circumstances. (4) They would have 
considered the chances of the required exceptional circumstances happening whilst 
the oil remained spread on the harbour waters as being remote. (5) I find that the 
occurrence of damage … was not reasonably foreseeable...236 
The Privy Council accepted, as points of fact, findings (1) to (4), but overturned finding 
(5), which was the crucial legal conclusion. Lord Reid, speaking for the Board, held that 
the ignition of the oil was a possibility, ‘a real risk’, albeit an exceptional one. Therefore 
the risk of fire could be ‘realised or foreseen’.237 This raises serious questions. If a ‘very 
exceptional’ risk is a foreseeable risk, what risk is not foreseeable?  
Is an unforeseeable risk one that has no possibility of occurring even in ‘very exceptional 
circumstances’? It seems that nothing short of the scientific impossibility of oil catching 
fire on water would have sufficed.238 But an impossible risk is not a risk. If so, the 
deconstructed ratio of The Wagon Mound (No 2) is that, despite the lip-service to the 
irrelevance of ‘far-fetched’ risks,239 any risk, however remote, may be foreseeable.   
Where Lord Reid led, others followed. In H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co 
Ltd (1977),240 the claimant pig farmers bought a hopper from the defendants. The 
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ventilators on the hopper were negligently installed and the nuts stored inside turned 
mouldy. Alas, the contaminated food, when eaten by the pigs, triggered an outbreak of E 
coli, which decimated the herd. Though ostensibly a case in contract, all three judges of 
the Court of Appeal agreed that foreseeability should be treated the same in contract and 
tort.241 On foreseeability, Lord Denning MR said: 
They ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if the mouldy pignuts were fed to the 
pigs, there was a possibility that they might become ill. Not a serious possibility. 
Nor a real danger. But still a slight possibility. On that basis the makers were liable 
for the illness suffered by the pigs.242 
Scarman LJ concurred: 
It does not matter, in my judgment, if they thought that the chance of physical injury 
… was slight, or that the odds were against it, provided they contemplated as a 
serious possibility the type of consequence, not necessarily the specific 
consequence, that ensued upon breach.243 
Again, the question from The Wagon Mound (No 2) demands our attention: if a risk that is 
‘slight’, ‘not a serious possibility’, ‘nor a real danger’ is a foreseeable risk, what risk is not 
foreseeable? Only an impossible one it seems: a non-risk.     
In Jolley v Sutton LBC (2000),244 two boys decided to repair an abandoned boat on council 
land. They used a car-jack and some wood to prop up the dilapidated vessel. This support 
gave way, crushing the claimant and resulting in catastrophic spinal injuries. He sued the 
council. The House of Lords held the damage was foreseeable.245 In the Court of Appeal, 
Lord Woolf MR noted that ‘there is no case of which counsel on either side were aware 
where want of care on the part of a defendant was established but a plaintiff, who was a 
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child, has failed to succeed because the circumstances of the accident were not 
foreseeable’.246  
In his historical study of tort law, Professor Paul Mitchell reviewed cases like Jolley v 
Sutton, wherein children were injured as a result of their own carelessness and sued some 
responsible authority or corporation in negligence.247 These cases, too, confirm the trend 
(pre-Wagon Mound): once want of care was proved, foreseeability was no hurdle. Any 
mischief, however ingenious, by children was deemed reasonably foreseeable.248 Having 
discussed attempts to ‘tighten the foreseeability test’, Mitchell concluded: ‘judges keen to 
limit liability were going to need sharper doctrinal tools than a foreseeability test’.249 The 
case of Jolley v Sutton, and those collected by Mitchell,250 strengthen the impression that 
foreseeability is sometimes a fig leaf for other policy reasons. In practice, foreseeability is 
not a limit on liability. 
One final instance of the dilution of foreseeability is worthy of mention. Spencer v 
Wincanton Holdings Ltd (2009)251 concerned a series of increasingly unfortunate events. In 
2000, the claimant injured his knee in a minor workplace accident. The defendant employer 
admitted liability. The knee was still painful in 2003 so the claimant made an informed 
decision to undergo an above-knee amputation and be fitted with a prosthesis. The 
employer accepted liability for this follow-on damage as well. To his credit, the claimant 
was a hardy man. Undaunted by his injury, he found a new job that accommodated his 
handicap and did his best to live without reliance on others. Later in 2003, the claimant 
was refuelling at a petrol station. Rather than call for assistance, he operated the pump 
himself, without his prosthetic leg, which was in the backseat, steadying himself against 
the car. He had done this many times before. This time he tripped over a raised manhole 
and fell, rupturing his quadriceps tendon. It left him paraplegic for life. For this last injury 
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the employer denied liability on the ground that it was not a foreseeable consequence of 
the initial workplace accident.  
In the Sheffield County Court, Judge Bullimore held the employer liable for the second 
accident (at the petrol station), but reduced the damages due to contributory negligence. 
His Honour explained his conclusion as follows: 
[The employer] submits that it was unforeseeable … that the claimant would fall 
while hopping round his car ... That in my view places too much emphasis on what 
exactly is to be foreseen. The direct result of the first accident was the loss of the 
leg. A one-legged man is less stable: it is foreseeable that in going about his daily 
business a one legged man is more vulnerable to trips and slips than a two legged 
man. It is quite unnecessary to ask if the Defendant … could or should have also 
foreseen the trip occurred when the Claimant was filling his car with fuel.252 
The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge’s decision, with Sedley LJ holding 
that ‘Like the amputation, the fall was … an unexpected but real consequence of the 
original accident’.253  
The question again calls for an answer: if an ‘unexpected’ risk is foreseeable, what risk is 
unforeseeable? Here the straining of the remoteness test has reached a new height since 
‘unexpected’ and ‘unforeseeable’ are exactly synonymous. And so, it appears any risk may 
be foreseeable in the right circumstances. A risk is reasonably foreseeable even if it is ‘very 
exceptional’ or ‘not a serious possibility’ or ‘slight’ or ‘unexpected’. Is it not fictitious to 
still talk about foreseeability when the word has been so denatured?  
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B. Is Remoteness in Negligence a Fiction?  
It would be unsafe to conclude that remoteness in negligence is a Hard Fiction. The first 
problem is the falsity requirement. Hard Fictions are barefaced in their falsity. We need to 
point to a definite contradiction with the physical world. When we are dealing with degrees 
of probability at the lower end of the scale, it is hard to say with any conviction that a 
certain event is unforeseeable as opposed to foreseeable. This is because there is no bright 
line; it is a continuum. Moreover, even if we could be sure that something that is not 
foreseeable is treated as foreseeable, it would be impossible to know that the judge is 
conscious of the falsity, rather than making a mistake. The consciousness requirement 
cannot be fulfilled. Remoteness in negligence is not a Hard Fiction. 
On the other hand, the way the foreseeability test has been strained does suggest a Soft 
Fiction. Foreseeability is clearly a factual test. The straining does amount to the imposition 
of an unnatural interpretation on a rule of law. But are the judges conscious of the contrived 
nature of the reasoning? In my opinion, they must be. If cornered on the point, they would 
have to admit that they stretched the test beyond its ordinary meaning. A ‘very exceptional’ 
risk is by definition not a reasonably foreseeable risk. An E coli outbreak is not a reasonably 
foreseeable result of a defective container. Whatever the motives, this is a conscious 
straining of the remoteness test. Remoteness in negligence is a Soft Fiction. 
 
C. Effect Classification  
This is the first New Fiction we have encountered that is not an Essential Fiction. 
Foreseeability is not the real conceptual reason for the result of the cases. If the judges had 
decided the above cases on foreseeability alone, they would have reached a different result. 
They found the defendants liable for other reasons254 – policy reasons or their inner sense 
of justice – and foreseeability had to be carried along. The judges had to say that the 
                                                          




unlikely event was reasonably foreseeable – because that was the law and it generally made 
sense – so they did. Reasonable foreseeability is like the Auxiliary Fictions of ages past 
(eg the neck verse or finding in trover): not the real reasons for the result of the case. Indeed, 
they masked the real reasons. It was just something that had to be said: lip-service. 
Remoteness in negligence is an Auxiliary Fiction.  
 
D. Evaluation  
The aim of the fiction is to allow recovery where the damage is not reasonably foreseeable 
but there are other reasons to hold the defendant liable. This can be seen in Lord Reid’s 
speech in The Wagon Mound (No 2):  
[T]he evidence shows that the discharge of so much oil onto the water must have 
taken a considerable time, and a vigilant ship's engineer would have noticed the 
discharge at an early stage … The most that can be said to justify inaction is that he 
would have known that [the oil could ignite] in very exceptional circumstances. But 
that does not mean that a reasonable man would dismiss such a risk from his mind 
and do nothing when it was so easy to prevent it.255 
As we have said, the fiction is Auxiliary, meaning it is not the real reason for the result of 
the case. In the above passage lurks the real reason. Lord Reid acknowledged that the risk 
was ‘very exceptional’ (read: not reasonably foreseeable), but thought the defendant’s 
inaction was inexcusable, given how easy it was to solve the problem. The real reason for 
the result of the case, then, was that inaction was unreasonable, not that the risk was 
foreseeable. The aim of the fiction here, as elsewhere,256 was to enable recovery in spite of 
the remoteness test, where there is an overpowering reason to do so.  
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To evaluate the fiction, we ask whether it is the best available means of achieving this aim. 
The alternative to the fiction is to adopt a new test that is more flexible or more nuanced. 
As it stands, the remoteness test is quite uncertain. As we saw in the context of another 
Soft Fiction, volenti non fit injuria, a strained argument is more uncertain than a plain 
falsehood. How are parties to know how much straining will be allowed in their case, if at 
all? How can parties predict whether the judge will effectively disapply the foreseeability 
criterion in their case or not? When judges knowingly play fast and loose with the law, the 
law is unpredictable. A result reached by twisted reasoning, even if it is a good result, is 
never a predictable result.  
It is arguable, perhaps, that the foreseeability test is so eviscerated that it is consistent in its 
meaninglessness: it is never a barrier. Hence there is no uncertainty. If this is true; if 
foreseeability is already dead, would it not be more sensible to accept its death rather than 
deny it? The law would then be officially changed so that foreseeability is no longer a sine 
qua non for remoteness.  
The foreseeability test is either consistent in its fictitiousness, in which case there is no 
point keeping it; or it is inconsistent in its fictitiousness, in which case it is confusing. 
Either way it is bad for the law. If the remoteness test in The Wagon Mound (No 1) has 
been found wanting by judges (who evaded it), it should be replaced; either with a 
multifactor test or a more nuanced test. The present response of the law – fudging – is 
beneath it. The Soft Fiction of remoteness in negligence ought to be abolished. 
        
X. Reading down Exclusion Clauses 
This is a practice we mentioned in the last chapter as an example of a Soft Fiction.257 We 
return to it now for classification and evaluation. It will be dealt with it in short order. A 
Soft Fiction is a factual issue decided by a consciously-unnatural interpretation. We have 
                                                          




already established that the meaning of a clause in a contract is a factual issue.258 As Lord 
Denning vividly described (or rather confessed) in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v 
Finney Lock Seeds Ltd (1982), the courts consciously strained the meaning of exclusion 
clauses to an unnatural degree – so as to defeat them.259 This mea culpa, a fine example of 
that Master of the Rolls’ legal prose, was quoted at length in the last chapter.260 Some of 
these artificial constructions would be amusing if they were not the reasoning of real cases. 
In Webster v Higgin (1948),261 the exclusion clause read ‘no warranty … is given or 
implied’. The Court seized upon the use of the present tense to conclude that the clause did 
not cover pre-contractual warranties.262 So the practice of reading down exclusion clauses 
was a Soft Fiction before 1977.  
Is this fiction still in existence? Lord Denning strongly implied that it was not extant at his 
time of writing, namely 1982. There is much to support this implication. Two years earlier, 
the House of Lords seemed to draw a line under the fiction. In Photo Production Ltd v 
Securicor Transport Ltd (1980), the Law Lords overturned Lord Denning himself for 
forcing an unnatural interpretation upon an exclusion clause.263 In a speech echoed by his 
brethren, Lord Diplock stated: 
My Lords, the reports are full of cases in which what would appear to be very 
strained constructions have been placed upon exclusion clauses, mainly in what to-
day would be called consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion. As Lord 
Wilberforce has pointed out, any need for this kind of judicial distortion of the 
English language has been banished by … the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. In 
commercial contracts negotiated between business-men capable of looking after 
their own interests … it is, in my view, wrong to place a strained construction upon 
words in an exclusion clause which are clear and fairly susceptible of one meaning 
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only even after due allowance has been made for the presumption in favour of the 
implied primary and secondary obligations.264 
In recent years, the courts have firmly rejected unnaturally-restrictive interpretations of 
exclusion clauses. In Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources plc (2016), the 
Court of Appeal was unanimous that ‘since the decision in Photo Production … the courts 
have recognised that artificial approaches to the construction of commercial contracts are 
to be avoided in favour of giving the words used by the parties their ordinary and natural 
meaning.’265 Comments to the same effect were made in Lictor Anstalt v Mir Steel UK Ltd 
(2012),266 Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup and Partners Ltd (2017)267 and Interactive E-
Solutions JLT v O3B Africa Ltd (2018).268 In 2017, Professor Edwin Peel stated that ‘the 
implementation of … [the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977] … did see the passing of a 
particularly strained form of interpretation in which the courts persuaded themselves of an 
ambiguity which did not really exist’.269  
Given the state of evidence, it is unlikely that the interpretation of exclusion clauses is still 
a Soft Fiction – at least as a widespread or condoned practice. We will therefore treat the 
fiction of reading down exclusion clauses as judicially abolished.  
Prior to its abolition, the fiction of reading down exclusion clauses was, obviously, a New 
Fiction. In terms of the Effect Classification, it was an Auxiliary Fiction. The judges 
employed unlikely interpretations, ‘sophisticated refinements’ per Lord Scarman,270 not 
because they thought that it was an objectively good way of understanding the exclusion 
clause. They resorted to this manipulation because, taking pity on the claimant, they did 
not want the clause to apply on the facts. Hence the fiction was not the real reason for the 
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result of the case or a belief justifying the outcome. It was no more than a fig leaf, a means 
to an end – and an inelegant one at that.       
All that remains now is to evaluate this bygone Soft Fiction (for didactic purposes that will 
become apparent in the next chapter). It is argued that it was right of the judges to abolish 
the fiction for the same reasons advanced for the abolition of the Soft Fictions in the first 
stage of the common intention constructive trust and remoteness in negligence. These 
arguments need not be repeated a third time.271 Fudging is no way to do law.  
In conclusion, reading down exclusion clauses was a New Auxiliary Soft Fiction, which 
was rightly abolished circa 1980.    
 
XI. Summary of Findings 
 
The table below sets forth our conclusions regarding all the purportedly-fictitious devices 
discussed in this dissertation, in order of discussion: 
Device Where 
discussed 
Nature Age Effect Recommendation: 
retain or abolish? 
Dominus 
remisit curiam 
ch 1, sect 
III(A), p 18 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Jurisdictional  Already abolished 
Vi et armis ch 1, sect 
III(B), p 19 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Jurisdictional Already abolished 
Geographical 
fictions 
ch 1, sect 
III(C), p 22 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Jurisdictional Already abolished 
Bill of 
Middlesex 
ch 1, sect 
III(D), p 25 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Jurisdictional Already abolished 
                                                          






ch 1, sect 
III(E), p 29 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Jurisdictional Already abolished 
Benefit of 
clergy 
ch 1, sect 
III(F), p 31 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Auxiliary  Already abolished 
Pleading the 
belly 
ch 1, sect 
III(G), p 35 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Auxiliary Already abolished 
Common 
recovery 
ch 1, sect 
III(H), p 38 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Auxiliary Already abolished 
Trover ch 1, sect 
III(I), p 41 
Hard 
Fiction 
Old Auxiliary Already abolished 
Ejectment ch 1, sect 





Essential Already abolished 
Quasi-contract ch 1, sect 





Essential Already abolished 
Corporation ch 2, sect 
VI(B), p 70 
Not a 
fiction  
N/A N/A N/A 
Trust (as 
such) 
ch 2, sect 
VI(B), p 70 
Not a 
fiction  
N/A N/A N/A 









ch 2, sect 
VII, p 107; 
ch 3, sect 
X, p 208 
Soft 
Fiction 
New Auxiliary Already abolished 
Reasonable 
man 









Volenti non fit 
injuria 
ch 2, sect 
VIII(B),  
p 118; ch 





New Essential Abolish 
Equity treats 
as done that 
which ought 
to be done 
ch 3, sect 
IV, p 136 
Hard 
Fiction 
New Essential Retain 
Estoppel ch 3, sect 
V, p 157 
Hard 
Fiction 
New Essential Retain 
Single 
meaning rule 
ch 3, sect 
VII, p 171 
Hard 
Fiction 







ch 3, sect 











ch 3, sect 
VIII, p 192 
Not a 
fiction 
N/A N/A N/A 
Remoteness in 
negligence 
ch 3, sect 
IX, p 201  
Soft 
Fiction 






The first chapter was history. The second chapter was theory. This third chapter was theory 
in practice. In it, the understanding we had acquired in the previous chapters was applied 
to contemporary fictions. We looked closely at a number of devices, determined whether 
they were fictitious, classified them and, for whatever it was worth, sentenced them to life 
or death. The results are tabulated above.  
In the fourth and final chapter, we will attempt to extrapolate from our findings on 
individual fictions some general principles about all fictions. The point of this dissertation 
is not simply to pass judgment on the value of this or that fiction, but to develop an 






AN ACCEPTANCE TEST FOR FICTIONS 
 
 
Lawyer, n. One skilled in circumvention of the law. 
 
         Ambrose Bierce1 
  
                                                          





This chapter represents the culmination of this work. A long mathematical treatise may 
culminate in a short equation, whose neat simplicity stupefies us. Legal treatises do not 
usually reduce their subject to a pithy precept; nor are they known for neatness or 
simplicity. In this chapter, we will try to defy the odds and produce an algorithmic 
conclusion for the dissertation – a flowchart – which contains all the knowledge we 
have accumulated. Needless to say, it will not approach the elegance (let alone the 
brilliance) of a scientific formula; but it will, it is hoped, be simple, concise and useful.  
Having traced, described, defined, classified and evaluated fictions, it is now time to 
formulate a test to determine which fictions should be retained and which discarded. 
This test will be called the ‘Retention Test’. We will also propose a slightly different 
‘Creation Test’ for situations where a judge is considering creating a new fiction. At the 
end of this chapter, these two tests will be joined in one flowchart, depicting a single 
‘Acceptance Test’ for fictions. The Acceptance Test will thus combine both the 
Retention and Creation Tests and embody the conclusion of this research project.  
The great difficulty in developing an Acceptance Test for fictions is that no two fictions 
are alike. If the previous chapters have taught us anything, it is that each fiction has a 
unique history, function and context. How can we generalise from one to all? How can 
we reduce this diversity of circumstance to a one-size-fits-all test that is simple, concise 
and useful? 
The answer lies in classification. No two persons are alike, but it is possible to classify 
them by relevant characteristics. Fictions may also be classified according to key 
characteristics, many of which we have already identified. The Retention Test will thus 
take the following form: if a fiction presents characteristics X, Y and Z, retain it; if not, 
abolish it. The Creation Test will work in the same way, but one of the characteristics 
will be different. As long as the characteristics are not in themselves unclear, the test 
will meet the condition of being simple, concise and useful.  
This Acceptance Test will be developed hereinbelow in three stages. First, we will ask 




will we permit? What general view of fictions will the test reflect? This first stage 
addresses the general nature and direction of the test. The second stage is concerned 
with the motives for fictions. What role should a fiction’s motive play in the Acceptance 
Test? Can we judge fictions by their motives? What are these motives? Finally, we will 
attempt to generalise the conclusions about individual fictions from the last chapter. 
This third stage, of extrapolation, will give the test its content: what characteristics make 
up the test. Much of what will be said in this chapter has already been foreshadowed in 
the discussions of individual fictions in previous chapters. This chapter will connect the 
dots.  
     
II. The Nature of the Test: Degree of Discretion 
 
A. Tests and Discretion  
Inasmuch as the Acceptance Test is the climax of this dissertation, it will be helpful to 
pause and reflect on the nature of the Test. We have just said that we want a test that is 
simple, concise and useful. We looked with envy to the precision of equations. It is 
suggested that what sets apart scientific formulae and legal tests, making one exact and 
the other inexact, is discretion.2 A scientific formula does not admit of discretion. A 
computer can apply it. It has high predictive value. If we know the value of the variables, 
we can predict the answer with certainty.  
Not so with most legal tests. To be sure, a few legal tests leave no scope for discretion. 
The test for the age of majority is an example. Assuming the person can prove his date 
of birth (which is a matter of evidence, not law), the judge has no discretion in deciding 
whether he is a minor. This is a decision a computer can make. But most legal tests are 
not of this kind. Most legal tests involve some degree of post-factual discretion. The 
discretion is post-factual in the sense that the judge (let alone different judges) may 
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justifiably reach different conclusions on the same agreed facts. This is why we cannot 
replace judges with supercomputers.3 Legal tests are less predictable and vaguer than 
their scientific counterparts because they are usually discretionary.              
Importantly for our Acceptance Test, legal tests vary in the width of their discretion. 
We can crudely4 divide this spectrum of discretion into four segments: (i) no discretion; 
(ii) narrow discretion; (iii) wide discretion; and (iv) unfettered discretion. Below are 
examples of each category.  
 
1. No Discretion 
An example of a test that involves no discretion is, as we have seen, the age of majority. 
The judge does not consider how mature the person actually is (mentally, intellectually, 
emotionally) but simply checks whether the person has attained the age of 18.5 The 
judge has no influence over the result. The result is entirely predictable.    
Another example of a test involving no discretion is s 9 of the Wills Act 1837 which 
specifies the formalities required for a valid will.6  
 
2. Narrow Discretion 
An example of a narrow-discretion test is found in s 1 of the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a contract 
(a ‘third party’) may in his own right enforce a term of the contract if— 
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(a) the contract expressly provides that he may, or 
(b) subject to subsection (2), the term purports to confer a benefit on him 
(2) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply if on a proper construction of the contract it 
appears that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third 
party. 
The influence the judge has on the result lies in deciding whether a term ‘purports to 
confer a benefit’ and whether the parties ‘did not intend the term to be enforceable by 
the third party’. While there will always be marginal cases,7 in the ordinary run of cases 
it will be clear whether a term appears to confer a benefit. Once this is decided, the 
judge construes the contract to see if there is a contrary overall intention. On the whole, 
the judge is largely constrained by the facts of the case. He is more constrained than 
free. Now it is true that the facts themselves are commonly in dispute and the judge 
exercises discretion in deciding them. However, we are concerned with degrees of 
discretion. The judge has influence over the result, but this influence is greater than in 
(i) (no discretion) and smaller than (iii) or (iv) (wide or unfettered discretion). In cases 
of narrow discretion, the result is fairly predictable. A lawyer would normally be able 
to advise a client whether a third party can sue with a high degree of confidence. 
Other examples of a narrow-discretion test include s 1 of the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943 (empowering the court to make an allowance for benefits received 
under a frustrated contract); and the test for repudiation – ‘evince an intention no longer 
to be bound by the contract’.8  
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3. Wide Discretion 
An example of a wide-discretion test is the tripartite test for whether a duty of care 
exists at common law: 
What emerges is that, in addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary 
ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist 
… a relationship … of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’ and that the situation 
should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the 
law should impose a duty...9 
Here all three (underlined) elements of the test are vague, in what seems to be an order 
of increasing vagueness. Even if the first two elements can be considered clear 
enough,10 the third element is so open-ended and devoid of identifiable content that the 
judge exercises almost complete influence over the outcome of the test. Whatever the 
facts, or the first two elements, the judge can always say a duty of care would not be 
‘fair’ on the facts. The judge is more free than constrained. It may even be said that the 
judge is not constrained by any objective fact. This makes the result hard to predict. 
Considering this test will only ever be called upon in hard or novel cases, it is of little 
help.  
Other examples of a wide-discretion test include s 61 of the Trustee Act 1925 (which 
empowers the court to relieve trustees from personal liability) and the multifaceted test 
for rescission of gifts in equity.11 
 
4. Unfettered Discretion 
An example of an unfettered-discretion test is Rule 3.1(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure 
Rules 1998 which says that the ‘court may … extend or shorten the time for compliance 
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with any rule, practice direction or court order’. Here the judge is totally unconstrained. 
His influence over the result is complete.  
Another example of an unfettered-discretion test is Rule 3.1(3) of the same Rules which 
provides: ‘When the court makes an order, it may … make it subject to conditions, 
including a condition to pay a sum of money into court’.  
It may be said, with good reason, that even a test that is not explicitly fettered by any 
consideration cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Orders made pursuant to the above Rules 
are subject to appeal and irrational orders will be overturned. Thus, an order setting the 
trial date for the next visitation of Halley’s Comet will be quashed. So even an 
‘unfettered’ discretion is not absolutely unfettered. When we say ‘unfettered’ we really 
mean that the test is subject only to minimal rationality.  
 
B. Choosing the Width of the Discretion  
In which category of discretion should we place our Acceptance Test? We certainly do 
not wish it to be an unfettered-discretion test. That will be self-defeating. The whole 
point of this chapter is to provide guidance (at the very least) as to which fictions to 
retain. A conclusion that judges or legislators ‘may’ create or retain fictions is 
pointless.12  
In the context of fictions, a wide-discretion test will be almost as pointless as an 
unfettered-discretion test. A conclusion along the lines of ‘fictions should be retained if 
they are just and reasonable’ does not offer any real guidance and merely begs the 
question. It will be an admission that it is not possible to articulate concrete conditions 
for the acceptance of fictions. 
A no-discretion test will be very handy but is, alas, impossible. The field of legal fictions 
is too complex for a test that involves no discretion whatsoever. We saw in the last 
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chapter that the evaluation of fictions involves weighing arguments and alternatives. 
This is the stuff of discretion. A test which precludes discretion must be ruled out. 
And so, by elimination, we are left with narrow-discretion. This means our Acceptance 
Test will allow a measure of discretion, but, hopefully, contain this discretion within 
meaningful boundaries. It should not be a free-wheeling discretion. Thus, the challenge 
we face in formulating the Acceptance Test is to make sure the discretion is narrow.  
   
III. The Nature of the Test: General Approach 
 
A. The Possible Approaches 
An Acceptance Test for fictions requires a general approach to fictions. It is perhaps 
surprising that, having discussed fictions at such length, we should still struggle to 
answer the question ‘What is your general view of fictions?’ But it is right that we 
should only consider this question now. We can arrive at an informed view after the 
discussion, not before the discussion.   
Let us suppose that we have to design a legal system from scratch. What would be our 
attitude to fictions? Four attitudes are realistically possible. First, we can decree that no 
fictions be allowed. This is the zero-tolerance attitude. Second, we can adopt the more 
nuanced stance that fictions will be avoided but not banned. This attitude may be 
described as fiction-minimisation. Third, we can positively encourage fictions. This 
may be called fiction-maximisation. Fourth, we need not care whether a device is 
fictitious. This is indifference.  
Each of these attitudes implies a basic view of legal fictions. The zero-tolerance 
approach implies that fictions are never legitimate. The fiction-minimisation approach 
implies that fictions are generally bad but are sometimes necessary; a necessary evil. 
The fiction-maximisation approach implies that fictions are fundamentally good. The 
indifferent approach implies that it does not matter whether a device is fictitious or not, 




But before we decide which view to adopt, one thing is clear: we must have a view. Just 
as we cannot design a city without some basic assumptions about what is good for a 
city to have, we cannot design a legal system without some basic assumptions about 
what is good for a legal system to have. 
 
B. The Champions of the various Approaches  
Almost all people who have thought about the subject take either the zero-tolerance 
view or the fiction-minimisation view, explicitly or implicitly.13 This means that most 
commentators agree that fictions are bad in themselves and differ only in the strength 
of the medicine that they prescribe.  
These two schools of thought are ably represented by Jeremy Bentham and William 
Blackstone respectively. It is worth remarking that the careers of these two men were 
intertwined. Bentham attended Blackstone’s famous lecture series in Oxford in the 
1760’s as a sixteen-year-old.14 Both men were unsuccessful barristers who made their 
mark as academics.15 Bentham’s very first mark upon the world, A Fragment on 
Government,16 published in 1776, was a withering criticism of Blackstone and the 
common law. In the preface, Bentham said of his erstwhile teacher that ‘the welfare of 
mankind, were inseparably connected with the downfall of his works’;17 no less. Severe 
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15 ibid. 
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and hyperbolic as these remarks may be, nothing in the common law exasperated 
Bentham more than legal fictions. That enfant terrible of English law castigated fictions 
with such vituperation that, it is fair to assume, he outdid any other critic of fictions in 
history. The following selection will suffice: 
[L]egal fiction [is] … the most pernicious and basest sort of lying—lying by or 
with the concurrence and support, as well as for the profit, of the judge … By 
the help of this instrument of fraud and extortion … a tissue of absurdities, which 
have no more natural connexion with it than a chapter out of the adventures of 
Baron Munchausen, or the tales of Mother Goose.18 
It affords presumptive and conclusive evidence of intellectual weakness, 
stupidity, and servility, in every nation by which the use of it is quietly endured.19  
[T]he pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of every instrument it comes 
near.20 
It has never been employed but to a bad purpose. It has never been employed to 
any purpose but the affording a justification of something which otherwise would 
be unjustifiable.21   
[A] wilful falsehood, having for its object the stealing legislative power, by and 
for hands which could not, or durst not, openly claim it.22 
It affords presumptive and conclusive evidence of moral turpitude in those by 
whom it was invented and first employed.23 
Fiction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade.24 
If Bentham was the iconoclast, Blackstone spoke for tradition and pragmatism. He at 
all events struck a more conciliatory tone:  
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And these fictions of law, though at first they may startle the student, he will find 
upon farther consideration to be highly beneficial and useful: especially as this 
maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work an injury; 
its proper operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, 
that might result from the general rule of law.25 
Earlier still, circa 1675, Sir Matthew Hale took a similarly pragmatic approach: 
 
‘[T]hough fictions be a shew of something that is not, yet there is scarce any 
well-ordered law, nay not even the Civil law, but hath its fictions. For they are 
but expedients without injuring anybody to bring men to their rights.’26 
 
Professor Baker was probably right when he said that Hale’s view was representative 
of the profession.27 It is a refrain of this work that English lawyers were pragmatic 
people. Fictions did not scare them.  
 
Though these statements by Blackstone and Hale look quite positive, indeed seeming 
to exalt fictions (‘highly beneficial and useful’), they should not be mistaken for 
defences of fiction maximisation. Blackstone and Hale said that fictions could do some 
good in certain circumstances, not that they should be encouraged generally for their 
own sake. It is just a more upbeat way of saying that they are a necessary evil – which 
is fiction minimisation.  
 
Since Bentham’s time, academic opinion has become more nuanced,28 but judicial 
opinion has reversed, judges having come round to the Benthamite point of view. In an 
influential case of the last decade, Lord Nicholls sounded remarkably like Roscoe 
Pound29 exactly one hundred years before: ‘I would like to think that, as a mature legal 
system, English law has outgrown the need for legal fictions’.30 Sir Terence Etherton, 
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now Master of the Rolls, reflected the zeitgeist in these extra-judicial remarks from 
2008: 
 
The use of a fiction in modern times to legitimise legal analysis is unsatisfactory. 
It brings to mind the former theory that the law of quasi-contract rests on an 
implied promise on the part of the recipient third party to repay, which has now 
been completely exploded. Fictions prevent the coherent development of the law 
in accordance with principle, and indicate an immaturity of legal development.31 
 
Whatever decline in popularity or acceptability the fiction may have suffered, it is still 
the case that almost all commentators fall into one of two schools of thought: the 
Benthamite school (zero tolerance) or the Blackstonian school (fiction minimisation). 
Nobody, to my knowledge, supports the fiction-maximisation view. Professor Louise 
Harmon summed up the situation as follows:  
 
Most of the participants in the historical debate expressed varying degrees of 
toleration for the legal fiction … none of the participants gave the legal fiction 
his unqualified support. There may have been recognition of its utility, but 
certainly no thunderous applause. Indeed, even those who thought the legal 
fiction had its time and place seemed somewhat embarrassed by it.32 
If this is still true, and I believe it is, it means that virtually no one thinks fictions are 
good in themselves. We will shortly consider why this is so.  
The indifferent view is largely overlooked. It is all-too-often assumed that fictions are 
either good or bad and that we must have some strong opinion about them. Few pause 
to consider the possibility that legal fictions do not make a difference either way; that 
they are simply unimportant. It is therefore welcome that a 2015 collection of essays on 
legal fictions, titled Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice, goes against the grain of the 
scholarship:   
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There seems to be little enthusiasm [among the contributors to the publication] 
for saying that fictions, in themselves, are either good or bad – instead, like other 
techniques, they are liable to be abused, but also to be put to good use … there 
is evaluative complexity here…33    
This book may signal a shift in opinion towards indifference; though it must be said that 
the very publication of the book suggests otherwise. At any rate, a truly indifferent 
approach to fictions means not simply that some can be good and some bad, but that it 
does not matter whether something is a fiction or not. Laws can be good or bad. That 
does not make law a matter of indifference. Put this way, true indifference to fictions is 
rare indeed.  
The state of the scholarship may be summarised as follows. The positions of fiction-
maximisation and (true) indifference command no following to speak of. The positions 
of zero-tolerance and fiction-minimisation have enough disciples to be called schools 
of thought. The latter outnumbers the former by a significant margin.34 The 
Blackstonians have had the upper hand since 1900 (at the latest) – and probably 
throughout history. While this is not a democratic decision, and the arguments of the 
minority have to be taken on their merits, it is significant that academic opinion weighs 
decidedly on the side of fiction-minimisation.     
 
C. Choosing an Approach  
So, in designing our hypothetical legal system, what will be our basic view or default 
position on fictions? In the previous chapter, we made two general observations about 
the default position. We said, first,35 that we would always prefer truth to fiction, all 
things being equal. We grounded this position in the axiomatic superiority of truth over 
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falsehood. If we stop preferring truth to falsehood, all rational discourse will end. We 
shall call this preference for truth the ‘Default Position’.  
But we also said, later in the same chapter,36 that we should not hasten to rationalise the 
law from the above, given the evolutionary and practical nature of the common law; 
and not least because of the unintended consequences that might follow. If it works, 
don’t fix it. This is a conservative disposition. We shall call this second observation ‘the 
Conservative Argument’. 
These two observations are, on their face, incompatible. The view that truth should 
always trump fiction (all other things being equal) (the Default Position) represents a 
bias against fictions: the fiction must justify itself. The view that the common law 
should not be disturbed unless there is a good reason for doing so (the Conservative 
Argument) represents a bias in favour of existing fictions: it is the removal of a fiction 
that must be justified, not its existence. How can these views be reconciled? Another 
way to phrase the question is: who bears the onus of proof, the proponents or opponents 
of a fiction?  
On closer reflection, the Default Position and the Conservative Argument are not 
inconsistent. This is because of the bracketed qualification that the Default Position only 
applies all other things being equal. That is to say, the anti-fiction bias has effect only 
if all other factors have been neutralised. Economists make ample use of this 
qualification in the form of the shorter Latin phrase ceteris paribus (‘other things 
equal’). If I say that, ceteris paribus, I prefer pasta to pizza, it does not mean I will 
always choose pasta over pizza. For example, the higher the price of pasta relative to 
pizza, the more likely I am to choose pizza. My preference for pasta holds true when 
the prices of pasta and pizza are equal; that is, when price is neutralised.  
So it is with fictions. When all other factors are neutralised, we always prefer truth to 
fiction, but there will be situations where we will prefer fiction to truth because of some 
preponderant circumstance. One such circumstance may be that the fiction is entrenched 
in the law and undoing it will require a wholesale remaking of an area of law. We were 
                                                          




swayed by this consideration in the context of the vendor-purchaser constructive trust.37 
Indeed, this situation is just what the Conservative Argument is about. We refrain from 
disturbing an established system unless there is some special justification for doing so.  
Now we see that the two observations are not incompatible. The Conservative 
Argument – that we should be slow to disturb entrenched fictions – is simply one of the 
factors that may sway us in deciding whether to depart from the Default Position. It will 
not be decisive. In evaluating the single meaning rule, we took into account the 
disturbance that might result from the abolition of the fiction but decided to abolish it 
anyway (because the injustice of the fiction outweighed the potential disturbance).  
And so, we do have a basic bias against fictions – fictions do have to justify themselves 
– but one way of doing so is through the Conservative Argument. It is now apparent 
that of the four approaches to fiction – zero tolerance, fiction minimisation, fiction 
maximisation, indifference – we adopt the second. We believe fictions are a necessary 
evil. As Lon Fuller put it, fictions were ‘something of which the law ought to be 
ashamed, and yet with which the law cannot, as yet, dispense’.38  
We can also arrive at this conclusion by elimination. In the last chapter we concluded 
that some new fictions deserved to live. That rules out zero-tolerance. Fiction 
maximisation would contradict our most basic, indeed axiomatic, bias in favour of truth 
and against falsehood (Default Position) even when other things are equal. Indifference 
would also fundamentally contradict this tenet because it would mean we do not esteem 
truth and recoil from falsehood. The only attitude that remains is fiction minimisation. 
Whether we judge existing or new fictions, this will be our guiding principle. 
So far we have decided two things about the Acceptance Test: the discretion must be 
narrow and the guiding principle will be fiction minimisation.        
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IV. Motives for Fictions 
 
A. Motives in Context 
In building an Acceptance Test, layer by layer, what account shall we take of the 
fiction’s motive? Should we judge a fiction by the motivations of its creator? Can we 
really unearth these motivations? ‘This inquiry will, of necessity, lead us into a 
conjectural field. One can scarcely conceive of a more complex and speculative problem 
than that of human motives’,39 said Fuller, and valiantly threw himself into the attempt. 
We shall do the same; for, as Fuller realised, ‘A fiction becomes understandable only 
when we know why it exists, and we can know that only when we know what actuated 
its author.’40  
In the Symposium, Plato says that the motive of love ennobles otherwise ignoble things:  
Consider, too, how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the 
lover; … in the pursuit of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many 
strange things, which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from 
any motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, and entreat, 
and supplicate, and swear, and lie on a mat at the door, and endure a slavery 
worse than that of any slave – in any other case friends and enemies would be 
equally ready to prevent him, but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of 
him and admonish him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery; 
the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them…41  
Descending again to the world of earthly fictions, might it be that a noble motive 
ennobles an otherwise ignoble fiction? Can we undermine any rule if the cause is just?  
It may perhaps be recalled that we have already mentioned motives in a number of 
contexts. In the first chapter, we attributed each Old Fiction to one of two broad motives: 
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justice or convenience.42 In the second chapter, it was argued that motives should not 
form part of the definition of legal fiction.43 In the third chapter, we implicitly dealt with 
motives when identifying the aim of each new fiction. This fourth chapter is an attempt 
to generalise our previous findings. We will offer, first, a general account of the motives 
for fictions; and, second, an answer to the question whether a fiction is justified by its 
motives. It will be contended that, unlike the lover’s actions, a fiction is justified by its 
efficacy in achieving its aim, not by its motives. This does not mean that the question 
why fictions exist is unimportant. We delve into it presently.   
 
B. Motives in the Literature 
Whereas the definition of fiction has provoked voluminous academic discussion, 
‘[t]here has never appeared to be much debate as to the reasons why the law has resort 
to fictions’.44 John Austin found it ‘extremely difficult to determine, why subordinate 
judges … have so often accomplished their object through the medium of fictions’.45  
Many writers simply assume or assert a motive, often one that suits their thesis. 
Bentham thus posited nefarious motives, namely deceit or subversion of the law.46 
Maine, who saw fictions as a stage in the early development of the law, and now 
obsolete, wrote: 
It is not difficult to understand why fictions in all their forms are particularly 
congenial to the infancy of society. They satisfy the desire for improvement, 
which is not quite wanting, at the same time that they do not offend the 
superstitious disrelish for change which is always present.47    
                                                          
42 p 56.  
43 p 82.  
44 John Gwilliam, ‘Legal Fictions - A Critical Analysis’ (1975) 8 Victoria U Wellington LR 452, 452. 
45 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, vol 2 (n 13) 609. 
46 p 224.  




Similarly self-serving was Hale’s choice of motive – justice – which fitted nicely with 
his defence of fictions as promoting justice. For him, fictions were motivated by a desire 
‘to accommodate judicial proceedings and the just recovery of Men’s Rights’.48 
The truth is that most scholars, of whom the last-mentioned few are illustrative, did not 
approach motives as an issue in its own right. The motive was implicit or secondary in 
their analysis.    
One thinker stands out in this regard. The most systematic study of the motives behind 
legal fictions is Lon Fuller’s, who devoted a third of his Depression-era trilogy of 
articles to the issue.49 He saw the motive question as key, indeed the key, to 
understanding fictions.50 Where others understood motives through their view of 
fictions, Fuller sought to understand fictions through their motives.   
Fuller begins his analysis of motives with an arch-motive, the most general and 
inclusive that can be articulated: 
Speaking for the moment in the most general terms, the purpose of any fiction is 
to reconcile a specific legal result with some premise or postulate. Where no 
intellectual premises are assumed, the fiction has no place. An autocrat, deciding 
disputes upon the basis of instinct or selfish interest, and feeling no compulsion 
to explain his decisions … would have no occasion to resort to fiction. A 
premiseless law would be a fictionless law – if it could be called law at all.51 
This overarching raison d'être for the legal fiction has won wide acceptance and the 
even-greater accolade of no opposition. John Gwilliam and James Stoneking, for 
instance, recycle Fuller’s words almost verbatim.52  
Having stated the arch-motive, Fuller offers the most comprehensive typology hitherto 
of specific motives for fictions. Below is an overview, necessarily incomplete, of this 
typology. After introducing each of Fuller’s motives, we will advert to other legal 
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thinkers who found the motive persuasive. In this way, Fuller’s typology will give 
structure to the literature (albeit an anachronistic one). 
 
1. Motive of Policy   
‘In short, a judge, fully conscious that he is changing the law, chooses … to deceive 
others into believing that he is merely applying existing law.’53 Many scholars, before 
and after Fuller, saw this as the pre-eminent motive. Bentham, we know, was certain 
this was the driving force behind fictions. Austin described it as a pragmatic tactic: ‘By 
accomplishing the change through a fiction, [judges] rather eluded the existing law, than 
formally annulled it: they preserved its integrity to appearance, although they broke it 
in effect’, wishing thereby ‘to conciliate … the friends or lovers of the law which they 
really annulled’.54 Austin added for good measure: ‘By covering the innovation with a 
decent lie, he treated the abrogated law with all seemly respect, whilst he knocked it on 
the head’.55  
Peter Smith, whose wide conception of fictions we encountered in the second chapter,56 
argued that fictions were secretly used to advance normative goals.57 Jeremiah Smith, 
of like mind, thought that the primary motive for fictions (by the early twentieth 
century) was ‘[t]o conceal the fact that judges, by their decisions, are making or 
changing the substantive law.’58 Baker, explicitly channelling Maine, was of the same 
view: ‘The object of fictions is that they allow the operation of the law to change without 
any outward alteration in the rules.’59 Oliver R Mitchell, in the Harvard Law Review of 
1893, put the point starkly: 
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A legal fiction is a device which attempts to conceal the fact that a judicial 
decision is not in harmony with the existing law. The only use and purpose, upon 
the last analysis, of any legal fiction is to nominally conceal this fact that the law 
has undergone a change at the hands of the judges.60 
The alert reader may have noticed that Fuller’s statement that the judge sets out to 
deceive others contradicts Fuller’s refrain that fictions do not deceive anyone.61 To be 
sure, Fuller is careful enough to discount this motive: ‘it is a little difficult to see how 
the supposed deceit could actually succeed. Bentham and Austin were not fooled by 
it.’62 Perhaps Fuller sees deception of others as a motive that exists but is ineffective.  
My take on this motive of policy is somewhat different. The deception, if it exists, lies 
in concealing the real reasons for the decision, not in concealing the change in the law. 
The fiction thus serves as a thin veneer for policy arguments. The fictions previously 
examined showcase this motive in action. The real reason for lowering the remoteness 
bar in negligence was, probably, the concern about easily-rectifiable harm that was left 
to fester for no good reason. In the cases, the policy reason, whatever it was, was masked 
by fictitious reasonable foreseeability.63 Similarly, the real reason for backtracking on 
the agreement requirement in volenti was the lack of sympathy for extremely-reckless 
claimants. The policy reason in those cases was cloaked as an implied agreement to 
forgo compensation.64  
With respect to geographical fictions, the policy reasons for hearing foreign cases were 
pragmatic, but they were not discussed. The record simply misstated the place, which 
avoided the issue altogether, preventing the true reasons from rising to the surface.65 
The non-traversable allegation of vi et armis, too, kept the reader of the rolls in the dark 
about the real reasons for expanding the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench.66 And thus, 
the motive of policy consists, according to this re-interpretation of Fuller, in covering 
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up: not the change in the law itself, but the reasons for the change. Judges use fictions 
to cover up policy arguments. Fuller’s name for this motive (‘motive of policy’) is more 
apt than he imagined.  
 
2. Motive of Emotional Conservatism  
If the judge who is motivated by policy wishes to deceive others (per Fuller), the judge 
driven by emotion deceives himself.67 Fuller uses the term ‘self-deception’,68 which 
again flies in the face of his conviction that fictions do not deceive. Fuller’s general 
drift, though, indicates that the judge is not so much deluded as concerned to preserve 
the stability and authority of the old law, to which he is emotionally attached:  
I call this the motive of emotional conservatism because it proceeds, not from 
any clearly formulated theory of the process of law making, but from an 
emotional and obscurely felt judgment that stability is so precious a thing that 
even the form of stability, its empty shadow, has a value.69  
This is reminiscent of Maine’s disparaging ‘superstitious disrelish for change’70 or 
Austin’s sneer about avoiding ‘offence to the lovers of things ancient’,71 only that here 
the judge himself is the lover of ancient things. 
It should be said, in view of the patronising tone of some writers, that emotional 
conservatism is not just nostalgia or fear of change. Stability and predictability have a 
value in any system, let alone one which has to be obeyed by millions. Moreover, the 
objectivity – and hence legitimacy – of the legal system depends on the fact that judges 
regard themselves as largely bound by existing law and change it only rarely and 
incrementally. A judge who dismisses existing law and forms as mere tradition 
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misunderstands his high office. It is therefore rational for a judge to be change-averse – 
to be ‘emotionally conservative’.      
 
3. Motive of Convenience 
It is easier to misdescribe the facts than to re-open basic concepts and re-write 
textbooks.72 As we saw with the vendor-purchaser constructive trust, overhauling an 
area of law is a daunting task with unintended consequences.73 Few are the brave who 
would undertake it, let alone in the context of adjudicating a particular dispute. Fuller 
borrows an illustration from Rudolf von Jhering, a German jurist of the nineteenth 
century: 
[A] taxing board has had schedules printed in which … because the article was 
not at the time known, a column or heading for an article … is lacking. In order 
to avoid the necessity of reprinting the whole schedule they provide that the 
article shall be brought under one of the existing columns; that lignite, for 
example, shall be regarded as hard coal.74 
Even Bentham, who usually prefers wicked motives, agrees ‘love of ease, or say 
aversion to labour’ is a possible incentive for fictions.75 
But convenience is not merely a matter of time-saving. As Professor Peter Birks 
explained, legal convenience was uppermost in the minds of plaintiffs’ lawyers: 
When the action for money paid was fictionalized, why did it happen? No rule 
of law actually prevented counsel from devising an honest form of action. But a 
new pattern would have encountered an instant demurrer. And the demurrer 
would have had to be met with novel uncertain arguments. Experiments of that 
kind cannot be made at a client’s expense.76 
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The oft-trodden route is also relatively risk-free. The accommodation of the new inside 
the old, by way of fictions, was of course the modus operandi of the Old System. It 
continues to this day, albeit less stridently since the forms are not so rigid. Fuller said it 
well: ‘Lawyers will not have to change their concepts – they need only change the 
content of these concepts’.77     
Side by side with legal convenience, we find linguistic convenience. Fuller, later in his 
work, talks of ‘abbreviatory fictions’, whose function is to avoid circumlocution.78 
These can be de-fictionalised by expanding the shorthand. He names corporate 
personhood as an example.79 He presumably means that instead of enumerating the 
rights and obligations of corporations, it is easier to make the analogy with humans, 
which holds good for most purposes. Kelsen argued that all legislative fictions are in 
fact mere abbreviations.80 Convenience therefore comes in many guises: practical, legal, 
linguistic – to name a few.  
 
4. Motive of Intellectual Conservatism  
This is Fuller’s most original – and interesting – motive: 
A judge may adopt a fiction, not simply to avoid discommoding current notions 
[ie motive of convenience], nor for the purpose of concealing from himself 
[motive of emotional conservatism] or others [motive of policy] the fact that he 
is legislating, but merely because he does not know how else to state and explain 
the new principle he is applying.81 
Fuller’s chosen name of intellectual conservatism is perhaps inapt. It implies the judge 
creates the fiction to conserve some intellectual dogma. The sense conveyed by Fuller’s 
exposition is that the judge feels in his bones, but cannot articulate in a legally-
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acceptable way, the rightness of the new principle. He is at a loss. Fuller – always 
quotable – said more generally that ‘the fiction is the cement which is always at hand 
to plaster together the weak spots in our intellectual structure’.82 How true in this 
context. ‘Intellectual weakness’ is a less kind but more accurate description of this 
motive.  
 
5. Institutional Constraints 
Fuller observes that some fictions may be invoked by ‘mere habit’.83 Bentham similarly 
speaks of ‘Aversion to depart from accustomed habits’.84 Baker concurs, pointing to 
comments by Scroggs CJ concerning the use of indebitatus assumpsit for the profits of 
a usurped office:85  
If this were now an original case, we are agreed it would by no means lie … But 
because judgments have been upon it, and that on solemn arguments, and many 
judgments—though some passed sub silencio, yet others have been debated and 
settled … we are therefore willing to go the same way…86  
Force of habit is not a motive for fictions but a reason for their spread and persistence. 
Habit can never explain the first use of a fiction. At most, habit is a motive for not 
abolishing fictions. Allied to the notion of habit is the doctrine of precedent. John 
Gwilliam and Peter Smith say stare decisis, by which an ad hoc creative solution to a 
hard case is replicated and entrenched, has a role in the proliferation of fictions.87   
Precedent brings us to an important factor in the generation of fictions, which is 
surprisingly inconspicuous in Fuller. Peter Smith has called it ‘institutional and 
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professional constraints’.88 Any system which professes objectivity and predictability 
values stability. As Robert Samek says:  
Starting off with the motive of keeping the law stable, the obvious conservative 
strategy is to hide any changes that are made by stretching the old concepts to 
accommodate the new ... For any given system, a certain level of energy is 
necessary to overcome these forces and to break the stable state.89  
In his analysis of the process by which the law changes, Professor Paul Mitchell stressed 
the importance of apparent historical continuity. Judgments include extensive 
discussion of previous decisions and are written so as ‘to legitimize subsequent 
statements about what the law is, by making the past consistent with, and, indeed, 
appear to lead inevitably to, an assertion about the present’.90 Shackled by precedent 
and wary of the stigma of judicial activism, judges find in fiction the lesser evil. Roscoe 
Pound goes so far as to say:  
When justice must be administered within the four corners of a rigid code or by 
means of a body of customary law which has attained fixity … the only resource 
in the absence of legislative revolution, from which men shrink, is to find by 
interpretation the needed rules…91 
In an unreferenced quotation attributed to John Bouvier, Sidney Miller has the French-
American lexicographer speak in the same terms:  
Courts, confined to the administration of existing rules, and lacking power to 
change them, have frequently avoided injustice by assuming in behalf of justice, 
that the actual facts are different from what they really are.92 
John Orth observes that it is the very nature of rules that creates the need for their 
evasion by fiction: 
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The Rule of Law, humanity’s best effort so far to produce justice on a regular 
basis, requires rules, but because of their rigidity and generality, rules can 
produce injustice in individual cases. Making and changing rules is the very 
definition of legislation, but the legislature is constrained to make rules with only 
prospective effect, and in any event the legislature is not in permanent session 
and cannot be expected to address every imaginable (and unimaginable) 
contingency. The judges have responded from time immemorial with fictions 
and constructions of one sort or another.93 
The point made by these commentators is that sometimes judges use fictions because 
the system leaves no other avenue for justice or reform. We know that under the 
sclerotic Old System fiction was often the only way to reform the law. 
Compounding external constraints is the judges’ own professional culture. As Peter 
Smith says, ‘Lawyers are socialized to view the legal system as a distinct system with 
a distinct set of norms, and they tend to guard that system from challenges to its 
norms.’94 There can be no doubt that institutional constraints are an important motive 
for the creation of legal fictions.  
 
6. Greed 
This last motive on our list is startling at first sight. It is likely, however, that some of 
the Jurisdictional Fictions of the Tudor era were motivated, in part, by the commercial 
interests of court officials. The judges of the three royal courts in Westminster were 
paid out of, and in proportion with, the business of their respective court. A busy 
courtroom meant high revenues. Courts had a financial incentive to attract plaintiffs to 
their own bench and from the late fifteenth century actively competed for litigation. 
They did so mainly by offering more efficient or plaintiff-friendly procedures for 
various actions and by encroaching on the jurisdiction of fellow courts.95 Fictions were 
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weapons in this trade war. The two great fictions of the day, the bill of Middlesex and 
the writ of quominus were, we recall,96 Jurisdictional Fictions. The former effectively 
extended the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench to include debt and the former enlarged 
the jurisdiction of the Exchequer to include wholly-private debt claims. John Hill 
Burton, in an introduction to a collection of Bentham’s works, wrote: 
The origin of this class of fictions was of the most sordid character—the judges 
and other officers of court being paid by fees, a trade competition for 
jurisdictions took place; each court trying to offer better terms to litigants, than 
the others, and adopting the fictions as a means of accomplishing this object.97 
Bentham himself did not miss this opportunity to take a swipe at legal fictions: 
King’s Bench stole business from Common Pleas: Common Pleas stole it back 
again from King’s Bench. Falsehood, avowed falsehood, was their common 
instrument. [King’s Bench] let off one lie; [Common Pleas] answered it by 
another. The battle is in all the books … Unwilling to be left behind, Exchequer 
stole with both hands at once, stole from both its neighbours.98  
It is telling that by 1700 the three common-law courts in Westminster Hall had 
‘comparable jurisdiction over most common pleas’.99  
It is important, however, not to overstate the role of profiteering in the development of 
fictions – even those fictions intimately connected with it. There must have been other 
reasons why these procedural fictions appeared in the Tudor era and not in the preceding 
centuries. Court functionaries were probably not greedier in the sixteenth century than 
in the fourteenth. Lucre alone cannot be a full explanation, even if it was one of the 
motives. Baker cautioned against attributing changes in the law to ‘avarice’: ‘The 
officials who benefited from changes in the legal system are seen rather as having 
reacted productively to forces outside their control.’100  
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Needless to say, the pecuniary motive for fictions is not relevant today.  
 
7. A Disagreement about Terminology: The Two True Motives 
Fuller’s account of motives is illuminating and original. It is accepted here, subject to 
the minor reservations already expressed and the following disagreement. At the risk of 
pedantry, it seems that something in the terminology has gone awry. Sadly, that small, 
but important, slippage has affected the understanding of motives.  
The words ‘motive’, ‘motivation’, ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ are synonymous in the thesaurus 
sense and interchangeable in many contexts. But shades of meaning can be crucial. If I 
miss the bus because my meeting ran overtime, the meeting was the reason for my 
missing the bus, but not the motive for it. On a moment’s reflection, it is obvious that I 
had no motive whatsoever for missing the bus: I wanted to catch it. ‘Reason’ and 
‘motive’ are not the same. While ‘reason’ is simply a matter of causation, ‘motive’ 
implies a deep-seated source of inducement; indeed ‘a contemplated end the desire for 
which influences … a person's actions’.101 The meeting did not induce me to miss the 
bus, though it did cause it.    
Institutional constraints like precedent or statute are thus not motives for using fictions, 
though they are reasons for doing so. The judge who uses a fiction to dodge an old rule 
is not motivated by institutional constraints. He is motivated by the desire to reach a just 
result. The constraints are like my meeting: it caused me to miss the bus, but it did not 
motivate me to miss it.   
Now it is plain that it is senseless to say that a judge was motivated by a desire to deceive 
others (motive of policy), let alone to deceive himself (emotional conservatism). No 
sane judge is motivated by a desire to deceive. The need to hide the reasons for the 
decision may be a reason for using a fiction but it cannot possibly be the motive for it. 
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Deception, if it exists, is a by-product, not a motive. The motive must be something like 
justice, or convenience, or, formerly, gain.  
It will also be seen that Fuller’s motive of intellectual conservatism (which we re-
christened ‘intellectual weakness’) is in truth no motive at all. A judge cannot be 
motivated by not knowing what to say. That is a hindrance: the opposite of a motivation. 
Intellectual weakness is a reason for fictions, certainly; but not a motive. True current 
motives there are only two: justice and convenience.  
It is possible to subdivide these two motives in search of greater specificity, but the 
temptation should be resisted. The opacity of fictitious reasoning makes the discovery 
of motives empirically unsound. Beyond deducing some broad motive (justice or 
convenience) from the end-result, or clues in the judgment, the exercise is entirely 
speculative. We can say with sufficient confidence that what actuated the judges to 
stretch remoteness in negligence or the volenti defence was their sense of justice. But 
we cannot say much more. We have no window into men’s souls. It is better to confine 
ourselves to what we know than to presume to speak on behalf of others. Nowadays 
there are two motives for creating legal fictions, namely justice and convenience.  
 
8. Summary of Motives 
The table below reproduces the table in section XI of chapter three, containing all the 
fictions discussed in this work, with the addition of a column for motive.  
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C. Motives and the Acceptance Test 
What role, if any, should motives play in the Acceptance Test? Should we discriminate 
on the basis of motive? In answer, it seems to me that both justice and convenience (the 
current motives we have identified) are legitimate motives. Justice is indisputably 
legitimate, being the supreme aspiration of the legal system. Convenience, whether 
practical, legal or linguistic, is perhaps not as lofty a goal as justice, but any system is 
allowed to, indeed should, take convenience into account. If a fiction reduces costs and 
risks; if it saves us the trouble of re-conceiving entire areas of law and re-writing 
textbooks; if it avoids prolixity; then it has positive value. Our Acceptance Test will not 
disqualify a fiction because of motive.  
Should a motive save a fiction from abolition? That is the Plato-inspired question with 
which we began this inquiry into motives. The answer must be no. Whether the motive 
is justice or convenience, the law only has the benefit of the sought-after justice or 
convenience if the fiction succeeds in furthering justice or convenience. We will judge 
fictions by how effectively they achieve their aims (which is some specific instantiation 
of justice or convenience). If a fiction is pursued for the sake of justice or convenience, 
and there is no justice or convenience, there should be no fiction. The way to hell, the 
trite saying goes, is paved with good intentions. What counts is the result, not the 
intentions. The Acceptance Test will reflect this: fictions will be judged by their efficacy 
in achieving their aims, not by their original motives.      
   
V. Analysis of Previous Results 
The Acceptance Test for fictions will be based on the results collected in previous 
chapters. As stated above, the Acceptance Test will be made up of a Retention Test (for 
existing fictions) and a Creation Test (for fictions about to be created). We start with 
the Retention Test. This section brings together all our conclusions with a view to 
gleaning general insights and principles. In particular, we will focus on the correlations 
between different classifications and the correlations between classifications and 




may find it convenient to refer back to that table. It sets out every fiction discussed in 
this work and classifies it by nature, age, effect and motive. The last column records the 
recommendation as to the fiction’s preservation.    
It is argued below that the classification of a given fiction gives us important signals, 
sometimes decisive indications, as to whether the fiction should live or die.      
 
A. Correlation between Nature and Recommendation 
The Nature Classification includes two classes: Hard Fictions and Soft Fictions. A Hard 
Fiction is a factual issue consciously decided irrespective of the facts. A Soft Fiction is 
a factual issue decided by a consciously-unnatural interpretation of the law.102 
‘Recommendation’ indicates whether a fiction should be retained.  
We have identified 14 Hard Fictions. Of these, 11 have already been abolished (the Old 
Fictions). Two we have marked for retention (Equity treats as done that which ought to 
be done, estoppel) and one for abolition (single meaning rule). No necessary 
relationship can be inferred from this. The fact that not all Hard Fictions are marked for 
abolition (or retention) means the ‘hardness’ of the fiction (viz the Nature 
Classification) cannot, on its own, contain the answer to the question whether to retain 
or abolish a given fiction.  
We have identified four Soft Fictions in total: (i) volenti non fit injuria; (ii) the inference 
in the first stage of the common intention constructive trust; (iii) remoteness in 
negligence; and (iv) reading down exclusion clauses. We have found all four to be 
deserving of abolition ((ii) and (iv) are already abolished). This is a more promising 
result. There is a perfect correlation between the classification of Soft Fiction and the 
recommendation: a 100% abolition rate. Of course, the sample is rather small. We 
cannot deduce that because four Soft Fictions should be abolished, all Soft Fictions 
should suffer the same fate. At the most, we may have an inference. 
                                                          




If we could, however, demonstrate by logical argument that there is something about 
Soft Fictions that makes them deserving of abolition, then we will have something more 
than an inference: we will have a principle. It is such general principles that will be the 
building blocks of the Retention Test.  
So is it a coincidence that all the Soft Fictions we have examined were marked for 
abolition – or is there a reason for this apparent correlation? I suggest it is not a 
coincidence. There is good reason why Soft Fictions all deserve to be abolished, and 
precisely because they are Soft Fictions. It is submitted that the Soft Fiction is unworthy 
of our legal system as a matter of principle as well as of practice. The argument from 
principle will be presented first.  
 
1. The Principled Argument against Soft Fictions 
A Soft Fiction is a factual issue decided by a consciously-unnatural interpretation of the 
law. It is a consciously contrived interpretation. To speak plainly, it is bad reasoning; a 
fudge; so much so that even the judge is unconvinced (hence conscious of the unnatural 
interpretation). To embrace Soft Fictions is to embrace bad reasoning. To accept Soft 
Fictions is to give up on a common-sense interpretation of law and to condone casuistry. 
As noble as the motives for Soft Fictions may be – and doubt not they are – a bad 
argument is a bad means to achieve even a good end. A bad debating point is bad even 
if we agree with the speaker’s position. A bad argument discredits its maker. A Soft 
Fiction discredits the law.  
But are not Hard Fictions just as discreditable as Soft Fictions? Why am I so hard on 
Soft Fictions and so soft on Hard Fictions (several of which I want to keep)? First of 
all, even if Hard Fictions were as bad as Soft Fictions, that would not exonerate the Soft 
Fictions (though it would reveal a double standard). More to the point, Hard Fictions 
are not as bad. Though it may seem counter-intuitive that the Soft Fiction should be 
more discreditable than the Hard Fiction, so it is. The totally fictional plot of Wuthering 
Heights is not discreditable. But a consciously-flawed argument in a book, whether 




treated as dogs is not shameful. But to argue in a judgment, with apparent seriousness, 
that cats should be construed to mean dogs; that ‘cat’ really means ‘dog’, is shameful. 
The former does not offend reason; the latter degrades it. To twist the truth is worse 
than to step outside it. He who steps outside the truth does not trample on it. That is why 
the contrived applications of volenti are worse than the hardest of Hard Fictions; 
because they have the appearance of truth, the claim of truth. A Hard Fiction is not a 
bad argument: it is not an argument at all. A thing that is patently false, like Wuthering 
Heights or geographical fictions or the maxim that Equity treats as done that which 
ought to be done, is just pure fiction; ‘an open and avowed pretense’.103 But a contrived 
interpretation is not pure fiction; it is still an interpretation, indeed a legally-valid one. 
It professes to be sound legal reasoning when it is not. The problem with the Soft Fiction 
is that it purports to be true. As Fuller said more generally, ‘A fiction becomes wholly 
safe only when it is used with a complete consciousness of its falsity.’104 
 
2. The Practical Argument against Soft Fictions 
If the principled argument against Soft Fictions is that bad reasoning is reprehensible, 
the practical argument against Soft Fictions is that bad reasoning is unpredictable. Let 
us take a judge whose policy is to reach what he considers the morally-correct outcome 
– even at the price of bending the rules. The key word is ‘bending’, not ‘breaking’. This 
judge would baulk at utter impossibilities like London in Minorca or female clergy (in 
the seventeenth century), but would gladly suffer a very wide definition of agreement 
when he wants to deploy the volenti defence. The judge we have imagined, it will be 
understood, favours Soft Fictions and rejects Hard Fictions.   
A judge who has a proclivity for Soft Fictions is inherently unpredictable – because we 
do not know which rules he will bend, when, and to what extent. We have argued 
before105 that the rule ‘Cats are deemed to be dogs for the purposes of pet tax’ is more 
certain than the rule ‘The definitions of some pets can be strained for the purposes of 
                                                          
103 Fuller (n 13) 80. 
104 ibid 10. 




pet tax’. A black-letter judge may sometimes issue unjust decisions, but he cannot be 
accused of unpredictability. A judge who treats rules as provisional or negotiable, and 
moreover stoops to consciously-unsound reasoning, is less likely to issue unjust 
decisions (at least according to his own lights). But he is less predictable. All depends 
on his personal conception of justice.   
This unpredictability may be seen in the case law of one of the Soft Fictions we have 
discussed, the first stage of the common intention constructive trust (while it existed, in 
the pre-Kernott days). In admittedly many cases, the courts were willing to strain the 
facts and ‘infer’ a common intention on questionable evidence – or even contrary to the 
evidence (eg Eves v Eves (1975) and Grant v Edwards (1986)106). But the courts were 
not always so accommodating. They were not willing to stretch the facts in Buggs v 
Buggs (2003),107 where the facts were more favourable to the claimant woman than in 
Eves v Eves or Grant v Edwards. In the opinion of the judge in Buggs, the evidence was 
insufficient to establish a common intention, despite his findings that ‘it was recognised 
by all three parties that the [property] should belong to the [claimant’s] household’; that 
‘the members of that household acted to their detriment’; and that the claimant ‘made a 
strong contribution to the family's welfare in financial as well as personal terms’.108 Nor 
were the courts ready to infer a common intention in Burns v Burns (1983), where the 
claimant shared the property with the defendant for 17 years;109 nor in Carley v Smith 
(1980), described by Lawton LJ as ‘a sad story’;110 nor even in Springette v Defoe 
(1992) – because the common intention was held independently by the co-habitants 
rather than expressly discussed.111 To conclude, because the Soft Fiction was bad 
reasoning as opposed to a transparent rule of law, it was applied inconsistently. The first 
stage of the common intention constructive trust is a testament to the unpredictability 
of Soft Fictions.  
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The Hard Fiction, it is interesting to note, is impervious to the charge of unpredictability. 
There was no unpredictability in geographical fictions and there is no unpredictability 
in estoppel. Treating cats as dogs is fictitious but not unpredictable. It is a transparent 
rule. We know exactly how to treat cats. The certainty of transactions is unperturbed by 
Hard Fictions. If the law is to change, as it sometimes must, let it be done transparently.  
But the problem with the Soft Fiction is not just that it undermines certainty. It also 
distorts the real reasons for the decision. The consciously-flawed argument is a 
smokescreen for policy-driven decision-making (as discussed under Fuller’s motive of 
policy112). We saw this in the Soft Fiction of remoteness in negligence.113 Again: if a 
decision is grounded in policy, let it be done transparently and openly debated.  
This is the double-headed argument for the proposition that all Soft Fictions should be 
abolished. It is unprincipled and uncertain to use bad arguments. We have succeeded 
in establishing a correlation between the Nature Classification (Hard/Soft) and the 
recommendation (retain/abolish). The Retention Test will reflect the conclusion that 
only Hard Fictions should be retained. This is the first question in the algorithm: is the 
fiction Hard or Soft? If Soft, abolish; if Hard, move on to the next question.    
 
B. Correlation between Age and Recommendation 
Since Old Fictions are by definition defunct, they are strictly speaking irrelevant to the 
Retention Test. We will never have to apply the test to decide whether an Old Fiction 
should remain. It will nonetheless be instructive to see whether the Retention Test, if 
applied to Old Fictions, produces sensible results.   
 
C. Correlation between Effect and Recommendation 
The Effect Classification has three classes: Jurisdictional, Auxiliary and Essential. 
Jurisdictional Fictions only affect the choice of court. Auxiliary Fictions are merely 
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formal and do not affect the conceptual foundation of an action. Essential Fictions go 
to the heart of an action and represent the real reason for the decision.114   
The table on page 244 lists five Essential Fictions for which there is a recommendation. 
The recommendation is to retain two (Equity treats as done that which ought to be done, 
estoppel) and abolish three (volenti non fit injuria, single meaning rule, the inference in 
the first stage of the common intention constructive trust). The last is already abolished 
but we are using our evaluation of it for didactic purposes. The table lists two Auxiliary 
Fictions for which there is a recommendation (remoteness in negligence, reading down 
exclusion clauses). The recommendation is to abolish both. There are no Jurisdictional 
Fictions with a recommendation. Those are all Old Fictions that have already been 
abolished. In the paragraphs below, I will argue that only Essential Fictions should be 
retained. This conclusion is consistent with, but not necessitated by, the above findings.   
A fiction that is not Essential has, by definition, nothing to do with the reasons for the 
result of a case. It is, as we have said many times, meaningless text or legal lip-service. 
In other words, it is superfluous. There seems to be no good reason to perpetuate 
meaningless text. Non-Essential fictions can be removed without affecting the basis of 
the action. It is astounding just how cleanly the Old Jurisdictional and Auxiliary Fictions 
were removed by the Common Law Procedure Act 1852. One day they were there; the 
next day they were gone. Nobody missed them. Nobody mourned them. That was the 
ultimate proof of their superfluity. Old Essential Fictions, as we have seen,115 could not 
be got rid of so easily. They formed the basis of actions and alternatives had to be 
provided lest claimants should find themselves without a remedy. We described in the 
first chapter how Parliament had to establish a new statutory code for ejectment, 
because ejectment was an Essential Fiction.116 The abolition of non-Essential Fictions 
was not attended by such problems – or indeed any problems.   
One would struggle to explain why a device that is useless and superfluous should be 
preserved for eternity. Occam’s Razor should trim these unnecessary propositions. How 
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much more is the razor needful when the useless device in question is a fiction? If our 
default position is to avoid fictions (unless there is some ground for accepting them), it 
seems that ex hypothesi superfluous fictions cannot hope to justify themselves.   
The wisdom of this policy may be seen in the fiction of remoteness in negligence. It is 
an auxiliary fiction. We have looked at cases where recovery was allowed although the 
risk was not reasonable foreseeable.117 The chestnut of reasonable foreseeability was 
recited for form, taking centre stage in judgments, while the real reasons hid behind the 
curtain. How much better would it be if judges did not have to say the words ‘reasonable 
foreseeable’ when the risk was clearly not so? If we no longer need to say ‘vi et armis’ 
in every action for trespass, why should we have to say ‘reasonable foreseeability’ in 
every action for negligence?  
In conclusion, it has been argued that only Essential Fictions should be retained. The 
Retention Test now has two conditions: to be retained, the fiction must be Hard and 
Essential.     
 
D. The Role of Justice in the Retention Test 
We continue with our analysis of previous results. The aim is to extrapolate from these 
results a Retention Test for all fictions. By this stage in the construction of the test, we 
have abolished (in our prescriptions) all non-Essential Fictions and all Soft Fictions. 
The volenti fiction is dead. The remoteness fiction in negligence is dead. What is left? 
It remains to examine previous results relating to fictions that are both Hard and 
Essential. Did we accept all of them? The fiction of the single meaning rule is both Hard 
and Essential. Yet we concluded that it should be abolished. It is clear then that the 
Retention Test will disapprove of at least some fictions that are both Hard and Essential. 
The reason that we decided that the single meaning fiction should be abolished was the 
injustice it produced. This suggests that justice has a role to play in the Retention Test.  
                                                          




This is hardly surprising. Justice is one of the two motives for creating fictions. It has 
been so from an early date. Consistently, justice has also proved to be a check on 
fictions. Judges have refused to apply a fiction, even a generally-recognised fiction, in 
circumstances when it was seen to undermine justice. Lord Mansfield CJ said in Lane 
v Wheat (1783) that ‘Fictions are allowed against all the king’s subjects for the 
furtherance, but never for the hindrance, of justice’.118 Edward Coke insisted that 
‘semper in fictione juris subsistit aequitas’ (in legal fictions equity always exists). The 
phrase occurs, with slight variations, in three of his reports and in his Commentary upon 
Littleton.119 Justice thus controls the scope of a fiction.    
We should not depart from this consistent historical position. If a fiction is responsible 
for injustice, it cannot be condoned. We use fictions, reluctantly, because they help us 
reach a desirable outcome. There is no reason to defend a fiction which brings about an 
undesirable outcome – and injustice is axiomatically undesirable. A fiction that, like 
Frankenstein’s monster, turns on its maker to become an instrument of mischief has lost 
its justification for existence. The Retention Test, in addition to disallowing Soft and 
non-Essential Fictions, should bar a fiction that creates or exacerbates injustice. 
But here we run into a problem. Justice is subjective. No two people have the same 
understanding of it. Using justice as a criterion in the Retention Test would make it 
vague and unpredictable. It would be too redolent of those unhelpful tests quoted earlier 
in this chapter, which refer to what is ‘just and reasonable’. If we were to adopt a vague 
injustice condition, the Retention Test would be a wide-discretion test rather than a 
narrow-discretion test. This is not the type of test we have pursued.    
What is the solution? How do we protect the law from unjust fictions but at the same 
time preserve the predictability of the Retention Test? More specifically, how do we 
reduce the scope of the discretion in relation to the justice condition from wide to 
narrow? The solution I propose here is to adopt a more stringent injustice criterion for 
the disqualification of a fiction: not simply ‘injustice’ but ‘Manifest Injustice’. 
‘Manifest’ is defined herein as ‘non-debatable’. Hence, Manifest Injustice is less 
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disputable than simply injustice. A Retention Test referring to Manifest Injustice could 
be sufficiently certain. The difference between simple injustice and Manifest Injustice 
will be explained and exemplified presently.  
Reasonable people hold diametrically-opposed views on what is just and unjust. One 
man’s justice is another man’s injustice. Some people believe in low taxes. They tend 
to see taxation as inherently-predatory – as a confiscation of hard-earned income by the 
state, a disincentive for entrepreneurship and a punishment for success. Other people 
favour high taxes. They tend to see taxation as inherently salutary – as a way to reduce 
inequality, fund public services and share widely the resources of society. Both groups 
tolerate a degree of taxation. But the first group sees high taxes as unjust, whereas the 
second group sees low taxes (on high-earners) as unjust. Their respective views of 
justice, in this respect, are diametrically opposite. Yet, it is not possible to say that one 
group is objectively in error. Even conclusive empirical studies by economists (an 
unlikely prospect) would avail us nothing because the disagreement is about goals and 
values, not means. That is to say, the disagreement is about the relative importance of 
such things as equality and freedom and reward (which is a value judgment). It is not 
about how best to achieve either of these (which is an empirical question). From the 
perspective of an objective judge, there is no way to settle this difference of opinion. 
Indeed, courts refuse to rule on political questions as a matter of policy.120 The rate of 
taxation is an example of debatable injustice (ie non-Manifest).  
Let us now, to further elucidate the concept, examine an example of debatable injustice 
in the law. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed a rule of law, the justice of which 
is debatable. In MT Højgaard A/S v E.ON Climate & Renewables UK Robin Rigg East 
Ltd (2017),121 a builder contracted to build wind farms according to designs. The wind 
farms were built faithfully to the designs but failed shortly after installation. It later 
transpired that the designs had been flawed. No wind farm built to them was ever going 
to work. The Court had to determine who bore the liability for the failure: the builder 
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or the client. It was held, following a line of cases, that in hard cases such as this English 
generally visited liability on the builder.122 Broadly, this is because the builder is 
primarily engaged to build something that works. The designs are secondary. So it is 
the builder who bears the risk of faulty designs.  
Now this rule of law is open to the charge of injustice. It may be argued that the builder’s 
obligation is to build to the designs, not contrary to them. The builder (or its insurer) 
should not incur liability for performing the contract. It is the commissioner of the work 
that should bear the risk for commissioning something that does not work.  
However one looks at it, this is a question that does not admit of an easy answer. Both 
options seem to carry a degree of injustice. The court must choose between plague and 
cholera. It is not possible to say, beyond reasonable disagreement, which outcome is 
less unjust. This is an example of debatable injustice in the law (ie non-Manifest).  
There are many things whose justice is debatable. Tax is one of them. Liability for 
flawed designs is another. The voting age is yet another. However, there are many things 
whose justice is not at all debatable. These include bribery, deceit, wanton violence – 
to name a few. These are things that no right-minded person would defend. It is possible, 
therefore, for a judge to regard them as objectively unjust (not merely as illegal123).  
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that there are (at least) two types of 
injustice: debatable and non-debatable. For our purposes, non-debatable injustice is 
Manifest and debatable injustice is not Manifest. 
By stating that the Retention Test will disallow fictions which cause Manifest Injustice, 
we are setting the bar high. Only the kind of injustice that reasonable people do not 
disagree on will trigger the exclusion. We do so to ensure that the Retention Test is of 
narrow discretion and not wide discretion. The test is of narrow discretion because: (i) 
all the cases where there is no hint of injustice clearly do not trigger the exclusion; (ii) 
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all the cases where it is debatable whether there is injustice do not trigger the exclusion 
(ie there is no need to determine whether there really is injustice); (iii) only cases of 
indisputable injustice trigger the exclusion. True, the decision-maker still exercises 
discretion in deciding whether the case is one of debatable or non-debatable injustice, 
but this level of discretion is small and acceptable. We never said we would allow no 
discretion at all. We said we would allow narrow discretion. Thus, if the trigger for the 
exclusion of a fiction is that it causes Manifest Injustice, the decision-maker has a 
narrow discretion. By acting only on Manifest Injustice, we sidestep or neutralise the 
uncertainty which is immanent in the whole justice question. The problem of 
uncertainty is solved.  
It may be urged against me that in seeking certainty, I oversimplify, or even paper over, 
a complex question. I do not deny that the solution proposed above avoids a complex 
question. Indeed, that is its aim. But I say it is better than the alternative. I also draw 
encouragement from the view expressed by Lord Neuberger P in FHR European 
Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (2014). There, the Supreme Court had to 
determine, after years of confusion and disagreement between courts, the legal 
treatment of bribes taken by agents. The President, with whom the Court agreed, said:    
The respondents’ formulation of the Rule has the merit of simplicity: any benefit 
acquired by an agent as a result of his agency and in breach of his fiduciary duty 
is held on trust for the principal. On the other hand, the appellant’s position is 
more likely to result in uncertainty ... Clarity and simplicity are highly desirable 
qualities in the law. Subtle distinctions are sometimes inevitable, but in the 
present case, as mentioned above, there is no plainly right answer, and, 
accordingly, in the absence of any other good reason, it would seem right to opt 
for the simple answer.124 
In the context of debatable justice, too, there is no plainly right answer. So it is right, I 
submit, to opt for the simple answer.   
                                                          




In avoiding uncertainty, however, we have exposed ourselves to an objection from 
another angle. If only Manifest Injustice is a reason to abolish a fiction, it follows, 
uncomfortably, that ordinary injustice is apparently fine. Are we really content to accept 
fictions that cause any injustice? 
This counter-argument misapprehends the distinction between Manifest Injustice and 
non-Manifest Injustice. For our purposes, if the injustice is not Manifest, we cannot 
really know whether there is injustice at all (because reasonable people disagree). So 
this counter-argument puts the cart before the horse. It assumes that a thing is unjust 
when we do not have the liberty to make precisely this assumption. We cannot base a 
test on a criterion which is an insoluble philosophical debate in itself. It is frankly not 
for this project, or indeed the legal system, to arbitrate philosophical questions of 
justice. The author of this work, or even a judge, is no better arbiter of such questions 
than the next person. Given the courts are ill-equipped to dabble in philosophy, and in 
view of the desirability of certainty, the law should only respond to Manifest Injustice. 
This is what we have proposed.  
To conclude this section, the Retention Test will disallow fictions that cause Manifest 
Injustice. Adding this condition to the conditions we have already identified, the 
Retention Test reads as follows: retain a fiction if it is Hard, Essential and does not 
cause Manifest Injustice; otherwise, abolish.    
 
E. The Role of the Conservative Argument in the Retention Test 
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Lord Hodge observed that ‘One of the 
attractions of English law as a legal system of choice in commercial matters is its 
stability and continuity...’125 There is much to be said for stability, continuity and (I take 
the liberty to add) predictability in a system that has to be obeyed by millions. Since our 
Retention Test, if adopted, will spell change for the law (by abolishing fictions), we, 
too, must bear in mind Lord Hodge’s implied exhortation.   
                                                          




This ‘Conservative Argument’ is that judges should be change-averse. Let sleeping 
dogs lie. In our context, it means that we should be change-averse as regards the future 
of fictions. Given the organic nature of the common law, the risk of unintended 
consequences, and the importance of stability, continuity and predictability, we should 
think twice before abolishing a fiction – if we can live with it. We should not seek to 
precipitately change the law from above in pursuit of theoretical purity. This argument 
is not new in this dissertation. It was first put forward in the last chapter and then 
considered earlier in this chapter.126 We concluded that while our basic bias was to 
prefer truth over fiction (all other things being equal), one of the arguments that could 
sway us in favour of retaining a fiction was the Conservative Argument. Why change 
the law, if we do not have to? Why sow disorder if there is no compelling reason to 
change the law? This argument found its strongest expression by the pen of Sir Edward 
Coke: 
The laws of England consist of three parts, the common law, customs, and Acts 
of  Parliament: for any fundamental point of the ancient common laws and 
customs of the realm, it is a maxim in policy, and a trial by experience, that the 
alteration of any of them is most dangerous; for that which hath been refined and 
perfected by all the wisest men in the former succession of ages, and proved and 
approved by continual experience to be good and profitable for the 
commonwealth, cannot without great hazard and danger be altered or changed.127 
It must be stressed, once more, that the Conservative Argument is not decisive. Nor 
should we read Coke to be saying that the common law must never change; only that it 
cannot be changed ‘without great hazard’. The Conservative Argument is not an 
argument for no change. It is an argument for caution, for a presumption of no change. 
It means that the starting position should be no change, but this starting position may 
give way to a compelling reason for change – that is, Manifest Injustice. The point is 
that when we have an existing fiction (that is Hard and Essential), the onus of proof lies 
with the opponent of the fiction. The opponent must point to a compelling reason (ie 
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Manifest Injustice) for abolishing the fiction. Therefore, and now we come to the point 
of this section, when assessing an existing fiction, we should omit the condition that a 
fiction must be the best way to achieve the aim. If we do not, even fictions which are 
Hard, Essential and give rise to no Manifest Injustice will have to show that there is no 
better alternative. This would contradict the Conservative Argument: instead of 
changing the law only for a compelling reason, we would have a system where the law 
is changed unless there is a compelling reason not to change it. This will make every 
existing fiction debatable and cause too much needless instability and uncertainty. 
There are too many problems in the law as it is for us to busy ourselves with changes 
for which there is no compelling reason.  
Of course, the Conservative Argument has no application when a judge is considering 
whether to create a new fiction (in dealing with a hard case). In this situation, the onus 
of proof lies with the proponent of the fiction. The proponent must point to a compelling 
reason for the creation of a new fiction. The proponent must show that the fiction is the 
only practical way to avoid Manifest Injustice.   
Now we see that we have actually split the Retention Test into two tests: one for existing 
fictions and one for novel fictions. On a moment’s reflection, however, it is a 
contradiction in terms to speak of retaining new fictions. It is better to say that we have 
two tests: a Retention Test and a Creation Test.  
 
VI. The Retention Test 
We have, at last, arrived at the full statement of the Retention Test: 
A fiction should be retained if it is Hard, Essential and does not cause Manifest 
Injustice.   
It will be recalled that the capitalised terms mean the following: 
A Hard Fiction is a factual issue consciously-decided irrespective of the facts. 
It is to be contrasted with a Soft Fiction, which is a factual issue decided by a 




An Essential Fiction is a fiction which represents the real basis for the result of 
the case. It is to be contrasted with a Jurisdictional Fiction, which merely 
determines the court in which the action is heard, and an Auxiliary Fiction, which 
amounts to no more than lip-service, meaningless text or verbal flourish.    
Manifest Injustice is an outcome which all reasonable people would agree is 
unjust.  
 
VII. The Creation Test 
 
A. Background and Statement 
This dissertation has mostly focussed on fictions that are or were in our law. We have 
not directed our attention to the fictions that are yet to be. The demise of the Old System 
has all but removed the need to create new fictions. The judicial fashion is decidedly 
anti-fiction.128 But fashions have been known to change and, even today, it cannot be 
ruled out that a judge, finding herself between a rock and a hard place, may be tempted 
by this old friend of her predecessors, the fiction. And so, as we bring to an end our 
examination of fictions of the past and present, we should look ahead to the fictions of 
the future. What guidance can this work give to a judge or policy-maker who is 
considering creating a legal fiction?  
It might be said that the Creation Test should not differ from the Retention Test. If we 
conclude that a fiction should be retained, is it not implied that it was right to create it 
in the first place? In point of fact, no; at least not in every case. This is because the 
Conservative Argument (let sleeping dogs lie) does not apply to fictions not yet created. 
One cannot conserve the non-existent. Hence, the deference we have shown to 
established fictions has no place here. In the absence of such toleration, and 
remembering our basic bias against fictions, the Creation Test should be more stringent 
than the Retention Test.  
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Such a test has already been foreshadowed.129 We now state the Creation Test fully:  
A fiction should be created if it is Hard, Essential and the only practical way to 
avoid Manifest Injustice.   
The defined terms have the same meaning as in the Retention Test.  
What, it may be asked, is the role of convenience in this Test? We know that 
convenience may justify the retention of an existing fiction. The Retention Test allows 
this to happen. Does the Creation Test make no allowance for convenience? It is 
conceivable that an inconvenience may be so oppressive that it amounts to Manifest 
Injustice – but then Manifest Injustice is covered. In any event, such cases must be 
exceptional. A new fiction should only be created to avoid an obviously unjust outcome.    
The Creation Test is more stringent than the Retention Test, reflecting our tolerance of 
existing law on the one hand and the basic bias against fictions on the other. Whereas 
the Retention Test demands of a fiction that it cause no Manifest Injustice (a negative 
filter), the Creation Test allows a fiction only to avoid Manifest Injustice (a positive 
filter). Certain existing fictions we will tolerate for the sake of stability and convenience, 
but new fictions we will allow only as a last resort.    
 
B. The Application of the Creation Test 
The Creation Test, as its name suggests, applies only where there is not a fiction in 
existence. This may occur if there is some technical or institutional barrier to applying 
a non-fictitious solution. An example of such a situation is where an Act of Parliament 
has an unintended and perverse consequence. Since the judge is unable to disapply the 
Act, the only way to achieve a just and sensible outcome is to create a legal fiction. This 
difficult choice – whether to create a new fiction – will be seen to advantage in the 
juxtaposition of two cases: Barnett v French (1980),130 where a fiction was rightly 
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created as a last resort, and Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services (2002),131 where a 
fiction was wisely eschewed. 
 
1.  Barnett v French: A Fiction rightly created  
This case is a prime example of legislation with a perverse effect. Some background for 
this curious case is necessary. When motor vehicles became common in the early 
twentieth century, so did traffic accidents. Parliament responded by regulating the use 
of motor vehicles and visiting criminal liability on offenders. Relevantly to our 
purposes, the Lights on Vehicles Act 1907 (now wholly repealed) enjoined ‘every 
person who shall cause or permit any vehicle to be in any street’ to install headlamps.132 
The Act also fixed a penalty for default.133 Aware that many vehicles were owned by 
the Crown, and mindful of the legal impossibility of prosecuting the Crown for 
permitting unroadworthy vehicles to be on the road, Parliament made special provision 
for vehicles in the service of the Crown. It was provided that the relevant department 
shall nominate an official, who would automatically (without personal fault) assume 
criminal liability under the Act.134 This scapegoating provision was presumably 
intended to ensure that the government was not above the law. In time, this mode of 
application to Crown vehicles was extended to numerous traffic offences.135  
For many years, public authorities did not nominate their officers to answer for traffic 
violations. Prosecuting authorities did not insist on such nominations.136 The law was 
not enforced. But this long honeymoon ended at just the wrong time for a certain HG 
Barnett, functionary of the Department of the Environment. As a senior civil servant, 
he was nominally responsible for a fleet of 3,500 vehicles. In May 1979, one of those 
vehicles was found to have a flat tyre. Barnett, the Department’s nominee, was charged 
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under the Road Traffic Act 1972,137 into which the scapegoating mechanism had been 
incorporated.138 He was convicted at first instance and appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
Donaldson LJ took pity on the bureaucrat, who, ‘[i]n the nature of things … can have 
no personal control over … vehicles, which are distributed all over the country’.139 But 
how was the man’s ‘legitimate grievance’ to be redressed, given the unambiguous force 
of the statute?140 ‘Solely because of the position which he holds, he is at risk of 
becoming the citizen with the longest record of motoring convictions ever known.’141 
After canvassing other options, the Court of Appeal finally settled on a fiction. It was 
important for the Court to fulfil the legislative purpose, while avoiding collateral 
casualties:  
If Parliament's obvious intentions are to be fulfilled, what is required is ‘a person’ 
who will stand in the shoes of the department for the purposes of criminal 
proceedings, but who cannot be prejudiced personally by performing this very 
important function.142 
Donaldson LJ, delivering the judgement of the Court, thought ‘it would be a grave 
reflection on the flexibility and ingenuity of a common law system if what is essentially 
a procedural problem were to be accepted as insoluble.’143 Happily, Donaldson LJ found 
a solution in one of the Old Fictions we described in the first chapter:  
A little over 300 years ago a not dissimilar problem arose in connection with 
proceedings for the recovery of land … Mr. John Doe came to the rescue, 
sometimes assisted by Mr. Richard Roe. These two gentlemen were conceived, 
in an intellectual rather than a biological sense, about the year 1656, and are said 
to have been the brain children of Rolle C.J. …  
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So far as we know, John Doe’s services to the law have thus far been confined 
to the civil jurisdiction of the courts and he has never been called upon to serve 
the Crown. However, we see no reason why he should be unable or unwilling 
to assist the courts with this new problem….  
If a ‘natural’ person is to be nominated, it is clear that only John Doe, Richard 
Roe or one of his relations fills the bill. John Doe would have been particularly 
well qualified in the instant case since the Department of the Environment is 
known to its intimates as ‘DoE.’ Pending any change in the law, we can see no 
legal, constitutional or ethical objection and very real and practical advantages 
if government departments were to nominate John Doe … 
Of course, the name John Doe is not unknown in real life, but we do not think 
that any confusion could arise between the departmental John Doe and any 
others. For the purposes of criminal records, people with the same name are 
usually distinguished by their date of birth and John Doe's is ‘circa 1657.’ We 
trust that our suggestion will not lead to John Doe acquiring any considerable 
criminal record, but if he does it will be for the government department 
concerned and not for John Doe to offer an explanation and he will have the 
consolation of having yet again rendered a signal service to the law.144 
The case of Barnett v French is a clever and justifiable creation of a legal fiction. It 
conforms with the Creation Test. It is a Hard Fiction because the existence of John Doe 
as nominee is factual, clearly false and knowingly so. It is an Essential Fiction because 
the nomination is the doctrinal basis of the outcome. It is also the only practical way to 
avoid Manifest Injustice, being the conviction of an innocent man. The judges did not 
hastily opt for fiction, but carefully assessed other alternatives. For example, the 
incorporation of a company, ‘Crown Defendants Ltd’, was ruled out because ‘there 
would be considerable difficulty in drafting the company’s principal objects’.145 
Another solution was that the Department would only nominate people actually 
culpable. Interestingly, the Court rejected this solution because it would have involved 
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the Department trying the issue of guilt. The scapegoating, we remember, was 
automatic: the nominee was deemed responsible.146 Other solutions were also 
considered.147 Obvious to remark, the Court could not change the statute, which 
required a nomination. Fiction was the only practical way to avoid Manifest Injustice 
while fulfilling Parliament’s intention: a conviction was recorded against a government 
nominee, but no innocent people were harmed in the process. The government nominee 
was in any event nominally guilty rather than guilty for personal fault. He was 
nominally guilty because the Crown could not be. What did it matter that the nominal 
person was not a real person? The nominee was just a substitute for the Crown anyway. 
This was an acceptable creation of a legal fiction.   
 
2. Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services: A Fiction rightly avoided 
This case, concerning the scourge of asbestos, was a hard case par excellence. Asbestos 
is a fibrous material, used in construction. Inhalation of the fibres may cause 
mesothelioma, an incurable cancer of the lung. It is understood that, while longer 
exposure to asbestos increases the risk of contracting the disease, the disease is not 
caused by the accumulation of exposure (as sunburn is caused by cumulative exposure 
to the sun), but by a particular intake of fibres (as road injuries are caused by a particular 
accident, not by cumulative exposure to the road).148 This medical fact was crucial in 
the instant case because the claimants had all been exposed to asbestos in the service of 
several employers. It was found that all employers breached their duty of care by 
exposing the claimants to asbestos, but there was no way to know which of the negligent 
employers exposed each claimant to the specific fibres that caused the disease.   
This was a seemingly insurmountable difficulty,149 for it had been a cardinal rule of 
causation (of physical harm) that the claimant must prove that the harm would not have 
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occurred but for the defendant’s tort.150 Two previous cases had made inroads into that 
principle.151 Crucially, however, these did not involve multiple potential tortfeasors. 
The civil standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. While it was clear that one of 
the employers must have been responsible for the deadly exposure, the probability that 
any single employer was responsible was less than 50% (or just unknowable). If the 
Court did not retreat from the cardinal rule, all defendants would get off scot-free. The 
House of Lords was confronted with a judicial Sophie’s Choice: sell out or fall into 
disrepute. In either case, the English law of causation could not survive as it stood.  
In the event, the House of Lords chose what most people would accept was the lesser 
evil. It created a narrowly-circumscribed exception for mesothelioma cases of this sort. 
Under this ‘modified approach to proof of causation’,152  it was sufficient for the 
claimants to prove that each employer had materially increased the risk of illness.153  
Importantly for our purposes, the House of Lords toyed with the idea of solving the 
evidentiary problem (proof of causation) by a legal fiction. Instead of formally changing 
the law to fit the case, the Appellate Committee could have simply ‘inferred’ or imputed 
proof of probability or downright ‘found’ it on the facts. It would not have been the first 
time such a thing was done. But the House expressly rejected this option: 
Lord Wilberforce … wisely deprecated resort to fictions and it seems to me 
preferable, in the interests of transparency, that the courts’ response to the special 
problem presented by cases such as these should be stated explicitly. I prefer to 
recognise that the ordinary approach to proof of causation is varied than to resort 
to the drawing of legal inferences inconsistent with the proven facts.154 
It is submitted that their Lordships were right. This decision is consistent with the 
Creation Test. A strained inference would have been a Soft Fiction, which is anathema 
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Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL) 6 (Lord Wilberforce), 8-9 (Lord Simon), 12 (Lord Salmon); cf Wilsher v 
Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074 (HL) 1090 (Lord Bridge). 
152 Fairchild (n 131) [2] (Lord Bingham). 
153 ibid [2], [34] (Lord Bingham), [42] (Lord Nicholls), [47] (Lord Hoffmann), [108] (Lord Hutton), 
[158] (Lord Rodger). 




to both Retention and Creation Tests. A clear factual finding in defiance of the factual 
uncertainty would have been a Hard Fiction. Even so, it would not have been the only 
practical way to solve the problem. So much is proved by the result of the case. A 
narrow exception was created in lieu of a fiction. More than a decade after that 
momentous decision, no negative consequences have been discerned. For our purposes, 
Fairchild illustrates how the Creation Test correctly prevents the creation of fictions.    
We can see that the Creation Test will only be satisfied where there is some constraint 
which prevents the judge from changing the law. Without wishing to limit the scope of 
the Creation Test, the constraint may take the form of legislation (as we saw in Barnett 
v French), binding precedent or impracticality.    
It is difficult to see how the Creation Test can ever be satisfied when the decision 
whether to create a fiction is made by legislators. Parliament is sovereign, meaning it 
faces no technical or institutional barriers (except its own procedures, which can 
themselves be changed by Parliament155). 
 
VIII. The Acceptance Test 
Now that both the Retention and Creation Tests have been articulated, it is possible to 
merge them into a single flowchart. This flowchart, shown below, is the Acceptance 
Test.   
 
  
                                                          





















The introduction to this chapter promised an Acceptance Test in three stages. At stage 
one, we asked what kind of test we wanted. The answer was a test of narrow discretion, 
aiming at fiction minimisation. At stage two, we scrutinised the motives for fictions, 
only to conclude that there were fewer motives than commonly supposed – justice and 
convenience – and that both were legitimate justifications for fictions. At stage three, 
we inferred the variables in the Acceptance Test from our previous analyses of fictions. 
The previous chapter was specifically prescriptive in that it considered a number of 
specific fictions and recommended retention or abolition. This chapter offers a general 
prescription. It presents a pair of tests, the Retention and Creation Tests, united in an 
Acceptance Test in flowchart form, which can be applied to any fiction.      
The flowchart, and this chapter, may be reduced to three propositions: (i) the only 
acceptable fictions under any circumstances are Hard and Essential; (ii) no fiction 
should be retained unless it is Hard, Essential and does not cause Manifest Injustice; 
and (iii) no fiction should be created unless it is Hard, Essential and the only practical 
way to avoid Manifest Injustice.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Latin phrase ‘Deus ex machina’ literally means ‘God from a machine’. The Latin is 
itself a translation of the Greek ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός. It described a device of ancient 
stagecraft. At the end of a play, with the plot seemingly at an impasse, a god would descend 
onto the stage and solve all the problems. Apparently introduced by Aeschylus (died 456 
BC), this miraculous dénouement was achieved by a crane which lowered an actor dressed 
as the deity. Hence ‘God from a machine’.1           
Despite the reputation of its supposed inventor, Deus ex machina is now a byword for 
creative inadequacy. It has come to mean any abrupt and convenient intervention serving 
to rescue a hopeless situation. It is in this wide sense that the phrase is applied to legal 
fictions in the title of this work. Unable to resolve a case in conformity with the facts and 
accepted rules, the judge, like the playwright, gives up, as it were. He summons a higher 
power to abolish both facts and rules – and produce a happy ending. Deus ex machina.     
* * * 
The story of the legal fiction in England may be retold in brief. Fictions have been in use 
in the common law almost since its inception in the second half of the twelfth century. At 
that time, fictions were essentially procedural, existing mostly in the form of a non-
traversable pleading, but also as withdrawn pleadings, collusion or bad evidence. 
Regardless of their mode of operation, fictions had one of three effects on the law around 
them. Some were what we called Jurisdictional, affecting only the choice of court. Others 
were Auxiliary, to wit, meaningless text. Still others were Essential, meaning they changed 
the substance of the action and formed the basis for the decision. Fiction-making was then, 
as now, motivated primarily by justice and convenience.  
                                                            
1 Chris Baldick, Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (4th edn, OUP 2015); Thomas G Chondros and others, 
‘“Deus-Ex-Machina” Reconstruction in the Athens Theater of Dionysus’ (2013) 67 Mechanism and 
Machine Theory 172, 172. 
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Fictions multiplied and flourished, especially from the late fifteenth century, owing to the 
ossification of the forms of action and the ever-mounting burdensomeness of the process. 
Fiction was sometimes the only way to reform the law – and in many cases did. Some of 
the old common law’s most recognisable actions – trover, ejectment, money had and 
received – were based on fictions. 
Inevitably, the backlash came. The nineteenth century, for most a romantic age, was for 
the law an age of reason. The Old System with its antiquated writs and fictions was 
rationalised in a series of legislative reforms. In this new order fictions supposedly had no 
place. Parliament gave them marching orders. After many years’ good service, it seemed 
they were dishonourably discharged. The old and the weak, the Jurisdictional and Auxiliary 
Fictions, obeyed. However, the strong – the Essential Fictions – had been deeply 
entrenched in doctrine, and were not successfully cashiered. They survived the great 
Victorian rationalisation. Some of these, like quasi-contract, were individually replaced 
later. Others, like estoppel, are still with us.  
After these shocks, English law welcomed the new century shorn of forms and formality. 
As the law changed, so did the fictions. No longer immanent in the procedure of the courts, 
fictions ceased to be statements that could not be proved or disproved. For this reason, they 
were not even obviously fictions. As the fiction became more elusive and more arguable, 
its scope grew and diversified.  
It became necessary, for us, to distinguish between Hard Fictions, Soft Fictions and non-
fictions. For which purpose we reviewed the intellectual history of the fiction. We defended 
the fiction, according to our lights, from the overly-sceptical on one side and the overly-
credulous on the other. As already stated, the definitions we settled upon do not profess to 
be correct in an absolute sense; for no conception of fiction is correct absolutely. They are, 
it is argued, analytically superior because they avoid the problems of other definitions. This 
precise understanding of the fiction in the modern law was a gateway to a rigorous 
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evaluation of current fictions. Furthermore, it enabled the fulfilment of the undertaking 
declared in the introduction.   
* * * 
The introduction to this work counted three shortcomings in the literature concerning legal 
fictions. First, it alleged, there was confusion regarding the definition. Seemingly 
irreconcilable views prevented any consensus from coalescing around one concept of the 
fiction. We have sought to dispel the confusion and cement a consensus by distinguishing 
between the Hard Fiction and the Soft Fiction. This solution preserves analytic precision 
while acknowledging the versatility of the device. Still, this is not a free-for-all: both types 
of fiction recognised here have clear boundaries and exclude some uses of the term.        
Second, the introduction complained that the treatment of fictions in the literature was 
either too abstract or too particular. This paper deals with 25 specific fictions but also paints 
an overall picture of the role of the legal fiction as a device in private law. It is at once 
general and specific. It uses specific fictions to reach conclusions about fictions in general.    
The third deficiency identified in the introduction is that the literature is too thin on 
practical advice. This paper makes specific recommendations regarding a number of 
surviving fictions. These recommendations, along with other useful information, may be 
seen in the table on page 244. Most importantly, the Acceptance Test for fictions is a 
practical answer to a practical problem. It is shown as a flowchart on page 270.  
* * * 
Finally, the introduction foretold a ‘new system for dealing with legal fictions’. Let it be 
re-capitulated here. It consists, first and foremost, in a precise understanding of the concept 
of the legal fiction (the Nature Classification: Hard Fiction, Soft Fiction, non-fiction); 
secondarily, in distinguishing between Essential Fictions, which inform the decision and 
may still have a role to play in the last resort, and Jurisdictional and Auxiliary Fictions, 
which have no rational role or justification (the Effect Classification); and of the other 
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elements of the Acceptance Test, which complete this new system for dealing with legal 
fictions.     
This Acceptance Test is the answer to the core question which has driven this paper from 
the beginning: Which fictions should we accept and which reject? It is the thesis of this 
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